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     This dissertation research makes contributions towards the evaluation of developing 
Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) technologies through the application of decision 
analysis (DA) techniques.  ATR technology development decisions should rely not only 
on the measures of performance (MOPs) associated with a given ATR classification 
system (CS), but also on the expected measures of effectiveness (MOEs) of the potential 
end product.    
     The purpose of this research is to improve the decision-making process for ATR 
technology development.  The basis of the research is a decision analysis framework that 
allows decision-makers in the ATR community to synthesize the performance measures, 
costs, and characteristics of each ATR system with the preferences and values of both the 
ATR evaluators and the warfighters.  The inclusion of the warfighter’s perspective in the 
decision-making process is important in that it has been proven that basing ATR CS 
comparisons solely upon performance characteristics does not necessarily ensure superior 
operational effectiveness.  The process for constructing an evaluator and warfighter DA 
framework is described.  The methodology also provides a means for capturing the 
relationship between MOPs and MOEs via a combat model.  An example scenario 
demonstrates how ATR CSs may be compared.  Sensitivity analysis is performed to 
demonstrate the robustness of the MOP to value score and MOP to MOE translations.  A 
multinomial selection procedure is introduced to account for the random nature of the 

















1.1  General Discussion 
 
 This dissertation research makes contributions towards the evaluation of automatic 
target recognition (ATR) classification systems (CSs).  Though ATR technology has been 
under development for quite some time, ATR CS evaluation theory is in its infancy.  No 
generally accepted methodology exists for evaluating multiple ATR CSs for the sake of 
comparison.  One aspect of the difficulty lies in the magnitude of the associated set of 
performance measures, costs, and system characteristics for each ATR CS.  This set is 
often overwhelming and generally leads to a non-dominating solution within ATR CS 
comparisons.  Thus, it is necessary to fuse the subjective preferences of the various 
decision-makers with the objective realizations of the given performance measures, costs, 
and system characteristics when making decisions which affect the lifecycle of ATR 











1.2  Motivation 
 
 1.2.1  ATR Technology Evaluation Interest.   
 Improving ATR technology evaluation is of interest to the Sensors Directorate of the 
Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL/SN) for its application to unsolved problems 
associated within the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) Benchmarking 
(DUSD-BM) program.  The decision situation involves the evaluation of several ATR 
CSs, each having multiple performance measures with which to compare, throughout the 
life cycle of the DUSD-BM program.  Decisions made throughout the program depend on 
the ability to evaluate a single CS or to compare the performance of several CSs in a fair 
and useful manner.   
     This research is also of interest to the Requirements Directorate of Air Combat 
Command (HQ ACC/DRSA), which is determining the role and applications of Combat 
Identification (CID) systems.  Though not focused solely on ATR technologies, 
evaluators developing the Targets Under Trees (TUT) program are interested in 
ascertaining the preferences of the warfighter, which is an important part of this research.  
Finding the relationship between ATR measures of performance (MOPs) and operational 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) is of great importance to each party.   
     1.2.2  Current ATR System Development Methodology.   
     Automatic Target Recognition is a processing problem where a classification system, 
typically in the form of a pattern recognition and classification algorithm, ‘examines’ an 
image to detect and classify objects of interest.  Various aerial platforms employ various 




millimeter wave, or laser radar systems, to collect images for defined military purposes 
(56).  Whether the mission is reconnaissance or targeting, the capacity and capability of 
these platforms to produce data is overwhelming.  Thus, a need for automatically 
exploiting the abundance of images grows.  Currently, human analysis far exceeds the 
capabilities of automated ATR systems.  It is highly desirable to improve automated ATR 
capabilities, which would increase analytic capacity in military intelligence systems as 
well as permit ATR systems to be employed on unmanned platforms.  Automatic Target 
Recognition is widely acknowledged as a critical military capability (20).   
     The objective of an ATR CS is to use the measurable aspects, or features, of a target 
object located in an image to automatically detect and correctly classify a specific target 
type, or class, in a real world environment amid various other objects.  An ATR CS 
analyzes the image to identify particular regions of interest (ROIs) and to then classify 
whether the ROI is a target or not.  Typically, the targets are difficult to separate both 
from normal environmental objects and objects with target-like signatures found within 
the image.   
     ATR CSs generally fall into three classes: statistical pattern recognition, neural 
networks, or model-based recognition.  All ATR CSs have a number of quantifiable 
evaluation measures, such as ATR CS performance, robustness, estimate accuracy, 
employment doctrine, and cost.  In general, these measures are not assessed in total, but 
specific measures are selected when considering decisions for a specific program. Of 
noteworthy importance is the method of dealing with the information concerning the 
class of targets to be classified.  A typical DUSD-BM ATR CS differs from previous 




the CS is a model-based approach that uses computer-generated templates for classifying 
a particular image (7).  This method requires a smaller data library of stored target images 
(7).   
     Within the ATR research community, a target is an object in an image that is to be 
found, or discriminated, by an ATR CS, but not necessarily destroyed (55).  Thus, 
friendly objects, such as the American M1 Abrams main battle tank (MBT), may be 
labeled as a target in ATR scenarios.  Clutter refers to objects detected within areas of 
unknown or untracked objects, such as fields or forests, which presumably contain no 
targets (2).  Confusers, on the other hand, are objects similar in size and appearance to the 
targets that are tracked during ATR testing, but are not to be detected by the ATR CS (2).  
These non-targets are used to confuse the CS with a target-like signal.  One important 
concept is that when clutter objects are made known, or truthed, during the testing phase, 
they are considered confuser items and are included in the non-target calculations (55).  
The performance of an ATR CS against non-target objects provides insight into the 
algorithm’s sensitivity of detection. 
     The purpose of the DUSD-BM program is to evaluate a wide variety of ATR 
programs to produce an end product that maximizes operational effectiveness.  Several 
different ATR technologies have been developed through several research programs, 
including the Moving and Stationary Target Acquisition and Recognition (MSTAR), the 
Non-Cooperative Target Identification (NCTI) and the Air-to-Ground Imaging (AGRI) 
programs (55).  Since these programs approach similar problems in different ways or 
approach different problems in the same way, the challenge of the DUSD-BM program is 




utility and robustness while striving to optimize the associated MOEs of each ATR 
technology.    
 
 
1.3  Problem Statement 
 
 
     Concerning the theories behind the objective evaluation of ATR CSs, there are several 
limitations.  The first problem stems from the limitations found when testing ATR 
systems.  Assessment of operational performance is difficult due to the small sample size 
of enemy systems and the regulations governing testing site operations.  Both hinder 
accurate recreation of operational conditions during ATR testing.  Next, the number of 
performance measures is often difficult to manage.  Thus, a subset of MOPs is typically 
used to evaluate ATR CSs.  Also, the objective evaluation of ATR systems via MOPs 
generally leads to a non-dominating solution.  Most importantly, it can be shown that 
optimizing a set of ATR performance characteristics does not necessarily lead to an 
optimized solution in terms of operational effectiveness (60).     
     Consider two ATR systems being compared using the performance data listed in 
Table 1.1.  The two systems (A and B) are based upon a declaration and reporting fusion 
concept between multiple sensors.  System A declares a system when both sensors agree 
at a target’s type level, i.e. both sensors claim that a target is a T-72 main battle tank 
(MBT).  System B uses a fusion concept at the target’s Friend/Enemy/Neutral (FEN) 
level.  For System B to declare a target as Friendly or Neutral, it requires both sensors to 
agree.  However, for a target to be declared as Enemy or Ambiguous, at least one sensor 




the MOPs to declare a dominating system based upon performance.  While System A has 
a superior FEN identification confidence rate to System B, it has an inferior FEN 
declaration rate.  In other words, System A has high confidence in its declarations, but it 
does not make as many declarations as System B.  Arguably, System B is the better 
overall system due to its high declaration percentage for all targets.     
 
Table 1.1  Measures of Performance for Hypothetical ATR Systems (60). 
MOPs System A System B 
FEN Identification Declaration Rate < 40% > 60% 
FEN Identification Confidence Rate > 99% > 90% 
Class/Type Identification Declaration Rate < 40% 0% 
Class/Type Identification Confidence Rate > 99% N/A 
Critical Error Rate 0.1% to 1% 0.6% to 2% 




      However, when the performance characteristics of these systems are introduced to a 
combat model, the MOEs, listed in Table 1.2, indicate a different conclusion.  
Operationally, use of System A results in a shorter conflict with fewer allied fatalities, 
more enemies killed per day, and a lower incidence and rate of fratricide.  Thus, simple 









Table 1.2  Measures of Effectiveness for Hypothetical ATR Systems (60). 
MOEs System A System B 
Length of Conflict (days) 80 100 
Friends Killed (day/conflict) 3 / 240 5 / 500 
Neutrals Killed (day/conflict) 0 / 0 0 / 0 
Enemy Killed (day/conflict) 25 / 2000 20 / 2000 
Fratricide (day/conflict) 0.35 / 28 0.4 / 40 




      Therefore, the problem with evaluating ATR systems, especially for the sake of 
comparison, is that MOPs do not directly translate into MOEs and that subjective 
preferences must be incorporated at some point within the decision-making process.  The 
major thrust of this research is to create a practical evaluation methodology within the 
ATR technology research and development system that incorporates the subjective 
preference structure of each decision-maker, includes the objectivity of each pertinent 
MOP, and exploits the relationship between ATR performance characteristics and 
operational effectiveness.  
 
1.4  Organization of Dissertation 
 
 
     The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter II provides a 
literature review of current ATR evaluation theory and techniques.  Chapter III 
introduces the implementation of the decision analysis (DA) techniques and assumptions 
required for the proposed evaluation methodology.  Two separate DA frameworks are 
constructed: one takes the perspective of the ATR evaluator, the other views evaluation 




techniques may be implemented when comparing several different ATR systems at the 
ATR evaluator decision-making level.  Chapter III also details how MOPs can be 
translated into MOEs via a combat model.  Chapter IV steps through the process of 
analyzing the outputs of the two decision frameworks via an application using three 
notional ATR CSs.  Chapter V provides an analysis of the sensitivity of the DA 
frameworks.  A linear regression approach, which utilizes a surrogate combat model, 
creates a differentiable response surface of the value scores from which the partial 
differentiations of individual MOPs may be calculated as to identify the salient features 
of the MOP set.  Chapter VI introduces a multinomial selection procedure as a means for 
a decision-maker to compare several different ATR CSs and make defensible selections 
by accounting for the inherent variation found within MOP sampling and by associating a 
level of confidence to the value and utility scores generated through both DA 
frameworks.  Research contributions are summarized and future directions are 
highlighted in Chapter VII. 
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2.1  Overview 
 
 
     This chapter reviews the pertinent literature on the two main topics required to 
complete this dissertation research—performance measure assessment and performance 
measure comparison for ATR CSs.  Much of the discussion on performance measure 
assessment focuses on air-to-ground ATR research, particularly performance measure 
assessment within the MSTAR program.  Though the performance measure names and 
assessment methods may differ between ATR programs, the general assessment and 
comparison concepts still apply. 
 
 
2.2.  Automatic Target Recognition Performance Measure Assessment. 
 
 
     2.2.1  Background.   
     To understand the problem at hand, it is imperative to grasp the concepts and 
implications of the several measures of performance used within the confines of ATR.  
Model-based ATR CSs are developed on a given set of training conditions and then 
tested with a set of testing conditions, which are not comprised entirely of the same 
training conditions.  The evaluation of CS performance lends insight into the possible 
operational environment performance of the CS.  Operational conditions (OCs) for 
DUSD-BM ATR CSs can be viewed as falling into one of three categories: 
environmental, sensor, and target (4).  Environmental conditions, such as revetments and 
adjacency to other targets, reflect the various backgrounds and obstructions that will 
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make a target difficult to find.  Sensor conditions consist of the variation used in the 
aerial platforms during tests, such as depression angle to target and sensor gain factor.  
Target OCs include the multitude of variations that a specific target type may assume.  
These variations to the target SAR image signature may include the different settings for 
articulated parts (turrets or doors), various external attachments (fuel drums or tools), or 
the different mission setting of a specific vehicle (rescue, command post, or personnel 
carrier) (4).       
     The objective of evaluation is to measure CS performance by constructing and using 
valid performance measures.  With the limiting test scenarios used for training ATR CSs, 
there is considerable thought on what the collected performance measures actually 
measure and what inferences may be drawn from them.  Performance measure validity is 
fulfilled through the following evaluation concepts: accuracy, robustness, extensibility, 
and utility (54,58).  Accuracy refers to the absence of a bias or error of a given CS, under 
the conditions of its training (54,58).  Thus, if a CS is not accurate under test conditions, 
then it is unlikely that the CS will be accurate outside the training conditions (58).  A 
robust system refers to how well a CS performs outside of the training conditions and 
outside of its modeled conditions (58).  Thus, robustness provides information as to how 
an ATR CS will perform under operational conditions (58).  Extensibility is the 
performance of a CS outside of the training conditions but within the modeled conditions 
(58).  The extensibility of a CS tells a decision maker valuable information about 
operational performance by giving insight into the payoff of the model-driven 
components of the CS.  Finally, CS utility is simply the performance of the system under 
operational conditions (58).  Though this is the evaluation concept of most interest and 
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relevance, it is generally the most difficult to obtain (54,58).  Figure 2.1 provides an 
abstract, graphical representation of the relationships between testing, training, 
operational, and modeled conditions.  Figure 2.2 does the same for accuracy, robustness, 
extensibility, and utility. 
Figure 2.1  Venn Diagram of Modeled, Training, and Testing Conditions (58). 
Figure 2.2  Accuracy, Robustness, Utility, and Extensibility (58). 
- Test Data Points















     For a generic ATR application, performance is typically assessed using a set of 
probabilities (3).  For the DUSD-BM program, the performance metrics of interest 
include: the probability of detection (pD), probability of identification (pID), probability of 
correct classification (pCC), and probability of false alarm (pFA).  Closely related to pFA is 
the false alarm rate (FAR), which is the ratio of the number of false alarms to the area 
being examined by the sensor.  Another method for assessing CS performance is the use 
of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves.  ROC curves are commonly used for 
summarizing the performance of imperfect diagnostic systems, especially in ATR and 
biomedical research (7).  Finally, new performance measures can be created through the 
synthesis or manipulation of existing performance measures.     
     2.2.2 Confusion Matrices.   
     Possibly the most succinct and popular way of reporting classification results of ATR 
CSs is the use of confusion matrices, also known as a discrimination event matrix.  The 
matrix is a square grid with a single row and a single column corresponding to each 
category defined in the data set.  The rows refer to the truth membership of each 
category, while the columns refer to the predicted, or classified, membership.  The (i,j) 
cell in the matrix is the number of predicted classifications on category j that correspond 
to the truth source of category i.  Confusion matrices may also include the relative 
proportions for each cell by dividing the contents of the cell by the total number of 
objects that belong to that row, or truth.  Another method of presenting a confusion 
matrix is to combine all targets and non-targets together into a 2x2 composite confusion 
matrix.  Figure 2.3 depicts the form of a standard confusion matrix and identifies several 
relationships and terms associated with confusion matrices within the fields of pattern 
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recognition, biostatistics, and ATR research.  Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide numerical 
examples of confusion matrices.   
     The strengths of confusion matrices are the ability to determine the power of a 
diagnostic system over the entire data set and to identify where deficiencies are 
occurring.  Confusion matrices, however, do not provide a measure of effectiveness for 
comparing multiple CSs and only visualize CS performance at a single decision threshold 
point (7). 
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     2.2.3 Probability Performance Measures.   
     In order to evaluate how an ATR performs in the real world where the target and non-
target densities are unknown, use of statistical measures that estimate performance 
against the known target densities within a testing environment is necessary.  
Probabilistic performance measures quantify how an ATR CS performs on a given data 
set.  The probabilistic measures detailed in this section are specific to the MSTAR 
program, but the concepts apply to all DUSD-BM programs.    
     The utility of a probability of success measure depends on the scenario in which it is 
used.  The most basic of the several probability measures, the probability of detection, 
designated pD, is simply the probability that a certain number of the total number of 
known targets are detected by the ATR in a test scenario (2).  AFRL defines correct 
detection as correctly declaring that a target in a region of interest (ROI) is, in fact, a 
target.  Next, the probability of correct classification (pCC) is the probability that an ATR 
detects a target and associates the target with the appropriate target type.  AFRL/SN 
defines correct classification as correctly classifying a detected target as a member of its 
actual target class regardless of the specific target type.  For instance, if the ATR detects 
what is known to be a T72 MBT and classifies it as a member of the ‘tank’ class of 
targets, then the result is a correct classification.  Notice that pCC is conditional on 
whether or not the target is actually detected (2).  Thus, the fact that a target is not 
detected does not factor into the correct classification calculation.  The same can be said 
for the next probability, the probability of correct identification (pID).  Correct 
identification, a subset of correct classification, is when an ATR correctly declares the 
specific target type of a detected target.  Thus, were the ATR to detect the T72 and 
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correctly identify it as a T72 MBT, the result is considered a correct identification.  Such 
events are captured in the pID metric (2).  A final probability measure attempts to capture 
the number of incorrect decisions, or false alarms, made by the ATR.  False alarms 
typically occur when an ATR declares a non-target, or confuser, as a target.  The 
probability of false alarm, pFA, is the ratio of detected non-targets to the total number of 
known, or truthed, non-targets.  The following figures provide a visual demonstration of 
how these probability performance measures are calculated. 
 
 
Figure 2.4  Graphical Example of Probability of Detection, pD (3). 
 
 






























Figure 2.6  Graphical Example of Probability of False Alarm, pFA (3). 
 
     A simple, numeric example will provide insight into the calculation of the 
aforementioned performance measures.  In the example, there are 14 known T72 tanks, 
14 M1 tanks, 17 Scud missile launchers, and 41 non-targets (confusers).  Notice that the 
T72 and the M1 both belong to the MBT class while the Scud launcher is a member of 
the Mobile Rocket Launcher System (MRLS) target class.  The following confusion 
matrices provide the fabricated DUSD-BM results.   
 
 
Table 2.1  Example Confusion Matrix. 
        Classified As (Reported) 
  T72 M1 SCUD Non-Target 
Actual T72 12 2 0 0 
(Truth) M1 2 8 3 1 
 SCUD 0 0 7 10 
 Non-Target 0 1 5 35 
 
 
Table 2.2  Example Composite Confusion Matrix. 
        Classified As (Reported) 




















     Thus, this particular ATR reported that the image contained 14 T72s, 11 M1s, 15 Scud 
missile launchers, and 46 non-target objects.  The following equations provide the 
calculations of the given performance measures: 
 





































etstasdeclaredconfusersofnumberpFA        (2.4) 
 
     While the example illustrates how the performance measures are calculated, there is 
too little information to gain an overall appreciation of the ATR.  For instance, the area 
covered, terrain type, mission type, or target density is not given.  Also, no performance 
baseline for an acceptable ATR is mentioned.  Perhaps in the same setting the average 
ATR may have a superior performance.  Finally, these performance measures are 
estimates of the true performance measures for the given ATR.  The ATR may perform 
well on such a small data set, but may not over a much larger, more realistic target 
setting.  The practice of placing confidence intervals around these point estimates will be 
mentioned later in the performance measure evaluation section.   
     Finally, consideration should be given to the use of probabilistic performance 
measures between ATR studies.  There are several different ways to compute and label 
these measures since there are several different ATR programs with differing objectives.  
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For instance, the NCTI ATR program incorporates the use of a probabilistic measure 
called pND, since NCTI classifiers also declare a No Decision category in addition to the 
target and non-target declaration decision (3).  Also, DUSD-BM performance measures, 
like pCC and pID, are conditional on the detection results of the CS, while NCTI metrics 
are not conditional (3).  Therefore, although this large variety of measures can be reduced 
to a small independent set, caution must be used when comparing probabilistic measures 
across ATR studies. 
     2.2.4  Rate Measures.   
     A common measure used in ATR evaluation is called the false alarm rate (FAR).  This 
rate is merely the number of false alarms in clutter divided by the area of the imagery 
evaluated by the ATR (2).  This measure offers a glimpse into the clutter density of a 
given area and the propensity of a given ATR CS to detect non-target objects.  Figure 2.7 
depicts how FAR is typically calculated.  The different uses of this metric change the 
ways in which it is measured.  For instance, when measuring the FAR for forward-
looking infrared data, the FAR may be computed as false alarms per frame or per second 
(55).  The strength of the FAR metric is that it is transportable to the area to be observed.  
In other words, if the FAR of a desert-like environment is quantified through testing, then 
when an ATR CS performs in a previously untested desert location, the FAR should be 
similar to the estimated FAR (55).  In fact, since they rely on environmental and sensor 
aspects rather than scenario and target assumptions, estimated FARs are likely to be the 
most reliable and operationally sound metrics that the AFRL COMPASE Center have 
gathered (55).  Since the pFA and FAR performance are related and much of the literature, 
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particularly the extensive medical literature, focuses on pFA, the discussion within this 
report generally uses the pFA metric for false alarm performance.  
 
Figure 2.7  Graphical Example of False Alarm Rate, FAR (3). 
 
     2.2.5  Confidence Intervals.   
     Metrics such as the probabilistic measures are actually point estimates of a true 
performance measure of a given CS.  The calculation of a single number for a given 
performance measure is insufficient in that it ignores the amount of data used to produce 
the quantitative value of the measure.  For example, an ATR designer may suggest that a 
given system may have a pD of 0.756 (as in Table 2.2).  However, since the ATR CS is 
tested on a finite set of data, the true pD is probably not 0.756 (7).  Instead, the true 
parameter probably lies within an interval centered about the point estimate.  This 
confidence interval, constructed from statistical assumptions and the sample size of the 
test, allows the ATR designer to make certain inferences about the experimental 












     The general procedure for constructing a confidence interval is to first postulate an 
underlying distribution.  Distributions that are frequently used in the area of ATR 
evaluation are the Gaussian, Binomial, and Poisson distributions (7).  The following 
example illustrates how a confidence interval can be obtained about the point estimate of 
a given performance measure. 
      Suppose an ATR is designed and tested on an independent sample.  For each ROI 












η      (2.5) 
with associated probabilities: P(0) = 1-p and P(1) = p.  This means that η is a Bernoulli 
random variable.  For a series of independent, identical trials, the Binomial random 
variable Y is the number of successful classifications in n trials (41).  Thus, 
Y~binomial(n,p) where:  









= )1()(     (2.6) 
and the expectation and variance of Y are given by: 
     npYE =)(     and    )1()( pnpYVar −= .     (2.7) 
Using the definition of the probability of detection can make an unbiased estimate for p, 
the true probability of detection: 
  
n
Yp =ˆ  .       (2.8) 
Now, p̂  is an unbiased estimator for p, so: 
pYE
nn
YEpE === )(1)()ˆ( .     (2.9) 
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and the usual method of substituting sample values for unknown parameters in the 
expression for the variance, one can approximate (1-α) confidence intervals for p̂ as: 











α      (2.11) 
where the normal approximation is used (assuming large test sample size; n > 30) for the 
binomial.  For the example above in Table 2.2 (pD = 0.756 and n = 45), with α = 0.05, the 
following 95% confidence interval is generated for the point estimate: 
=p̂ 0.756 ± 0.1255   or   0.6305 ≤ p̂  ≤ 0.8815.   (2.12) 
     The strength of confidence interval utilization is that it provides a measure of the 
accuracy of the evaluation process.  Thus, small sample sizes propagate large intervals 
about a point estimate in which there is little confidence about the location of the true 
parameter.  Large sample sizes tend to narrow the intervals about a point estimate and 
provide a certain amount of confidence based on the underlying assumptions made about 
the distribution of the data.  Confidence intervals allow the comparison of multiple CSs 
under the same conditions by quantifying the possible variance in CS performance.   
      Confidence intervals are limited in that they provide information on how a CS is 
expected to perform in the future under the same conditions (7).  Confidence intervals are 
not guaranteed to be robust over many different scenarios.  Thus, if any of the operational 
conditions of a given ATR test are changed, the confidence intervals about a performance 
measure point estimate will not be valid over the new conditions. 
 
2-14 
     2.2.6  Hypothesis Testing.   
     Hypothesis testing and point estimation form the two branches of classical statistical 
inference (28).  Confidence intervals reveal insight into the strength of a point estimate.  
Hypothesis testing uses statistical evidence to justify or reject a suspected inference 
through the strength of a given point estimate.  In the typical language of hypothesis 
testing, the null hypothesis, denoted by H0, is a statement made about the given point 
estimate which is being evaluated.  For instance, the null hypothesis may state that the pD 
of a given ATR CS equals a certain value, e.g. H0: pD = 0.8.  The null hypothesis is 
usually tested against an alternative hypothesis, HA., which is typically the opposite of the 
null hypothesis.  Thus, an example of an alternative hypothesis would be HA: pD ≠ 0.8.  In 
order to test a hypothesis, a test of significance approach may be taken.  A hypothesis test 
uses a test statistic based upon a probability distribution.  For instance, a test statistic 





µ .     (2.13) 
The test statistic, Z0, may now be compared against the probability distribution of a 
standardized normal pdf, N(0,1).  An acceptance region can be thought of as the portion 
of the N(0,1) distribution that is suggested by a given acceptance parameter, generally 
given as an alpha (α) parameter.  If the test statistic lies within an acceptance region, the 
null hypothesis is accepted.  Otherwise, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted.   
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     Suppose that a given ATR CS has been tested against 45 known target objects and has 
correctly classified 34 as targets, resulting in a pD of 0.756 (using Table 2.2 as data).  The 
goal of hypothesis testing is to determine, given the above information, whether or not 
the ATR CS meets a designated pD goal for the system.  Further suppose that for an ATR 
CS to be eligible for evaluation continuance, a pD of 0.8 must be demonstrated.  The pD 
value (0.756) of the given CS suggests that this system should be removed from 
consideration of further study since it falls below 0.8.  However, if a hypothesis test is 
performed, the test statistic Z0 is formed as: 
H0  :  pD ≥ 0.8      (2.14) 













=      (2.16) 
where the test statistic is based upon the Binomial distribution, and p0 is the required pD 
performance value (0.8).  Calculating the test statistic and applying the result to the one-
sided hypothesis test (using α=0.1) provides the following: 
Z0 = -0.68723 > -ZA = -1.28.     (2.17) 
Thus, the null hypothesis is accepted (or fails to be rejected), which implies that there is 
no statistical evidence that the pD of the ATR CS fails to meet the pD requirement of 0.8.  
In fact, a pD point estimate value as low as 0.71376 would allow the null hypothesis to be 
accepted.  Figure 2.8 depicts the hypothesis rejection region (shaded) and the value of the 




Figure 2.8  Graphical Description of Hypothesis Testing Example (α=0.1). 
 
     Hypothesis testing provides a formal approach to the statistical evaluation of CSs.  
However, its weaknesses are similar to those of confidence intervals.  For example, 
confidence interval and hypothesis testing based on the Binomial distribution assumes a 
constant probability of success and a constant variance for all observations.  However, as 
an example of when hypothesis testing may not work in an ATR evaluation context, the 
classification performance of an ATR CS may be different for different targets at 
different aspect and depression angles.  Finally, accepting the null hypothesis does not 
mean that the hypothesis is correct.  The acceptance of a hypothesis simply means that no 
statistical evidence proves that the hypothesis is false.  Accepting a hypothesis is also 
referred to as failing to reject a hypothesis.  Therefore, inferences made with hypothesis 
testing must be used with caution, especially when making inferences about performance 
measures based on small sample sizes. 


















     2.2.7  Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve Performance Measures.   
     The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is an important technique in 
summarizing the power of imperfect diagnostic systems that attempt to detect a signal in 
noise (7,23,27,51,66).  An ROC curve describes the relationship between a diagnostic 
system’s sensitivity (probability of selecting true positives) and specificity (selecting true 
negatives) (66).  Though an ROC curve may model the outcomes for multiple alternatives 
or variable decision rules, only two-alternative, forced-decision (2AFC) ROC curves will 
be discussed here in the context of ATR CSs (27).  Figure 2.9 provides examples of ROC 
curves for imperfect diagnostic systems.  Note that the D(n,n) notation is explained in a 
subsequent section. 
 
Figure 2.9  Binormal 2AFC ROC Curves. 
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     The two alternatives typically used in an ATR CS decision-making context are the 
target and non-target classifications.  For the following examples, the distribution that 
represents the target signal will be designated sn (signal plus noise) while the non-target 
signal distribution will be labeled n (noise).  The term signal mentioned here is 
synonymous with the term score in the ATR context.  The response of the ATR classifier 
is restricted to the same alternatives: S denotes the event that the classifier reports a 
target, while N denotes the event that the classifier reports a non-target.   
     Since the objective of the problem at hand is to detect and correctly identify an 
observed signal (score), most probably degraded by noise, it is natural to investigate the 
concepts within signal detection theory.  Signal detection theory refers to the science 
behind the “process of detection and recognition of a wanted, or useful, signal that has 
been degraded by noise” (23).  Two separate concepts form the basis of signal detection 
theory: distribution theory and decision theory.  Distribution theory, of which ROC 
analysis is a subset, refers to the relationships between wanted signal (target) and noise 
(non-target) distributions.  Decision theory refers to the rules used in decision making 
that hope to satisfy some decision goal.  The aspects of decision theory that impact the 
ATR problem are handled by the ways in which the ATR CS measure and compare 
individual scores for each ROI.   
     In terms of distribution theory, the primary challenges to correctly classifying an 
object as a target or non-target are found in (1) the variability of the target and non-target 
ROI values (scores) when observed by an ATR sensor and (2) the tendency of the target 
score distribution to overlap the non-target score distribution, as seen in Figure 2.10.  For 
DUSD-BM ATR CSs, raw data is used to represent the distribution of target scores 
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empirically.  However, for ease of explanation, probability distribution functions (pdfs) 
will be used to represent the score distributions of targets and non-targets.  These pdfs are 
generally assumed to be Gaussian in the medical literature, which is sound theoretically 
due to the properties of the Central Limit Theorem and sound practically due to the ease 
of parameter manipulation (27).  ROC curves based upon two normal distributions 
representing the populations of interest are referred to as N-N ROC curves, or binormal 
ROC curves (23,66).  For the examples depicted in Figures 2.10 and 2.11, the non-target 
pdf is distributed as a N(0,2), and the target pdf is distributed as a N(4,1.5).  While the 
empirical distribution of DUSD-BM ATR target and non-target scores may have a bell-
shape similar to Gaussian distributions, the actual scores tend to have more observances 
farther away from the mean of the distribution, or put simply, the distribution has “fatter” 
tails.  In general, DUSD-BM ATR CSs make no underlying assumption about the 
distribution of target and non-target score distributions (55).   
 
2-20 
Figure 2.10  Target and Non-target Normal pdfs for a 2AFC Task. 
 
     A fundamental concept in decision theory is that of the likelihood ratio function, L(x) 
(23).  Where x is a specific value of the continuous random variable X, the relationship 
between L(x) and x summarizes the changing ratio between the corresponding probability 
densities, sn and n (23).  The likelihood ratio function for continuous target and non-
target distributions is: 




snxfxL = ,      (2.18) 
and for discrete distributions it is: 
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The likelihood ratio is important in that the observer can control the value of the L(x) 
required for a desired probability of target detection (23).  An observer could raise/lower 
the value of the threshold to decrease/increase the chances of detecting a target.  A 
critical cutoff value, L(x0), results in optimal performance with respect to the stated 
decision goal whenever a decision rule is based upon the likelihood ratio (23).  For 
continuous distributions, consider the case for which P(S|sn) and P(S|n) are determined 
by the corresponding areas in the upper portions of two distributions: 
The coordinates on the ROC curve are 
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at the cutoff point, x0.  Thus, the slope on the ROC curve at x0 is equal to the likelihood 
ratio of the cutoff L(x0) (23).  The decision rule then divides the L(x) axis into L(x) > 
L(x0) and L(x) ≤ L(x0) intervals (23).  As a result, the x-axis is divided in similar fashion 
into regions of acceptance (target) and rejection (non-target), as seen in Figures 2.10 and 
2.12 (23).  Since each cutoff, or decision threshold value, represents a diagnostic 
system’s performance at that particular level, a 2x2 confusion matrix that summarizes the 
system’s performance may be generated at each such point (23).  In terms of L(x), an 
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ROC curve is a function which represents the possible set of 2x2 matrices that result 
when the cutoff, L(x0), is varied continuously from its largest possible value to its 
smallest possible value (23).  In terms of x, an ROC summarizes a possible set of 2x2 
confusion matrices, limited by the two probability distributions selected, that results 
when disjoint intervals of the x-axis are successively added to the region of acceptance, 
starting with the empty set (a threshold value where no observed signal from either 
distribution is classified) and ending with the entire x-axis (23).  In other words, the 
cutoff value, x0, generates a ROC curve as the value is continually decreased across all 
possible values of x beginning with a very high value for x0, as seen in Figure 2.11.   
 
Figure 2.11  Sample N-N ROC Curve Generation. 
 
     A continuous, N-N ROC curve, D(∆m,s), may be completely described by two 
parameters (as demonstrated in Figure 2.9): the distance between the means of the two 
normal distributions (∆m =µsn-µn) and the ratio of the target population’s standard 
deviation to the non-target’s standard deviation (s = σsn/σn).  Figure 2.12 illustrates the 
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two-parameter description system for N-N ROC curves.  The left side subplots of Figure 
2.12 illustrate the Gaussian distributions that represent sn and n.  The difference in the 
means (∆m) remains constant at 0.5, while the standard deviation ratio (s) varies.  The 
markers on the distribution plots indicate where the probability density of either 
hypothesis is the same.  At these points, the slope of the ROC curves (right side subplots) 
at the associated point is unity, indicated by a similar marker on the ROC curve.  Table 
2.3 lists some of the salient features of ROC curves based on pdfs. 
 

























































Table 2.3  Salient Features of 2AFC ROC Curves. 
1 An ROC is based upon a pair of pdfs, one conditional upon the event sn, the other 
conditional upon the event n. 
2 Under the assumption that the mean of the sn distribution is greater than that of 
the n distribution, an ROC starts at (0,0), ends at (1,1), and must be 
nondecreasing as long as the observer decreases the value of the cutoff point, x0. 
3 Assuming a pure decision rule is used with respect to each value of x, the slope of 
a ROC curve at a given point is equal to the likelihood ratio associated with the 
cutoff on the x-axis that generates the given point. 
4 For each x0, two disjoint, exhaustive intervals result, which generate a 2x2 matrix 
that corresponds to the false alarm rate (pFA) and the hit rate (pD).  
5 The area under the curve, AUC, is equal to the percentage correct of a diagnostic 




     The ROC curve provides useful metrics and properties for the purposes of 
performance measurement.  In the case of ATR, the ROC curve of a given CS is the 
graph of the probability of detection (pD) versus the probability of false alarm (pFA).  This 
curve summarizes the possible performances of a signal detection system faced with the 
task of detecting a target in the presence of clutter (7).  Thus, as the cutoff value is varied, 
the ROC curve illustrates the relationship between an ATR CS’s correct target 
classification rate and its incorrect non-target classification rate (7).  Closely related to 
this property is the area under the ROC curve (AUC) metric, which is simply the 
percentage correct for the 2AFC task and provides a simple index of signal detectability 
(26).  This principle holds under the following assumptions: (1) that the decision in the 
2AFC task is unbiased and (2) that the observations (ROIs, in the ATR CS context) are 
treated as statistically independent.  The analytical principles have been applied to a wide 
number of ordered, monotonic ROC families, which may differ in the type of probability 
distribution used to generate the signal and clutter data (26).         
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     Consider a two-class example problem where n represents the non-target class and sn 
represents the target class and with a single variable, or score, x ∈ ℜ as depicted in 
Figure 2.10.  Let X be a real-valued random variable and let p(x) be its pdf.  Thus, p(x|n) 
is the conditional pdf representing the distribution of non-target objects while the target 
pdf, p(x|sn), represents the distribution of target objects.  Since the choice of scale for the 
x-axis is arbitrary and is easily transformed, let higher values of x equate to stronger 
indications of target, while lower values of x equate to stronger indications of non-targets.  
The decision threshold value x0 then divides the x-axis into two disjoint intervals.  An 
observed score, x, found in the interval (-∞,x0) is classified as a non-target while an 
observed score lying in the interval (x0,∞) is classified as a target.  The given decision 
threshold boundary, x = x0, then partitions the feature axis into two regions, target and 
non-target, resulting in two types of errors: 
 
Type 1 Error (α):  Misclassifying an actual non-target object as a target object, or 
False Positive (FP). 
Type 2 Error (β):  Misclassifying an actual target object as a non-target object, or 
False Negative (FN). 
 
In Figure 2.12, the shaded portions on either side of the decision threshold line, labeled α 
and β, indicate the two types of error associated with the given cutoff value.  This 
example offers a problem with a low degree of complexity.  Target and non-target 
distributions that are nearly indistinguishable, as well as multiple class features, can 
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easily complicate this type of performance measure (6A).  However, a transformation can 
always be made to a simple one-dimensional space X, where X is the real-valued random 
variable representing the strength of conviction for the non-target (6A).  Therefore, the 
conditional probabilities, PFP and PFN, corresponding to the two types of errors described 
above can be defined as: 
               α = PFP(x0) = P({x > x0 |n}) = P(S|n)    (2.23) 
β = PFN(x0) = P({x < x0 |sn}) = P(N|sn).    (2.24) 
Associated with these two probabilities are their complementary probabilities of correct 
classification, where TP stands for True Positive and TN stands for True Negative:  
     PTN(x0) = P({x < x0 |n}) = P(N|n)       (2.25) 
   PTP(x0) = P({x > x0 |sn}) = P(S|sn).    (2.26) 
The interrelationships among these probabilities and the various terminologies used in 
ATR, statistics, and medicine to describe them are shown in Figure 2.3.  Due to these 
interrelationships, a collection of probability pairs is all that needs to be reported to 
describe the performance of an ATR CS for a particular decision threshold value, x0 (6A).  
The probabilities correspond to specificity, the power to correctly declare true negatives, 
and sensitivity, the power to correctly declare true positives, of the CS. 
     The major strength of ROC curves in CS evaluation is that they do not simply report 
the system’s performance in terms of a target detection batting average for a specific 
decision threshold.  ROC curves enable performance reporting in terms of a pair of 
related indices (detection probability, false alarm probability) for varying thresholds, as 
seen in Figure 2.11 (6A).  ROC curves provide a means for characterizing and 
quantitatively comparing CS designs (6A).  In other words, two ATR CSs can be 
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compared over multiple decision thresholds and over the same feature space by a single 
ROC curve for each CS, usually via the AUC metric.  This will be examined in depth in 
the section dealing with ROC curve comparison metrics. 
     Variants of the ROC curve include: the frequency ROC (FROC), the expected utility 
ROC (EUROC), the localization ROC (LROC), the response analysis characteristic 
(RAC) curve, and the operating curve (29,36,66).  The FROC and EUROC, occasionally 
used in the field of biomedical analysis, merely change the parameter used when 
generating the ROC curve (36).  The LROC, or joint ROC, is a version of the ordinary 
ROC curve that allows the CS to choose a confidence rating and one of m alternatives in 
its classification decisions (61).  The RAC curve depicts the inverse of both the 
probability of false alarm, P(S|n), and the probability of detection, P(S|sn) (61).  Thus, 
the RAC curve is a plot with P(n|S) and P(sn|S) as the x and y axes (61).  The RAC is 
practically useless in that the curves generated takes forms that are not easily indexed and 
the range of the curve depends upon the prior probabilities (61).  The operating curve 
uses the misclassification of known targets as the y-axis (1-pD) and retains the false 
negative axis of the typical ROC curve (30).  The result is a curve that demonstrates the 
power of misclassification by the ATR CS (30).  Like the ROC curve, the area under the 
curve of an operating curve is the preferred performance index in assessment.  A near 
perfect ATR CS generates an area under the curve close to zero (30).  Figure 2.13 depicts 





Figure 2.13  Operating Curve Derived from 2AFC Task. 
 
 
     Current ROC analysis research, particularly in the field of biostatistics, seems to focus 
on several different areas of concentration.  First, there is considerable work 
accomplished on the different ways to calculate the AUC for a given ROC curve 
(17,36,43,66).  The estimation of AUC is very important, especially when comparing two 
or more competing CSs.  Thus, superior and robust methods of producing an accurate 
AUC value are desired.  Another area of ongoing research is that of ROC curve meta-
analysis, which is the estimation of the true ROC curve of a given diagnostic system 
through ROC analysis across many studies or trials (38,44,53,70).  Capturing an estimate 
of the true, overall ROC curve for a given CS is the goal.  Using data from several 
different studies, tests, and trials introduces problems in the way that the data is meshed 
or weighted in order to produce the best ROC AUC estimate.  Finally, a new approach to 















































system yields not only a diseased/non-diseased (target/non-target) decision, but also a 
third outcome, such as an undecided decision (21,47).  This third decision alternative 
relates to the declaration question in a typical ATR.  Instead of using the AUC metric, a 
new metric, the volume under the surface (VUS), is used.  This new approach realizes 
new challenges in the comparison of multiple diagnostic systems. 
 
 
2.3  Automatic Target Recognition Performance Measure Comparison 
 
 
     2.3.1  Background.   
     There is considerable theory and literature associated with the concept of performance 
measure comparison.  This section is broken into two sections that correspond to the two 
types of comparison: the use of visual techniques and the use of mathematical techniques 
to compare multiple systems via their performance measures.  The first section lists the 
various graphical techniques used in the comparison of ATR CSs.  The second section 
highlights the various mathematical comparison techniques used in the comparison of 
ATR CSs.  
     2.3.2  Visual Techniques.   
     The strength of these visual techniques is the simplicity with which they can be used 
and their inherent appeal to the human ability to visually compare objects via size, color, 
and shape.  These techniques can typically frame the comparison in a way that is easily 
understandable to a decision maker and can often associate multiple dimensions, large 




           2.3.2.1  Visualization Guidelines.   
     Multidimensional variables are often difficult for humans to compare, especially when 
listed in a numerical fashion, such as a table.  Graphs and plots offer an analytical 
window into the trends, oddities, and pertinent features of multi-dimensional data. 
     With the several tasks and concepts to remember when approaching an abstract 
scientific visualization problem, visualization specialists often implement an algorithm of 
engineering guidelines to follow (49).  The typical algorithm highlights several effective 
means of visually displaying multivariate data and associated problem solutions.  One 
such algorithm uses eight engineering design guidelines to lead an analyst through the 
process of visually describing a problem and its solution.  The guidelines are generalized 
in order to accommodate the various problem types encountered by analysts.  The authors 
admit that some of these guidelines may not apply to a given problem, but they expect the 
algorithm to be useful for most tasks and applications (49).  Table 2.4 lists the eight 
guidelines for visualizing multivariate data and problem solutions. 
 
Table 2.4  Eight Visualization Engineering Guidelines (49). 
 Engineering Guideline Description 
1 Task-specific Plots and graphs answer the questions of interest 
2 Reduced Representation Fit data on one screen, if possible 
3 Data Encoding Use glyphs, markers, & colors to represent data 
4 Filtering Reduce amount of data shown through filter rules 
5 Drill Down Visualize data not currently onscreen 
6 Multiple Linked Views Update plot changes on all plots at once 
7 User Interface Allow user to manipulate plots/data 




     The first engineering guideline is to keep the visualization task-specific.  The most 
important thought in visually depicting a problem and its solution should be to keep the 
user’s needs in mind.  In other words, being task-specific in scientific visualization 
ensures that the graphs and plots are illustrating what the user wants to know in a way 
that he or she may understand.  If the graphs do not answer the user’s questions, then the 
graphs and plots are irrelevant.  Therefore, this guideline is of utmost importance.   
     The concept of utilizing reduced representation is the next guideline to consider.  This 
concept refers to illustrating the entire data set or results on a single screen.  Doing so 
avoids a user having to flip through several different pages of results and allows the user 
to compare results or different areas of data easily.  Accomplishing this task is not always 
easy.  Care must be given to the type and position of glyphs used to represent the data.  
Also, showing all of the data onscreen should not be something that overwhelms the user; 
it should just be a quick, efficient way to compare trends and dimensions within the data.   
     Data encoding, the third engineering guideline, refers to employing the physical 
attributes of the glyphs effectively in the graphs and plots.  Size, shape, color, and 
position are a few of the attributes that can be used to annotate information within the 
data. 
     Another concept worthy of consideration is that of filtering.  Filtering allows the user 
to toggle between certain aspects of the data.  For instance, if the data set has several 
features used to classify an observation, the user could select to view only a few of the 
features at one time.  This creates a manageable, uncluttered view for the user.  This 
technique can be very useful for very large data sets with many variables. 
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     The drill down technique allows a user to find out information about a feature or 
observation that is not currently onscreen.  For instance, a user could drag a mouse 
pointer over a given data point represented by a glyph in a plot, and a pop-up window 
would display the numerical location of the point.  This technique can be very effective in 
sensitivity analysis; trying to determine which data points have the most effect on the 
solution, and in determining outliers in a data set. 
     The sixth guideline, incorporating multiple linked views, suggests that, when using 
multiple views of the same or similar graph and plots, changes to one plot should carry 
over to the subsequent plots.  This concept creates harmony in the viewing of complex 
data and may uncover trends that may have remained undetected.  The technique also 
saves the user time by automatically changing several plots rather then the user manually 
changing each plot of interest. 
     The seventh guideline shows concern for the one actually visualizing the data by 
calling for user interface of the plot or graph.  Plots and graphs of large or complex data 
sets should incorporate the ability to be directly manipulated by the user.  Some of the 
features may include plot axes changes, plot zooming features, rotateable images, and 
data set selection.  The authors also suggest that this process must be executed quickly 
and that sluggish imaging performance greatly reduces the effectiveness of scientific 
visualization by disenchanting the user.   
     Use of animation and motion is the premise behind the final data visualization 
guideline.  This guideline refers primarily to data sets that have a temporal aspect.  
Motion and animation can be key in determining changes in the data.  One difficulty with 
this technique is the computational power afforded by the visualization platform. 
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          2.3.2.2  Confusion Matrices.   
     Confusion matrices are an efficient and orderly way of presenting the pertinent 
performance information for a given ATR CS.  The matrix structure allows for quick 
comparison between the numeric performance measures of several CSs.  The 
performance measure probabilities are typically the items of interest in a given confusion 
matrix.  Figure 2.14 illustrates the use of confusion matrices in the comparison between 
two different ATR CSs, systems A and B.  CS B seems to perform better as a target 
classifier overall, but does not do as good a job on clutter when compared to CS A.  CS 
A’s major deficiency is the tendency to report actual targets as clutter (false negatives), 
seen in that it misclassified nearly 60% of the Scud MRLSs as clutter.  CS B’s major 
weaknesses are its tendency to misclassify detected T72s and to declare actual clutter as a 
target (false positives).  
 
             Classification System A    Classification System B 
    Classified As (Reported)     Classified As (Reported) 
  T72 M1 Scud Non-
TGT 
  T72 M1 Scud Non-
TGT 




































































Figure 2.14  Example Composite Confusion Matrices. 
   
     While a typical confusion matrix contains the numerical performance description of a 
given CS, the confusion matrix can be transformed into a matrix of shaded blocks that 
correspond to the numeric values of the original matrix (7).  This technique enables an 
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evaluator to identify the strengths and inadequacies of a particular CS and differences 
between multiple CSs through the use of color.  The darker the shading of a square in the 
grid indicates that the classifier associated (classified) a detected target to the given row 
(truth) more frequently (7).  A near perfect classifier produces a confusion matrix with a 
very dark right hand diagonal and very pale entries elsewhere (7).  Figure 2.15 illustrates 
the use of shading in confusion matrices for the purposes of comparing the same two 
ATR CSs.  Viewing the matrices indicates that the CS B does a better job at correctly 
classifying M1s and Scud MRLSs, which is the same conclusion drawn from the 
composite confusion matrix comparison in Figure 2.14.  The darker diagonal of CS B 
indicates it is closer to a near-perfect classifier than the CS A.  However, depending on 
the desired goal, CS A could be considered better.  For instance, if the objective is to find 
the CS that most correctly classifies T72 MBTs, then CS A, which correctly classified 
86% of the T72s, could be considered the better system. 
 
ATR Classification System 1    ATR Classification System 2 
           Classified As (Reported)   Classified As (Reported) 




  T72 M1 M109 Non-
TGT 
 T72      T72     
Actual M1      M1     
(Truth) M109       M109     
 Non-
TGT 
     Non-
TGT 
    




     Though it allows quick comparison between the performances of two systems, one 
disadvantage of the gray level confusion matrix is the inability to distinguish between 
slight differences of color.  For instance, it is difficult for the human eye to detect a 
difference between a 75% gray level and an 80% gray level.  This disadvantage requires a 
better method of visual comparison when dealing with CSs that are very similar in 
performance.  The previous example offered two classification systems with stark 
contrasts.  Thus, the advantages of the technique were readily apparent. 
          2.3.2.3  Error-Reject Curves.   
     Doubt reports are a method of allowing a pattern recognition classifier to report 
confidence in its ability to correctly classify an object (7).  Due to the assumed 
distribution of targets and non-targets, certain objects detected by the CS are difficult to 
classify, i.e. the given score of a detected object lies close to the decision threshold 
between the target and non-target distributions.  These objects are then rejected until 
further measurements that lead to a more definite classification can be made or these 
objects may be transferred to a second stage classifying system designed to deal with 
objects that require finer classification precision (7).  A loss function can be defined as 
the loss incurred by making decision l if the true class is k (out of K classes) (7).  If every 
misclassification is equally serious, then the loss function is given by: 























dlkL   (2.27) 
where k = 1,…,K and l∈{1,…,K} is a reasonable choice.  The total risk for the optimal 
decision rule is called the Bayes’ risk (R) and is defined by 
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R = pMC + d ⋅ pd    (2.28) 
where pMC is the probability of misclassification, pd is the probability of doubt, and d is 
the rejection threshold, or the cost of being in doubt (7).  Error-reject curves are the plot 
of pMC versus pd (7).  These curves are particularly useful is describing the relationship 
between making a classification error and the doubt associated with a classification 
decision.  Since the slope of the error-reject tradeoff curve is the value of the rejection 
threshold, the tradeoff is most effective for low levels of rejection and becomes less 
effective for high levels of rejection when the error rate is very low (7).   Figure 2.16 
provides an example of an error-reject curve. 
 
Figure 2.16  Error-Reject Tradeoff Curve. 
 
          2.3.2.4  Error Histograms.   
     For classifiers with several outputs or in situations where the size of the errors is more 
important than their type, an error histogram provides another quick method for 




frequency with which a classification error falls within a set of bandwidths, i.e. within a 
certain range of error sizes.  These bandwidths or error sizes are the ranges of possible 
differences between the actual target class and the predicted class for each exemplar.  For 
a classification probability score from zero to one, these bands must be split into a small 
set of bins.  This error binning technique contrasts the setting of class thresholds used to 
classify the exemplars and generate the confusion matrix.  For a simple two-class 
confusion matrix, if the predicted classification score for a particular exemplar exceeds 
some preset threshold, then that exemplar is classified as class 2.  For the error histogram, 
the difference between a given exemplar’s predicted classification probability and each 
target output class probability is used.  A healthy classifier will show a peak at zero, 
quickly falling off as the number of errors of greater magnitude diminishes.  For a data 
set with normally distributed noise, the error histogram should have the appearance of a 
normal distribution.  Figure 2.17 shows an example of the error histogram of a healthy 
classifier.  The error histograms of competing classifiers can be examined to identify 











Figure 2.17  Error Histogram Example. 
 
          2.3.2.5  Classification Trees.   
     In biomedical decision-making scenarios, classification trees are used to aid the 
diagnosis between diseased and healthy patients (5).  Often this technique combines 
information from one or more diagnostic tests with patient characteristics to better 
identify patients with the disease of interest (5).  Another advantage of this technique is 
that the leaves of a classification tree provide enough data for ROC curve generation (5).  
This technique could be applied to the various questions raised in DUSD-BM evaluation.  
For instance, the selection of a superior ATR CS by allowing questions to systematically 
rank the performance of a CS or “weed out” an inferior CS that does not meet AFRL/SN 
performance requirements.  The following simplistic scenario uses a classification tree to 
identify a superior CS.   
     Suppose that for a combat identification (CID) scenario, AFRL/SN requires a pID of 
0.87 and a pFA of 0.2.  Since each CS can presumably achieve these values dependent 

































compare the other metric at a specific performance measure criterion.  For instance, if the 
most important performance measure for a CID scenario is pFA then the selection should 
be based on the superior pID at the required pFA level.  The objective of the decision is to 
determine which two ATR CSs should be chosen for further competition and 
improvement.  The CSs competing for contract selection, along with their performance 
measures, are listed in Table 2.5.  Notice that the performance measures of each CS 
indicate that no dominant CS exists for consideration.  Therefore, the decision maker 
must weight the preferences. Pertinent questions from the decision maker’s perspective, 
and implied by the rules of the program, are ranked by importance and used in the 
classification tree.  The questions for this simplistic scenario are given in Table 2.6.  The 
first two questions attempt to divide the CSs on the CID requirements.  The final question 
separates the CSs on overall performance.  Figure 2.18 provides a depiction of the 
classification tree and the results.  The ATR CSs are rank-ordered from right to left.  
Thus, the CS performance ranking in descending order is 4,2,1,3. 
 
Table 2.5  ATR CS Performance Measures for Competitive Selection Scenario. 
ATR pID (Rank) pFA (Rank) AUC (Rank) 
1 0.82 (3) 0.3 (4) 0.878 (4) 
2 0.87 (2) 0.18 (1) 0.823 (3) 
3 0.77 (4) 0.28 (3) 0.902 (1) 







Table 2.6  Rank-Ordered Questions for Competitive Selection Scenario. 
Number Question Metric 
1 Does the CS have a pID ≥ 0.80 @ the CID pFA requirement? pID 
2 Does the CS have a pFA ≤ 0.25 @ the CID pID requirement? pFA 
3 Does the ATR CS have a higher ROC AUC value than its 




Figure 2.18  Classification Tree for Competing ATR CS Selection Scenario. 
 
     Notice that in this scenario, the classification tree used is a slightly modified version 
of that used in biomedical decision-making.  The typical classification tree would 
implement only the right–hand-side of the tree depicted in Figure 2.18.  The above tree 
illustrates the ranking system for all CSs, but could have ended after the second question 
since two CSs are found superior to the others.  Finally, notice that the final question is a 
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multiple “no” responses.  A more complex decision could require further questions to 
rank and separate CSs below the third classification level.       
     2.3.3  Statistical Techniques.  
     Statistical techniques are particularly useful in performance measure comparison 
because they typically provide not only a structured method of comparison but also a 
level of certainty in the comparisons made.  The major drawbacks of using statistical 
methods are the reliance on the assumptions made about the data and the lack of 
confidence associated with a given comparison due to the lack of data.  The methods 
discussed here include statistical representations that are used to make inferences about 
comparisons (hypothesis testing), indicate differences between several competing 
systems (ROC curve performance measures and the multinomial selection procedure), 
evaluate multi-goal decision-making (linear goal programming), and employ decision 
analysis (DA) to decide amongst several competing classifiers.      
          2.3.3.1  Confidence Intervals.   
     The AFRL COMPASE Center uses confidence intervals to compare sensitivity of 
performance of several ATRs.  During ATR testing, a known target is presented in its 
most basic configuration.  This configuration represents the data on which the ATR CS 
was initially trained.  For example, if a T72 tank were used as the baseline target, the 
turret would be positioned straight ahead.  No external devices would be attached to the 
vehicle, and the tank would be positioned in the field clear of clutter and revetments.  The 
probabilistic performance measures, such as pD, for each individual ATR CS are 
computed for the baseline target.  The performance measures collected on each ATR CS 
serve as a benchmarking measure for the ATR’s performance at a nominal setting.  In 
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other words, an ATR CS’s detection and classification performance on the baseline target 
is considered to be in the optimal expected performance region for the CS.  Changes to 
the OCs are expected to degrade system performance, or, at best, remain unchanged.  
Performance measures from the remainder of the test, where the OCs are varied, are 
calculated and subtracted from the baseline performance measures to create a deviational 
(delta) performance measure.  Confidence intervals are constructed around the 
deviational and baseline performance measures.  The confidence intervals are then used 
to determine performance deviations from the benchmark performance measures.  Thus, 
each ATR CS is compared to its own “optimal” performance, and the deviational results 
are used to compare ATR CS’s across the board.  This technique does not use raw 
probabilistic performance data, such as pD, to compare various CSs.  Rather, a difference 
between baseline and deviated performance figure is used.  Figure 2.19 demonstrates how 
the confidence interval comparison results are presented.  Table 2.7 provides a sample 
chart of how the results are used for CS comparison.  In Table 2.7, all deviations are 
considered degradations.  In other words, the inclusion of OC variation introduced a 










Figure 2.19  Demonstration of Confidence Interval Use in ATR Comparison (56). 
 




     A limitation of this technique is that the differences in the benchmark performance for 
each ATR CS are not given.  Therefore, a CS may perform poorly on the baseline target 
while every other CS performs well.  The poor performer may have similar deviational 
scores, but the deviation values are from a lower performance.  Thus, the CS should not 
be considered for comparison between the other CSs.  Figure 2.20 illustrates this 
Baseline Delta
LEGEND
Level 1 - The Confidence Intervals overlap Not 
confident that the OC affected Performance
Level 2 - The Confidence Intervals are separate 
Confident that the OC affected Performance
Level 3 - The Confidence Intervals are separated by the 
width of one CI the OC is an especially strong factor
OC Type Delta OC ATR 1 ATR 2 ATR 3
Version 0 0 -1
Serial Number -8 -5 -2
Fuel Drums On -12 -34 0
Target 2 Hatches Open 0 -11 -12
4 Hatches Open -23 -23 -16
Turret @ 10 deg -9 0 -1
Turret @ 20 deg -12 -14 -2
10 deg Depression -3 0 -15
Sensor 20 deg Depression 0 -3 -22
Off Broadside Squint -13 -4 0
Shallow Revetment -35 -55 -27
Environment Deep Revetment -49 -65 -67
Rough Background -22 -34 -44
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problem.  However, performance of CSs against the baseline is generally near perfect 
since the target is in the configuration upon which the ATR CS was trained.  Thus, all 
CSs are relatively equal when detecting and classifying the baseline target. 
      Higdon proposed improvements to the ATR evaluation process that would 
incorporate a factorial design rather than a one-at-a-time test design currently being used 
by the AFRL COMPASE Center (35).  Results from simulated data demonstrated that 
such a design offers more efficient identification of significant relationships between 
features, or OCs, and more accurate confidence interval estimation for performance 
measures (35).      
 
Figure 2.20  Graphical Depiction of Limitations when Using Confidence Intervals to  
                      Compare ATR CSs. 
 
 
          2.3.3.2  Hypothesis Testing.   
     Hypothesis testing can be used to determine if there is a statistically significant 
difference between the performance measures of two or more systems (41).  When 
OC Type Delta OC ATR 1 ATR 2
0.97 0.76
Version 0 0
Serial Number -8 -5
Fuel Drums On -12 -34
Target 2 Hatches Open 0 -11
4 Hatches Open -23 -23
Turret @ 10 deg -9 0
Turret @ 20 deg -12 -14
10 deg Depression -3 0
Sensor 20 deg Depression 0 -3
Off Broadside Squint -13 -4
Shallow Revetment -35 -55
Environment Deep Revetment -49 -65
Rough Background -22 -34
Baseline Prob of Detection
Deviation Table indicates that CSs perform 




ATR 1 ATR 2
Knowledge of baseline pD indicates
that ATR CS 1 is much better.
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comparing two CSs, one can decide in advance the number of trials for testing each 
system (non-sequential) or one can have the testing procedure decide on the fly 
(sequential) (7).   
     When using non-sequential testing to compare two CSs, one can compare the 
confidence intervals for some performance measure p for both systems, or the confidence 
interval for the difference in performance between the two systems can be computed.  For 
large n (n>30) and assuming equal sample sizes (n = n1 = n2), the difference interval can 
be calculated as: 





±− −α     (2.29) 
with the associated test statistic: 










= .    (2.30) 
Then the following hypothesis may be made: 
H0 : p1 ≥ p2     (2.31) 
HA : p1 < p2.     (2.32) 
     This technique is useful for comparing two CSs, but requires large sample sizes, 
especially for distinguishing between small differences in the performance measures of 
the two systems.  As before, the assumption that the probability p does not vary from trial 
to trial makes this technique inappropriate for use in some ATR applications.  However, 
Wald’s non-sequential testing procedure is a cleverly simple method for probability 
comparison, which allows for the variation of probabilities from trial to trial.  In 
















η .  (2.33) 
The results are arranged in pairs in the ordered observed, i.e. t=(η1,η2) where 1 and 2 
correspond to the two ATR CSs.  Thus, the number of observations where the first ATR 
CS correctly identified the ROI while the second CS did not, represented by (1,0), are 
denoted as t1.  The other outocme, denoted t2, is the opposite case (0,1).  Therefore, a 
hypothesis test may be generated using 
H0:  p ≥ 0.5      (2.34) 
HA: p < 0.5      (2.35) 









= .     (2.36) 
The test statistic for the equivalent hypothesis tests is simply the number t2 of observed 
ordered pairs (0,1).  The null hypothesis, that p1 is better than p2, is rejected only if, t2 ≥ T, 
where the value of T, for a given level of significance α, is given by the binomial 
distribution with p = 0.5: 
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where t = t1 + t2. 
     An extension of Wald’s procedure can be applied in a sequential hypothesis testing 
approach (7).  The Wald sequential test is based on the efficiencies of the two competing 
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such that p is the true probability of success.  The relative superiority of a second CS over 
the first CS is measured by the ratio (u) of the efficiencies: 













== .     (2.39) 
For the test, four parameters must be set, which reflect the precision required (u0, u1) and 
the tolerated risks (α,β).  Also, the test statistics and hypotheses are constructed as in 
Wald’s non-sequential test.  However, t2 is compared to two critical values: the 
acceptance and rejection numbers, given by 


















































.  (2.41) 
If t2 falls below the acceptance number for any value of t, the null hypothesis that ATR 
CS1 is better than ATR CS2 is accepted.  If t2 exceeds the value for the rejection number, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and the conclusion is that ATR CS2 is better than ATR CS1.  
If t2 remains between these bounds, testing is continued.   
 The Wald sequential test procedure has been applied in comparing the pID 
performance measure for different configurations of the MSTAR system using actual 
data and in a four system comparison, with an embedded Wald sequential test 
methodology in a multiple sequential rejective Bonferroni procedure, using simulated 
data (15).  The results indicated an improved sample size savings advantage through the 
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use of the Wald procedure, which is of great benefit since image data collection is very 
expensive (15).       
          2.3.3.3  ROC Curve Performance Measures.   
     The most commonly used index for comparing ROC curves is the area beneath the 
ROC curve (AUC) (7,8,9).  This area is equivalent to the probability of success for a 
diagnostic system identifying both target and clutter images in a series of image pairs in 
which there is always a target and clutter image (27).  Again, the AUC measure 
represents a convenient and simple index of target detectability.  However, deficiencies in 
the AUC performance measure have pushed the search for better ways to compare ROC 
curves.  ROC analysts in the field of biostatistics discourage the use of AUC when the 
ROC curves for classification systems overlap or are mismatched (17,43).  The AUC 
measure has been shown to fail in the definition of being a true metric (7).  For example, 
two ROC curves may have different shapes, but have the same AUC value.  With respect 
to metric definition, this violates the definiteness property (7).   
     Several measures have been proposed as alternatives to the AUC measure.  First, the 
area under the binormal ROC, denoted Az, is the area under the ROC curve that is above 
the diagonal chance line (66).  Thus, Az ranges from 0.5 to 1.0 and provides a measure of 
how a diagnostic system performs in relation to chance.  This measure is “less affected by 
the location or spread of the points” that compose the ROC curve (66).  The Az measure 
assumes that the target and non-target distributions may be modeled with normal pdfs.  
Then, the ROC curve may be plotted on a binormal graph, where the ROC curve is linear.  
The result is an easily calculated area under the curve that does not underestimate the 
area under the ROC curve by using an approximation rule.  The AUC calculation method 
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for empirical data is typically computed using the trapezoidal rule, or some other 
approximation rule, on a linear probability scale thereby underestimating the true area 
under a complete ROC curve.  One can argue that the AUC measure is superior in that it 
makes no assumption concerning the underlying distribution of the ROC like the Az 
measure.  In the context of ATR evaluation, this method is of little use since no 
assumption is made concerning the underlying target and non-target distributions.  
     A proven metric, called the average metric distance, has been proposed for the 
comparison of multiple ROC curves associated with multiple CSs (7).  Since the area 
under the curve may be the same for two different ROC curves, this metric does not 
incorporate the idea of area under the ROC curve.  Rather, the metric measures the 
average metric distance between two ROC curves in order to estimate the difference in 
their respective AUC measurements.  The average metric distance metric can be 
approximated to range from 0 to 1, like the AUC measure, where 0 implies no difference 
between two ROC curves and 1 implies maximum difference between two ROC curves 
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for each 1 ≤ q < ∞.  For the above equations, ρ is the distance metric, q corresponds to 
the type of distance metric implemented, m is the number of thresholds evaluated, θ is the 
individual threshold value where each ROC curve is evaluated, and P(f) and P(g) represent 
the two ROC curve data sets.  The vectors xv and yr  correspond to the points of two ROC 
curves under comparison via the distance metric.  The average distance metric also 
allows the use of any available distance metric, such as the Euclidean or Manhattan 
metrics, which determines the distance between two points on two separate ROC curves 
(7).  Most importantly, each ROC curve can be compared against a known reference 
curve, such as the negative diagonal line.  Doing so corresponds directly to a difference 
comparison in the AUC measurement between classifiers.  Another strength of this 
metric lies in the fact that the distance measure is based upon the threshold placement, 
not the number of samples from the target and non-target distributions.  Finally, all 
calculations of this metric are perpendicular to the negative diagonal line, as seen in 
Figure 2.21, which illustrates the calculation of this ROC performance metric.  Note that 
the distance measure, di,j, depicted in the plot is based on the distance metric selected by 
the user.  In the plot, this same measure is shown at the 120th threshold for each CS and is 




Figure 2.21  Depiction of Average Metric Distance Metric Calculation. 
 
     A similar metric introduced in biostatistical research is that of the q-norm metric, 
which compares the distance between matched ROC curves (13).  The second method 
measures the distances based upon a line with a slope b = )/( nm−  where m and n are the 
number of samples taken from the target and non-target distributions.  Though this metric 
does not require that the same number of non-targets and targets be sampled, the use of 
differently sized target and non-target populations complicates this metric.  
     Consider a simple example of the average metric distance metric for comparing two 
separate ATR CSs.  The ROC curves for the CSs have been provided in Figure 2.22.  
Notice that CS2 seems to be the superior system, and, in fact, it is by design of the target 
distributions.  CS1 is based upon a N(3,2) target distribution, while CS2 is based upon a 
N(3,1) target distribution.  However, the ROC curves cross, which, by recommendations 
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from the biostatistical community, indicates that the use of the AUC measure is 
unreliable.  Using the Euclidean distance metric, an average metric distance measure may 
be calculated to compare each CS to the negative diagonal line.  The results are presented 
in Table 2.8.  For this example, the results indicate that CS2 is the better classifier, which 
we know to be true.    
 
Table 2.8  Comparison of AUC and Average Metric Distance Measures. 
Classifier AUC Avg Metric Dist 
(q=1) 
Avg Metric Dist 
(q=2) 
Avg Metric Dist 
(q=100) 
1 0.8850 0.2071 0.1464  0.1043 
2 0.9231 0.1797 0.1271 0.0905 
 
 
Figure 2.22  ROC Curves for Average Metric Distance Example. 
 








































     A final method of comparing ROC curves lies in the construction of confidence bands 
around the ROC curve.  Non-parametric confidence bands based on the Kolmogorov 
theory concerning distributions can be constructed about each point on an empirical ROC 
curve (13).  Thus, the (1-α) Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) confidence band takes the form  
(Fm(t) - d, Fm(t) + d) on a ROC curve, where Fm(t) represents a realized target probability 
of detection value at threshold t and d is the half-length distance measure of the given 
confidence band.  Using Gm(t) and e to represent the non-target probability of false alarm 
value and confidence band half-length, the overall confidence rectangles about a single 
point on the ROC curve takes the form:  
P{ Fm(t) – d< Fm(t) < Fm(t) + d, Gm(t) – e < Gm(t) < Gm(t) + e} = (1-α)2 , (2.44) 
assuming the independence of the two distributions (13).  Thus, the collection of 
rectangles with width 2d and height 2e each centered at an observed point of the ROC 
curve has simultaneous coverage (1-α)2.  Note, this coverage is valid at all thresholds 
since the sensitivity and specificity are the same on the interval [ti, ti+1) as at ti.  The 
confidence statement about this collection of confidence rectangles is merely that, for all 
thresholds simultaneously, the theoretical values of (1-specificity) and sensitivity are in 
their associated rectangles with confidence (1-α)2.  Hypothetically, these bands could be 
used in similar fashion to confidence intervals about point estimates for the purposes of 







1.  Generate the empirical ROC curve by plotting the probability of false alarms  
     and probability of detection from the target and non-target distributions.   
 
2.  Construct the confidence rectangle about each point in the empirical ROC   
     curve.  Using the critical values for the K-S Goodness-of-Fit Test for a single   
     sample and a desired confidence level, α.  For observations greater than 40, the  
     formula K/√n is used to compute the confidence bands.  Let m refer to the  
     observations of the target distribution and n represent observations of the non- 
     target distribution. 
 
 
As an example of this procedure, a randomly selected set of targets (m = 200) generated 
from a Normal distribution (µ = 4, σ2 = 1.5) and non-targets (n = 200) generated from a 
Normal distribution (µ = 0, σ2 = 2), seen in Figure 2.23, are used to create an empirical 
ROC curve, shown in Figure 2.24.  
 
Figure 2.23  Empirical Data Set: Target~N(4,1.5) and Non-target~N(0,2). 
 
     A confidence rectangle is then constructed about each point in the ROC curve.  In this 
instance, the rectangle is a square due to the equal number of observations from each 
distribution, e.g. n = m = 200.  Thus, for α = 0.05, the half-length of each confidence 
rectangle is equal to d = e = 1.36/√m.  The resultant confidence bands can be seen in 
Figure 2.24. 



























Figure 2.24  ROC Curve and Associated K-S Confidence Rectangles (m=n=200). 
 
Figure 2.25 illustrates the change in size of the K-S confidence rectangles when the 
number of observations of the non-target population increases to 1000.  Note that the 
confidence rectangles have adjusted in width. 
 


















Figure 2.25  ROC Curve and Associated K-S Confidence Rectangles (n = 1000). 
 
         2.3.3.4  Multinomial Selection Procedure (MSP).   
     Multinomial selection procedures (MSPs) have only recently been applied to the 
evaluation of competing algorithms (4,5).  Multinomial selection problems involve the 
comparison of k classification systems across a given objective performance measure 
(8,9).  MSP may also compare k systems across n classes, rather than being limited to the 
target/non-target alternatives in the typical DUSD-BM scenario (8,9).  The objective of 
the MSP is to find the system, given a limited amount of data, which is most likely to be 
the best performer in a single trial among the systems, rather than identifying the best 
average performer over the long run (8,9).  Thus, instead of relying on the overall 
performance power of AUC, the MSP generates a metric on a CS’s performance per class 
with which to compare systems.  


















     Consider an example of the MSP in the performance comparison between three 
notional CSs classifying a two-class data set of the classic XOR problem.  Each CS has 
been trained using the same data set, balanced between the two classes.  In this example, 
there are 250 data points (125 for Class 1 and 125 for Class 2) for training each classifier, 
and the same number of points for testing each classifier.  A plot of the data to be 
classified is given in Figure 2.26.  For this example, three classifiers are examined: a 
linear statistical classifier, a quadratic statistical classifier, and a multi-layer perceptron 
(MLP) artificial neural network classifier.  The idea is to use the classification results of 
the three different classifiers.  The classification accuracy and confusion matrix for each 
classifier is listed in Table 2.9.  Notice that though the linear classifier proves to be 
inferior, there is no clearly superior classification system.  This inability to distinguish 
between the classifiers leads to the use of the MSP for a better performance metric. 
     Procedure BEM (Bechhofer, Elmaghraby, and Morse) is a classical solution procedure 
for the MSP (12).  On the assumption that larger is better, BEM selects the system having 
the largest value of the performance measure in more replications than any other, as the 
best system.  Another necessary assumption is that for a multinomial distribution there is 
a constant probability of success over all test trials.  This assumption holds as long as the 
test trials are at random, and the probabilities of success obtained are still estimates of the 
probabilities of winning in any randomly selected trial (7).  A modified version of the 
BEM procedure is given below: 
1.  Given vj Class j test data points, compare estimated posterior Class j  
     probabilities for each classifier.  
 
2.  Select the best classifier for each data point as the classifier with the maximum  
     estimated posterior Class j probability. 
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3.  Compute the number of wins/successes Yi|j for each classifier i given Class j  
     data. 
 
4.  Let Y[1|j] ≤ Y[2|j] be the ranked number of successes from Step 3.  Select the  
     classifier associated with the largest count, Y[3|j], as the best for Class j. 
 
Using this technique, a point estimate can be computed for the conditional probability 
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This is accomplished when the number of successes Yi|j for each classifier I given vj 
Class j test data points, is modeled as a single multinomial distribution.  The 










α .     (2.46) 
The total probability that each classifier is the best according to the estimated posterior 
probabilities can be computed using the law of total probability: 
)()|()()|()( 2211 ΦΦ+ΦΦ= PCPPCPCP iii =PBEST OVERALL  (2.47) 
where P(Φj) are the prior probabilities for each class (in the example, these prior 
probabilities are equal to 0.5).  Tables 2.10 and 2.11 illustrate the use of the BEM 
procedure with the given classifiers for both Class 1 and Class 2 data, respectively.  Table 
2.12 provides the resultant confidence intervals (α = 0.05) around the PBEST point 





Figure 2.26  Testing Set of Two-Class XOR Data (250 Samples). 
 
Table 2.9  Confusion Matrices and Classification Accuracies for MSP Example. 
 Linear Classifier 
Classified As 
 Quadratic Classifier 
Classified As 
 MLP Classifier 
Classified As 
  C1 C2   C1 C2   C1 C2 
Actual C1 54 71  C1 113 12  C1 113 12 
(Truth) C2 64 61  C2 9 116  C2 11 114 
      
CA 0.460  0.916  0.908 
 
Table 2.10  BEM Procedure Illustrated for Class 1 XOR Data. 
Test Data Posterior Probabilities Win/Successes = 1 
Number Linear Quadratic MLP Linear Quadratic MLP 
1 0.7473    0.7229    0.3510 1 0 0 
2 0.3025     0.5257    0.8896 0 0 1 
3 0.6384     0.5819    0.1328 1 0 0 
… … … … … … … 
125 0.3652     0.4338    0.8673 0 1 0 
Linear Quadratic MLP   

























Table 2.11  BEM Procedure Illustrated for Class 2 XOR Data. 
Test Data Posterior Probabilities Win/Successes = 1 
Number Linear Quadratic MLP Linear Quadratic MLP 
1 0.4512     0.8705    1.000 0 0 1 
2 0.6974     0.8442    1.000 0 0 1 
3 0.6724     0.9265    1.000 0 0 1 
… … … … … … … 
125 0.4489    0.9942    0.9489 1 0 0 
Linear Quadratic MLP   







Table 2.12  Procedure BEM PBEST  Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals for  
                        XOR Data. 
PBEST Linear Quadratic MLP 
Class 1 0.032 0.464 0.504 
CI [0.001 0.063] [0.377  0.551] [0.416  0.592] 
Class 2 0.024 0.272 0.704 
CI [0 0.051] [0.194  0.350] [0.624  0.784] 
Both Classes 0.028 0.368 0.604 
CI [0.000 0.029] [0.283  0.453] [0.518  0.690] 
 
     The results show that for classifying Class 1 data, the MPL and quadratic statistical 
classifier are similar, but when classifying Class 2 data, the MLP classifier is statistically 
the best classifier by using the MSP PBEST metric.  Finally, the confidence intervals 
indicate that the MLP classifier is the best overall system for classifying the given XOR 
data set.  Results from various pattern recognition problems have indicated that the MSP 
can be used to distinguish differences between CSs that other performance measures, 






          2.3.3.5  Linear Goal Programming (LGP).   
     Linear goal programming (LGP) is a constrained optimization technique used by 
decision-makers to solve multivariable, multigoal problems (2).  Many problems, such as 
comparison of ATR CSs, involve not only multiple objectives, but also multiple 
conflicting objectives (2).  All LGP models consist of three components: an objective 
function, goal constraints, and non-negativity requirements (2).  Differences from the 
typical linear programming model include the preemptive priority factors, deviational 
variables, and the concept of satisficing.  Preemptive priority factors (Pk) is a method 
whereby goals are ranked ordered, where P1 represents the most important goal and PK 
represents the least important goal of K goals.  Thus, the Pk are numeric values that 
represent the decision-maker’s goal priorities within the model.  Deviational variables, 
denoted di- and di+, express the deviation from a particular goal as the LGP is solved.  
Finally, the idea of satisficing implies that the LGP will seek a solution that satisfies as 
many goals as possible rather than optimizing a single goal (2).  Thus, proper goal 
selection is an important aspect to LGP formulation.   
     In LGP, there are three different types of objective functions and six different types of 
goal constraints.  Table 2.13 lists the different types of objective functions and their 
purposes.  Table 2.14 lists the different goal constraints and their uses.  LGP formulation 







1.  Define the decision variables.  Clearly state what the unknown decision variables are.   
     In an ATR CS comparison application, this may be the various CSs that are being    
     subject to comparison.  
 
2.  State the goal constraints.  Identify the right-hand-side variables first paying attention  
     to the permissible deviation for each deviational variable. 
 
3.  Determine the preemptive priorities.  Rank the goals in accordance with the decision- 
     maker’s stated preference.  For CS comparison, this could be the mission scenario  
     or the desired performance measure to be maximized or minimized. 
 
4.  Determine the differential weights.  Examine preferences within a specific goal level.   
     For instance, a goal range may be given where any deviation outside of that range  
     affects the decision. 
 
5.  State the objective function.  Select the correct deviational variable for inclusion in  
     the objective function.  Ensure the that the deviational variables correspond to the  
     appropriate preemptive priority factor. 
 




Table 2.13  LGP Objective Functions. 
Objective Function Purpose 
Minimize Z = Σ (di+ + di-) 
for all I 
Used when deviational variables are not 
distinguished by priority or weighting 
Minimize Z = Σ Pk(di+ + di-) 
for all i   
for k = 1,2,…K 
Used when K goals are ranked by Pk priorities; 
Goals are ranked but deviational variables are 
of equal importance 
Minimize Z = Σ Pkwkl(dI+ + di-)  
for all i  
for k = 1,2,…K  
for l = 1,2,…,L 
Used when K goals are ranked by Pk priorities;  
Goals are ranked and deviational variables are 































aij + di- = bi dI- Negative None Equal to bi 
aij - di+ = bi dI+ Positive None Equal to bi 
aij + di- - di+ = bi di- Negative and 
Positive 
Positive bi or more 
aij + di- - di+ = bi di+ Negative and 
Positive 
Negative bi or less 
aij + di- - di+ = bi di- and di+ Negative and 
Positive 
None Equal to bi 
aij  - di+ = bi di+ (artificial) None None Exactly bi 
 
     The following example illustrates how a LGP model can be used to compare between 
two ATR CSs.  Suppose the goal of comparison is to determine which CS is more 
suitable for a CID mission.  A CID mission requires a low probability of false alarm since 
the goal is to destroy known enemy targets.  The most important priority in the CID 
mission is to minimize the number of possibly civilian non-targets. Thus, the value of pFA 
in the objective function is appropriately weighted.  In fact, the decision maker has 
decided that this performance measure is 3 times more important than any other measure.  
A way to incorporate the other dimensions of performance for a CID mission is to 
include the deviations from pID, pCC, or pD in the objective function.  Minimizing pFA 
without doing so allows the LGP to select an ATR CS that may not detect anything.   The 
factors of CS cost, computational time, and other various measures, though not used in 
this example, could be incorporated into an expanded model. 
     Suppose that an ATR CS, denoted C1, has a pD = 0.560, a pFA = 0.440, a pCC = 0.762, 
and a pID = 0.833.  Further suppose that another ATR CS, C2, has a pD = 0.680, a pFA = 
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0.540, a pCC = 0.804, and a pID = 0.922.  Assuming that is the only available information 
concerning the two systems, the LGP formulation could be given as follows: 
 
Minimize  Z = 3( d1+) + ( d2-+ d3-+ d4-)    (2.48) 
subject to:   0.440x1 + 0.540x2 - d1+ = 0      (pFA goal constraint)  (2.49) 
0.560x1 + 0.680x2 + d2- = 1      (pD goal constraint)   (2.50) 
0.762x1 + 0.804x2 + d3- = 1      (pCC goal constraint)  (2.51) 
0.833x1 + 0.922x2 + d4- = 1      (pID goal constraint)   (2.52) 
  x1 + x2 = 1      (constraint which forces CS selection)  (2.53) 
x1, x2 ∈ {0,1}    (assignment constraint)   (2.54) 
  d1-, d2-, d3-, d4- ≥ 0  (non-negativity constraint)  (2.55) 
 
 
Notice that P1 equals 3 and P2 equals 1 since the pFA goal is three times as important as 
the other goals.  The three goal constraints associated with preemptive priority factor P2 
share the same preemptive priority factor due to the fact that they have no distinguishable 
priority over each other.  These values are gathered from discussions with the decision 
maker and may be arrived at through a value hierarchial analysis.  Also notice that the 
decision variables, x1 and x2, correspond to the two separate ATR CSs, C1 and C2.   
     The deviational variables, di+ and di-, represent the amount over or under the ith goal 
constraint when a particular ATR CS is chosen.  For instance, in the pFA goal constraint, 
the object is to have the lowest possible pFA while maintaining all other goals, if possible. 
Thus, the right-hand-side (RHS) of the pFA goal constraint is set to zero.  The lowest 
possible deviation (d1+) above 0 is the ideal solution for that particular goal, which is 
evident in the minimization aspect of the objective function.  The opposite is true of the 
remaining deviational variables since the problem formulation attempts to minimize the 
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amount under 1, the RHS of the remaining goal constraints, which an ATR CS forces 
upon the solution.  As a final aspect to the problem, the decision-maker made no mention 
of an acceptable pFA.  Though an acceptable CS was chosen by the LGP solution, the CS 
itself may fall short of an overall mission requirement not mentioned in the problem 
description.  However, since such constraints are easily added to an LGP formulation, the 
burden of correctly formulating all requirements and constraints for a given LGP solution 
falls on the analyst.   
     The solution to this simplified problem is the selection of C1 as the appropriate CS for 
use in the given mission.  However, the objective function value is 2.17 for the selection 
of C1 and 2.21 for the selection of C2.  This very slight difference has no statistical 
significance for choosing one CS over the other.  Thus, C1 has a very slight advantage 
with its low pFA, but C2 almost overcomes its deficiencies in spite of the decision-maker’s 
preference for a low probability of false alarm.   
     For the typical ATR CS comparison scenario, the decision variables, which 
correspond to N CSs to be compared, are binary.  Thus, selection of C1 in the previous 
example results in x1 equal to 1 while not selecting C2 results in x2 equal to 0.  In other 
words, there is no way to choose x1 equal to 0.5 and x2 equal to 0.5 since only one CS can 
be used by an aerial platform during its mission.  One technique in LGP to use in this 
case is the branch and bound method for integer solutions (2). 
     One hindrance in using the single LGP formulation for the given scenario is that the 
performance measures of the ATR CSs are point estimates of the actual values.  Thus, 
confidence intervals may be constructed around the point estimates in order to estimate 
the variance in the point estimates.  For the scenario in question, assume that there are 75 
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known targets and 50 known confusers.  Thus, C1 correctly detected 42 of the 75 targets 
and incorrectly declared 22 of the 50 confusers.  C2, on the other hand, correctly detected 
51 of the 75 targets but incorrectly declared 27 of the 50 confusers.  From these results, it 
should be clear that C1 correctly classified 32 and correctly identified 35 of the 42 
detected targets.  Similarly, C2 correctly classified 41 and correctly identified 47 of the 51 
detected targets.  Using confidence intervals like those detailed in section 2.2.1.4, the 
95% confidence intervals are generated and presented in Table 2.15. 
 
Table 2.15  Point Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals for LGP Example. 













PFA 0.302 0.440 0.578  0.402 0.540 0.678 
PD 0.448 0.560 0.672  0.574 0.680 0.786 
PCC 0.633 0.762 0.891  0.699 0.804 0.913 
PID 0.721 0.833 0.946  0.848 0.922 0.995 
 
     Having quantified the possible variance within each point estimate, it is evident that a 
single iteration of the LGP formulation will not suffice.  There are at least two 
approaches to assessing the variability within the given LGP formulation.  The first is to 
solve an LGP of each permutation of performance measures at the lower level, upper 
level, and mean values.  This results in 38 (6561) different LGP solutions.  Table 2.16 
lists the results from this approach.  From the results, it is clear that C1 is the superior 





Table 2.16  LGP Results at Tri-Level Performance Measure Values (6561 Reps). 
Classifier Wins Percentage Mean Z 
C1 3500 0.5335 2.1647 




     The second approach of comparing the two systems is to generate a Monte Carlo 
simulation of the point estimates of the probabilistic performance measures.  By using a 
random number generator, the point estimates are randomized and contain more variance 
than the previous method where the lower and upper bounds represented the greatest 
deviation from the point estimate.  The randomized estimates are then fed into the LGP 
formulation to produce an objective function value.  One benefit of this technique is that 
the number of replications performed is limited only by computational time and the 
random number generator used.  For the example, 10,000 replications were generated and 
each performance measure point estimate was distributed as a Normal distribution with a 
mean and variance based upon the data of Table 2.15.  The results, seen in Table 2.17, are 
very similar to the previous method.  The results indicate that C1 is a superior system, but 
with a smaller margin of difference.   
 
Table 2.17  Monte Carlo LGP Formulation Results (10,000 Reps). 
Classifier Wins Percentage Mean Z 
C1 5570 0.557 2.1664     




     The major advantages of the goal programming method are that all performance 
measures of an ATR CS could conceivably be incorporated into the LGP formulation of 
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CS comparison and that the decision-maker has control over the goal priority selection.  
Thus, each LGP formulation is tailored to the decision-maker’s objectives and uses the 
greatest amount of information possible to influence a decision.  Another benefit to LGP 
is the ability to quantify a system’s inability to meet a given desired performance level.  
The LGP can be formulated to reflect whether or not a given ATR CS can even meet the 
desired performance levels.  
     The disadvantages of the multiple replication techniques hinge upon the large amount 
of computational time, but more importantly, the reliance upon the initial point estimates 
used in the LGP formulation.  The point estimates used when building these comparisons 
should be well defined.  In other words, the performance measure point estimates must be 
based upon a reasonable number of replications that allow an analyst to make 
assumptions concerning the distribution of the performance measure.  Without this, the 
utility of the Monte Carlo and parameter levels (mean, upper bound, lower bound) 
comparison techniques are somewhat limited despite the large number of replications in 
each. 
     Overall, the LGP formulation depends on the preferences of the decision-maker.  Each 
parameter used within the LGP must make sense to the decision-maker for use in 
addressing the ultimate goals of the decision to be made.  Thus, if the LGP method does 
not mirror the objectives listed in the decision-maker’s fundamental objective hierarchy, 
then the results will be rather useless.  For instance, if a decision-maker’s objective is to 
find the classifier which best detects the targets in a SAR image, then the probability of 
detection should most likely be the performance measure which is weighted most heavily 
in the calculations. 
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          2.3.3.6  Decision Analysis (DA).   
     Since decisions are at the heart of ATR evaluation, a review of decision analysis (DA) 
methods and techniques is fitting.  The deficiencies in current techniques for comparing 
performance measures in ATR CSs are well known (7).  For instance, the direct 
comparison of probability performance measures is generally inadequate as these metrics 
provide information for only one decision threshold.  The AUC ROC performance 
measure solves this problem, but has been shown to be unreliable in the comparison of 
very similar systems (7,17,36,43,46).  In the biomedical analysis community, it is 
considered bad practice to compare the AUC for ROC curves that overlap (17,43).  The 
AUC for two CSs may be significantly different, but the implementation of the CSs may 
provide similar risk/benefit results and vice versa (17,46).  A DA approach could allow a 
decision-maker to quantify the risks and benefits of using two separate ATR CSs, 
compare the expected performance, and make the appropriate decision. 
     The field of decision analysis focuses on decisions where preferences and 
uncertainties need to be modeled.  The concept is to present a decision maker with a list 
of alternatives and their expected impact from which he or she may make a more 
informed decision (19).  The decision maker provides input as to the risks that he or she 
is willing to accept and anxious to avoid by indicating outcome preferences.  The benefits 
and drawbacks of each alternative are modeled in order to describe the problem at hand.  
Finally, the decision maker along with experts associated with the problem may provide 
insight into the uncertainties involved with making a decision, which are also modeled 
within the problem formulation.  Thus, subjective judgments may be included in the 
formulation of a DA approach to decision making.  While the incorporation of personal 
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judgments is necessary, these judgments should not be considered perfect.  Personal 
insights on uncertainty and system performance value can be misleading or limited (19).  
Therefore, DA techniques must be applied with care. 
     The concept behind DA is to use the known information about the problem at hand, 
provide expert opinion or standards to the uncertainty in the problem, and quantify the 
value of making a particular decision.  The DA process as a whole begins with a 
description of the problem.  Once the appropriate problem has been identified, the 
objectives and alternatives within the problem must be identified.  The next step is to 
decompose the problem into the structure of the decision, measure the unknown elements 
of the problem, and obtain the preferences or restrictions of the decision maker (19).  
When these elements of model formulation are complete, the best alternative should be 
selected.  Sensitivity analysis may then be performed on the decision to determine if 
small changes in the aspects of the model result in large changes in the outcome of the 
decision or even change the optimal decision.  If so, the decision maker may wish to 
reevaluate his or her decision.  If analysis indicates that the decision should be changed or 
more alternatives should be examined, then the modeling process begins again (19).  








Figure 2.27  Decision Analysis Process Flow Chart (19). 
 
     Modeling the problem is an important step that may immediately help a decision 
maker.  Influence diagrams provide a graphical approach to capturing each element that 
has an impact upon the decisions to be made or is impacted by the decisions after they are 
made.  Shapes within the influence diagram, or nodes, model the decisions, chance 
events, and value of outcomes (19).  In the influence diagram context, decisions are 
represented by squares, ovals represent problem uncertainty, and rectangles with rounded 
corners depict values.  Arrows, or arcs, indicate the relationship between the given nodes.  
As an example, suppose that a decision maker with an ample amount of capital must 
decide whether or not to invest in an emerging technology.  The decision depends upon 
the future success of the given technology.  If the decision maker invests and the venture 
succeeds, the result is a large monetary return.  If the venture fails, then the investor loses 
all of his capital.  The decision maker could also choose not to invest and merely keep the 
capital.  Figure 2.28 illustrates a simple influence diagram for the decision of whether or 
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Figure 2.28  Influence Diagram of New Technology Decision Problem (19). 
 
     Decision trees are a popular method of modeling the problem by portraying the 
structure of the decisions, events, and uncertainties.  Decision nodes, represented by 
squares, indicate where decisions are to be made within the problem.  Uncertainty nodes, 
depicted by circles, represent the unknown factors that impact the problem, such as 
events that may happen following a decision (19).  The events branching from an 
uncertainty node must be mutually exclusive (only one branch may be taken) and 
collectively exhaustive (no other alternatives for that node exist) (19).  At the end of the 
branch of a decision tree is the cost or value associated with the decision or outcome.  
The decision tree, typically viewed as a time progressing model from left to right, 
represents all possible paths that a decision maker may experience through the decision 
making process of a problem.  The time-oriented structure of a decision tree is important 
in that uncertainty nodes to the left of a decision node indicate that the decision depends 
on an unknown outcome within the problem domain.  A decision node to the left of an 
uncertainty node indicates that a decision is made and the uncertain events follow (19).  
Continuing from the previous technology investment example, further suppose that for an 
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investment of $2M the possible investment return would be $10M if the venture 
succeeds.  Experts expect that the technology has a 40% chance of being successful.  This 
information can be entered into the form of a decision tree.  Figure 2.29 depicts a 
simplistic decision tree for the decision maker deciding whether or not to invest in a new 
technology.     
 
Figure 2.29  Decision Tree Representation of New Technology Decision Problem. 
 
     Decision trees and influence diagrams are the primary modeling tools used in the DA 
problem solving approach.  Though not much information is displayed in influence 
diagrams, their strength is their simplistic representation of the problem.  Introducing a 
decision maker to the DA approach through influence diagrams is usually the preferred 
method.  Decision trees, on the other hand, depict each possible outcome and decision 
associated with the problem.  While this approach is helpful to the analyst and excellent 




















problems.  However, the decision should not be to use one over the other since they are 
isomorphic.  In other words, a decision tree can be constructed from a well- built 
influence diagram and vice versa (19).   
     Modeling uncertainty can be a very difficult task.  Quantifying a person’s feelings or 
beliefs about an uncertain aspect of a problem requires a degree of precision to make the 
solution useful.  The primary method of modeling chance events in a DA model is 
through the use of probability (19).  Since events preceding or following a decision may 
or may not happen with a certain probability, it is possible to model these events through 
probability models.  These probability models may be based upon known probability 
density functions, such as the normal or exponential functions, subjective probability 
estimation, historical data, or through data generated from Monte Carlo simulations. 
     Modeling the decision maker’s preferences is important in that almost every decision 
involves a trade-off.  It is possible to model a decision maker’s risk policy by developing 
a decision utility function.  While a decision may be made based upon the optimal 
expected outcome, a different alternative on the same decision may be made based on 
other factors associated with the decision (19).  For instance, consider the game proposed 
in Figure 2.30 where a player has the option to play one of two games (G1 and G2) that 
offer differing expected values over the long run.  In both games, the player flips a fair 
coin.  In G1, if the result is “heads” the player wins $30, while the player must pay $1 if 
“tails” is the outcome.  The expected long run value of G1 is $14.50.  G2, however, pays 
the player $2000 for “heads”, but requires a payment of $1900 for a “tails” result.  The 
expected value for G2 is $50, which is superior to G1 over the long run.  Under ordinary 
decision rules, the player would choose G2 to player in order to gain more winnings in the 
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long run.  However, the decision dynamics change if each game could only be played 
once.  In this case, the range of possible outcomes drives the decision.  The best case is 
for the player to choose G2 and win $2000.  However, in playing G2, the player risks 
losing $1900.  Most people would choose playing G1 and risking only $1 with the 
possibility of winning $30 instead of risking such a large amount of money in a game of 
chance (19).  Thus, this situation implies that a decision maker must incorporate a risk 
policy into the formulation of the problem model.  This can be accomplished through the 
use of preference modeling.  
 
Figure 2.30  Risk Gaming Example. 
 
     Utility functions capture the relationship between the value of an outcome and the risk 
the decision maker is willing to accept (19).  Different people respond to risk differently.  
Therefore, each decision maker has a personalized risk attitude utility function.  A risk-
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of person may elect to play one round of G2.  The chance of winning $2000 outweighs 
the risk of losing $1900 in a risk-seeker’s mind.  A risk-averse individual attempts to 
avoid risk.  This type of person may stick with G1 in the long run to avoid the loss of 
$1900 in a single coin flip.  A risk-neutral person ignores the effect of risk in a decision.  
For this individual, maximizing the expected value of a decision is the same as 
maximizing the expected utility of the same decision (19).  Figure 2.31 illustrates the 
shape of a utility function for the risk-seeking, the risk-averse, and the risk-neutral. 
 
Figure 2.31  Three Different Shapes for Utility Functions (19). 
  
     Advantages of the DA approach to comparing ATR CSs include the ability to compare 
multiple performance measures, the inclusion of decision maker standards and expert 
opinion, and the ability to perform sensitivity analysis on decision outcomes.  Despite 
these benefits, the DA approach does have its limitations.  The input from decision 













value on the outcome of a decision can be very difficult, especially if human life is 
involved.  Finally, the use of DA techniques does not guarantee a good decision.  The 










3.1  Overview 
 
 
     The goal of this research is to create a credible, defensible method for making 
decisions concerning ATR technology development while using all of the pertinent 
measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs), including all of 
the interested parties, and incorporating the preferences and values of the decision-
makers.  In regards to the interested parties, the role of the ATR evaluator is to oversee 
ATR evaluation at the research and development level, but the evaluator may or may not 
be an expert on what performance levels a fielded ATR system may require.  The 
warfighter, on the other hand, will ultimately use the ATR end product in an operational 
environment and should understand the impact of ATR operational effectiveness, but 
may or may not fully understand the intricacies of ATR performance assessment, 
particularly during the testing phase.  Thus, the concept is to construct two separate 
decision analysis frameworks: one for the ATR evaluator and one for the warfighter.  The 
end product of each framework will be a value score for each ATR system.  These scores 
may then be analyzed for use in decision-making.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the approach of 
translating ATR CS MOPs into a single value score from both perspectives. 
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Figure 3.1  Overall MOP Translation Methodology. 
 
  
     The objective of this research is to define an evaluation methodology.  Though care 
was taken with scenario creation and sensor instantiation, the combat models used in this 
research do have noted limitations.    
     This chapter is organized as follows.  First, an analysis of alternatives approach, as 
endorsed by the United States Air Force, is reviewed.  A summary of the ATR evaluator 
decision framework construction is given, which includes example results using data 
from the MSTAR program.  Next, a process for translating ATR MOPs into operational 
MOEs is introduced, followed by an overview of the Extended Air Defense Simulation 
(EADSIM) combat model.  Finally, a description of the warfighters’ decision analysis 
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3.2  Analysis of Alternatives 
 
 
     3.2.1  Overview.   
     The following section serves as a review of the “basic elements and practices” of 
analysis, particularly within the United States Air Force (24).  Good analytical practices 
can be standardized to a large extent (24).  The following elements of analysis provided 
the roadmap to the ensuing research and emphasize the importance of tailoring the 
methodology to meet the goal.  Therefore, subsequent use of this ATR evaluation 
methodology should include a detailed study into the following elements before 
application. 
     3.2.2  Goals.   
     The ultimate goal of ATR technology development is to provide a useful ATR system 
to the end users.  The idea is to develop an ATR system, or a set of ATR systems, that 
performs better than any other and employ that system in an operational environment.  If 
the technology is well-developed, the ATR system will decrease the time required for a 
warfighter to make particular decisions by condensing the immense amount of 
information that must be processed before a decision is made (42).  Thus, the real-time 
battlefield decision process may be shortened, and battlefield management resources may 
be applied towards other activities (42).  The goal must include the impact of military 
worth.  Military worth may be summarized through the use of six different attributes: 
Time to achieve objective, Targets placed at risk, Targets negated (killed), Level of 
collateral damage, Friendly survivors, and Resources required (24).  The alternatives, i.e. 
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each ATR CS being compared, may then be subjected to a cost versus effectiveness 
analysis.   
     3.2.3  Tasks.  
     Tasks are the means by which goals are achieved.  The delineation of these tasks is the 
responsibility of the decision-maker.  These tasks may change as the scenario, i.e. the 
operational environment, changes.  Thus, it is important to either construct a 
methodology that is robust for all possible scenarios or to clearly state the different 
scenarios (tasks) with which the results may be associated.    
     3.2.4 MOEs and MOPs.   
     The practicality of the DA models described below depends on the accuracy and 
acceptance of the associated MOPs and MOEs.  As defined by the Office of Aerospace 
Studies, MOEs are used in measuring proficiency in the performance of a task (24).  As 
useful guidelines, MOEs should be associated with a single task, should not be strongly 
correlated with one another, and should typically be the raw number of an outcome or 
occurrence.  Additionally, cost is never an MOE (24).  MOPs are typically “a qualitative 
measure of a system characteristic chosen to enable calculation of one or more MOEs” 
(24).  Thus, MOPs are used as inputs to describe the system for which the MOEs will be 
used in the analysis of alternatives.   
     Most of the MOPs used in this research were established at the time of the MSTAR 
program.  However, MOPs do evolve as the ATR technologies change.  New approaches 
and capabilities to solving target recognition problems require new metrics for assessing 
ATR performance; thus, MOPs are not necessarily stable.  On the other hand, the goals 
for any given ATR technology should be.  Therefore, while a new ATR program may be 
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assessed with a different metric, i.e. the definition of PD changes, the objective of 
correctly identifying targets does not. 
 
3.3  ATR Evaluator Decision Analysis (DA) Model 
 
 
     3.3.1  Overview.  
     The following is a summary of the research captured in the Air Force Institute of 
Technology technical report entitled “Application of Decision Analysis to Automatic 
Target Recognition Programmatic Decisions” (40).  The research found within the 
technical report constitutes a joint dissertation research effort and serves as a feasibility 
study for influencing ATR programmatic decisions using decision analysis (DA) 
techniques from an ATR evaluator’s perspective (39).  The results of the study indicate 
that DA tools and techniques can be implemented to influence ATR technology 
programmatic decisions.  Figure 3.2 highlights the portion of the performance measure 











Figure 3.2  Evaluator Portion of the MOP Translation Methodology. 
 
     3.3.2  Decision Situation.   
     To begin construction of the DA framework, a subject matter expert (SME) from 
AFRL/SN provided input for the construction of the decision framework from an 
evaluation community perspective.  This individual, who represented the various 
decision-makers and SMEs throughout the ATR evaluation organization, provided all 
decision-making preferences, values, and utility functions for the model.  The SME’s 
value and utility preference structure was elicited over several meetings.  
     To better understand the construction of the decision analysis model, the different 
ways in which ATR systems may be employed must be defined.  There are two basic 
employment concepts for ATR technology: Combat Identification (CID) and 
Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR) (40).  The CID employment profile is 
implemented when the primary objective of the ATR CS is to select targets for weapon 
systems (40).  In this scenario, the ATR system is allowed to sacrifice detection 
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associated with a high degree of confidence as to minimize the number of false alarms.  
The ISR employment profile is used when the primary objective of the ATR CS is to 
collect information for many potential targets, i.e., classification accuracy may be 
sacrificed for improved detection performance (40).  For the purposes of the research 
found in the technical report, each employment concept was considered separately.  In 
this research, the two are combined within a scenario and considered to be of equal 
importance.     
     3.3.3  Encoding the Value Hierarchy.   
     The intention of the research was to create a decision framework that applied to 
several different ATR technology programs, e.g. MSTAR, AGRI, NCTI, as well as to 
several different programmatic decision types, e.g. technology investment, transition, or 
competition.  Therefore, a wide variety of performance measures are incorporated into 
the decision analysis model.  Figure 3.2 provides a depiction of the resultant ATR 




Figure 3.3   Value Hierarchy for Influencing ATR Evaluator Decisions. 
 
     The nodes and their associated numbers featured in Figure 3.2 indicate the weight, or 
value, that the evaluator places on the given objective, or area of performance. For 
instance, the Classification Ability node accounts for 11% of the total influence on the 
decision.  Within the Classification Ability performance area, the Classify by Type 
measure of performance constitutes 47.4% of the Classification Ability score while the 
Classify by Class measure comprises the remaining 52.6%.  The figure also indicates that 
the evaluator places the most value on the performance measures associated with the 
Robustness objective (20%), while the Cost objective is the least important (10%).  Table 
3.1 gives the total value attributable to each MOP.  This total possible value is calculated 
by multiplying the appropriate weights along each branch of the value hierarchy for a 
given MOP and represents the total value provided by the MOP were it at its maximum 




















































































value.  This provides insight into the relative importance of each individual MOP to the 
evaluator.  The individual MOPs are also ranked according to this total possible weight in 
Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1  Total Possible Value Attributable to Each MOP (Evaluator). 




%∆ PD (TGT/NTGT) 0.0850 4 
%∆ PID (Type) 0.0550  8 
 
Robustness 
%∆ PCC (Class) 0.0600  6 
FAR|PD 0.0729  5 Detection 
Performance PFA|PD 0.0971  3 
Employment Concept Employment Rating 0.1500  1 
Declaration Ability PDEC 0.1300  2 
PID 0.0521   9 Classification 
Ability PCC 0.0579  7 
Development Money 0.0002  21-23 
Development Time 0.0002  21-23 
Development Expertise 0.0002  21-23 
Development Risk 0.0004  20 
Redeployment Money 0.0041  19 
Redeployment Time 0.0052  18 
Redeployment Expertise 0.0093  17 
Redeployment Risk 0.0104  16 
Use Money 0.0152  15 







Use Expertise 0.0244  14 
ES-PD 0.0466  10-12 
ES-PCC 0.0466  10-12 
Self-Assessment 
Accuracy 




     The value hierarchy illustrates how ATR system measures of performance influence 
programmatic decisions.  For this example, the weights were elicited for a competition 
decision between three different ATR CSs.  In fact, the framework could be used to 
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influence any number of decisions made by the ATR evaluator, but the corresponding 
weights on the various nodes would most likely be different (40).  This points to the 
flexibility of the decision analysis approach, but also hints at the time consumption 
associated with the value elicitation of the decision framework construction.  MOPs are 
introduced to the DA framework to produce a single value score.  This score incorporates 
the preference structure of the decision-maker.  Thus, the subjective preferences of the 
decision-maker are quantified and then translated into a single score, which may be 
evaluated objectively.    
     3.3.4  Results Using MSTAR Data.  
     Since the ATR evaluator data served as a feasibility study, real world data was applied 
to the model.  The performance characteristics of three different ATR systems, labeled A, 
B, and C, were introduced to the evaluator’s model.  From discussions with the SME, it 
was clear that ATR B was considered to be the superior system performance-wise.  The 





Figure 3.4  Plot of ATR Value Under Certainty. 
Figure 3.5  Plot of ATR Value Under Uncertainty. 
 
















































Figure 3.6  Plot of ATR Utility Under Uncertainty. 
 
      Analysis of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 would indicate that ATR B is the superior performer in 
almost every situation.  In fact, in terms of value, it ranks as the best ATR CS except 
when value is assessed for the CID employment concept.  In terms of utility, ATR A 
ranks as possibly a better choice than ATR B for the CID employment concept.  In terms 
of a value-to-cost-ratio, though, ATR C ranks as possibly a better choice than ATR B for 
the CID employment concept.  Since the value score for ATR C lies above an imaginary 
line between ATR A and ATR B in Figure 3.4, it must have a higher value to cost ratio 
for the CID case.  For the ISR case, it seems that the value and utility measures are much 
lower.  This conclusion follows since the ATR is not expected to perform as well at ISR 
settings, i.e. a high probability of detection results in a high probability of false alarm.  
Again, ATR B dominates the field except for ATR C, which again exhibits a higher 
utility measure and a higher utility-to-cost ratio for the ISR case in Figure 3.6.  The 
conclusion that ATR B is probably the superior ATR CS falls in line with the overall 
























performance assessments given by the ATR evaluators involved in the testing.  The 
results allow a graphical comparison and provide insight into the measurable differences 
between the ATR CSs.  
 
Table 3.2  ATR CS Expected Value and Expected Utility Results. 
  ATR A ATR B ATR C 
CID 0.509 0.537 0.525 Value  
(Certainty) ISR 0.497 0.531 0.497 
CID 0.509 0.556 0.525 Value  
(Uncertainty) ISR 0.497 0.531 0.497 
CID 0.572 0.507 0.518 Utility  
(Uncertainty) ISR 0.414 0.455 0.439 
 
 
Table 3.3  Ranked ATR CS Alternatives by Expected Value and Utility. 
  ATR A ATR B ATR C 
CID 3 1 2 Value  
(Certainty) ISR 2 1 2 
CID 3 1 2 Value  
(Uncertainty) ISR 2 1 2 
CID 1 3 2 Utility  




3.4  Process for Translating MOPs into MOEs  
 
 
     3.4.1  Overview.   
     While the ATR evaluator DA framework uses ATR MOPs as a direct input, the 
warfighter DA model requires MOEs for inputs into the value hierarchy.   Thus, two 
extra steps are required before the warfighter DA model can produce value scores.  First, 
ATR MOPs must be translated into operational results, via a combat model in this case.  
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Next, the combat model outputs must be slightly altered into the form of MOEs that are 
of interest to the warfighter.  For this research, EADSIM served as the combat model for 
its ability to accurately model ATR technology effects, its operational modeling level of 
detail, its acceptance throughout the armed forces simulation community, and its 
operating system diversity.  Figure 3.7 highlights the portion of the performance measure 
translation methodology being discussed. 
 
Figure 3.7  Combat Model Portion of the MOP Translation Methodology. 
 
     3.4.2  Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM).   
     EADSIM, produced by Teledyne Brown Engineering, Inc., is the combat model used 
for producing outputs that may be translated into MOEs for the warfighter DA 
framework.  EADSIM is a system-level simulation designed to be used by combat 
developers, material developers, and operational commanders to assess the effectiveness 
of Theater Missile Defense and air defense systems against the full spectrum of extended 
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missile warfare, an integrated simulation tool to support joint and combined force 
operations, and a tool to augment exercises with realistic air defense training (67).  
EADSIM allows a user to explicitly model sensors and their interaction with objects 
within the battle space.  EADSIM was selected for its level of engagement detail, 
hardware platform diversity, and DoD acceptance.  For further validity, EADSIM was 
most recently selected to serve as the constructive model for the Targets Under Trees 
program (1).      
     Figure 3.8 depicts the EADSIM data and module architecture, which consists of three 
separate sections: the Simulation Setup, the Run-Time Models, and the Post-Simulation 
Analysis (68).  For routine use, EADSIM is comprised of three separate modules: 
Scenario Generation, Scenario Playback, and Post-Processing.  The Scenario Generation 
module allows a user to create a battle space, deploy forces, and select scenario execution 
preferences.  The Scenario Playback module allows the user to view the scenario results 
in two or three dimensions, highlight objects or actions of interest, and visually debug 
problems occurring within the execution of a scenario.  The Post-Processing module 
allows the user to select various engagement, detection, and communication statistics for 




Figure 3.8 EADSIM Architecture (68). 
 
     3.4.3  EADSIM Scenario Construction.  
     EADSIM models battle space players at the system level.  An EADSIM user 
collectively associates various elements along with a ruleset to create a system.  Elements 
used by a particular system include airframes, weapons, communication devices, sensors, 
formations, and jammers.  The ruleset defines how the particular system will react with 
other systems and actions in the scenario.  Once an acceptable system is defined, the user 
deploys a system as a platform within a scenario.  Thus, a single ruleset and applicable 
elements within EADSIM are grouped together to define a system.  A platform is an 
instance of the particular system deployed within an EADSIM scenario.   A user can 
employ ground-based and airborne platforms easily within an EADSIM scenario.  
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Additionally, the deployed platforms may be specified as Friendly (Blue force) or Foe 
(Red force).  EADSIM scenarios consist of laydowns, which are specified collections of 
deployed platforms.  Differing platform formations or characteristics may be saved under 
different laydowns rather than creating an entirely new scenario.  Figure 3.9 depicts the 
relationship between elements, systems, platforms, laydowns, and scenarios in EADSIM.   
 
Figure 3.9  Graphical Explanation of EADSIM Scenario Construction. 
 
     For the purposes of this research, two different types of airborne platforms were 
deployed in EADSIM: an ISR platform (using the AWACS ruleset) and a CID platform 
(using the AG_ATTACKER ruleset).  The sensors on each were altered to mimic the 
performance of a SAR sensor.  First, the sensors are pointed at angles and given detection 
range limitations appropriate for a SAR sensor.  The Non-cooperative Target Recognition 
(NCTR) and Detection Parameters settings were changed at the sensor element level.  
These changes indicate how well the airborne sensor can detect and classify potential 
targets of a given type.  The Detection Parameters and NCTR settings can be changed at 
Blue Forces
Red Forces
















the ground-based component to indicate how effectively the ground-based system hides 
from the airborne sensor, but were not for this study. 
     The scenario executes in the following manner.  A Blue ISR platform launches from a 
Blue airbase to detect ground targets in the immediate area, which is roughly 8100 km2.  
The ISR platform relays track information to a ground site, which transfers the 
information to the Ground Commander, or Air Operations Center (AOC).  The AOC then 
schedules air-to-ground fighters, using the ATR technology in the CID mode, for 
engagement against possible ground targets.  The fighters engage only if their own ATR 
assessment agrees with the ISR platform’s assessment at the Friend or Foe level.  Thus, if 
the ISR platform designates a Blue Tank to be hostile, the fighter will only expend a 
weapon if his own ATR assessment agrees that the target is hostile.    
     3.4.4  Assumptions.   
     As for the objects being modeled, a change necessary for EADSIM to accurately 
model the effects of an ATR CS in the scenario is the removal of Identification Friend or 
Foe (IFF) devices, which is a reasonable assumption for ground targets.  When a new 
target is detected, it is placed in the track file of the detecting system.  One of the first 
actions by the detecting system is to perform an IFF check.  If the IFF is working 
properly, there is no way for a sensor to misclassify a target.  To notice the effects of 
misclassification, the IFF was disabled on ground platforms.   Another correctable issue 
with EADSIM is the fact that Friendly ground-based units are not added to the track files.  
Therefore, all Friendly ground-based entities were created as Foes, but tagged as Friends 
during scenario generation.     
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     There are many different possible scenarios faced by the armed forces of the United 
States.  Whether it is a conventional attack or a peacekeeping mission, the warfighter 
must be ready.  Computation time and the sheer magnitude of possible scenarios prohibit 
the full study of this area.  Thus, a single scenario location and force mixture is used for 
all of the analysis contained in the research involving EADSIM.  There are a few 
assumptions made throughout the scenario.  The first major set of assumptions is the 
employment of ATR technologies within the scenario.  It is assumed that the ISR 
platform is using a mature ATR technology, orbits the battle space searching for targets, 
and passes track information to a ground commander for use in vectoring fighters to 
targets.  The fighters serve as the CID platform in the scenario.  Once tasked by a ground 
commander, they must detect the target with their onboard CID sensor before engaging.  
The ATR technologies on the aircraft are assumed to be the same ATR system operating 
at different PD levels.  These assumptions, though they disregard additional players 
within the scenario and do not accurately describe current operations, are fairly 
reasonable.  Analysis of the flow of information from the ISR platform to the CID 
fighters is not the main objective of this research. 
     Next, within the scenario, engagements are limited to friendly air-to-ground strikes in 
order to gather battlefield effects based solely on the implementation of ATR systems.  It 
is assumed that enemy aircraft do not attack friendly air forces while they are detecting, 
classifying, or attacking targets.  The underlying assumption is that Friendly forces have 
achieved air superiority or are providing adequate air protection during sorties.  This 
assumption allows for analysis of the direct effects of employing ATR technology within 
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the operational scenario.  If this assumption were not made, it would not be clear if 
employing ATR technologies enabled the destruction of enemy ground targets.   
     3.4.5  MOE Translation from Combat Model Outputs.   
     Executing the EADSIM scenario produces both a playback file and user-selected data 
files from which post-processing reports may be generated.  EADSIM provides the 
number of systems destroyed, the number of weapons expended, and the number of 
remaining systems for friendly, hostile and neutral forces.  EADSIM also tracks the 
length of the conflict and records when each detection, engagement, success, and failure 
occurs.  EADSIM post-processing reports may be tailored to capture events or specific 
platforms of interest. 
     The combat outputs must be translated for application to the warfighter DA model.  
Table 3.4 lists the MOEs used by the warfighter DA framework and the EADSIM outputs 













Table 3.4  Warfighter DA Model MOEs and Associated EADSIM Outputs. 
Objective MOE EADSIM Output Utilized 
% of Bombs Left Engagement Report Analysis
% of Mass Destruction Left Engagement Report Analysis




% of S/A & A/A Left Engagement Report Analysis
% of Systems Left Success Category 
% of Personnel Left Engagement Report Analysis
Minimize Hostile 
Warfighting  
Systems % of C2 Left Success Category 
Length of Battle Determined by Scenario or 
GA: Scramble 
# of Civilians Killed Engagement Report Analysis




# of Fratricide Incidents Engagement Report Analysis
% of Systems Left Success Category 





% of C2 Left Success Category 
% of Precision Bombs Left Weapons Category &  
GA: Scramble 
% of Dumb Bombs Left Weapons Category &  
GA: Scramble 






% of S/A & A/A Left Engagement Report Analysis
    
 
 
     The Length of Battle MOE is implicitly calculated as a simulation runtime is 
established during EADSIM scenario creation.  Since no other means of halting EADSIM 
model execution exists, the Length of Battle MOE must be calculated in a different, but 
reasonable, manner or conceded.  A possible way to account for the length of time is to 
run the model for a small segment, say one day, and apply the results of the smaller 
segment to that of a longer segment, i.e. one week.  Another method would be to mark 
the time when a certain status is reached within the scenario.  For instance, the Length of 
Battle time could refer to when the friendly forces destroy at least 50% of the hostile 
forces.  The limitations of this second method are that the result fixes the level of another 
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MOE (in this case, % of Hostile Systems Remaining), and there are no guarantees that the 
fixed MOE will meet a predefined level throughout the scenario.  Finally, this MOE 
could be held standard across all ATR CSs being evaluated.  The method for calculating 
Length of Battle ultimately depends on the preferences of the analyst translating the 
MOEs and should be explained when presenting the value scores of the warfighter.  For 
the purposes of this study, the Length of Battle MOE was assumed to be proportional to 
the number of sorties accomplished in the given time frame.  This method rewards ATR 
CSs that do not send out fighters against friendly and neutral targets, but penalizes ATR 
CSs that send many fighters out in the hopes of destroying enemy targets.  It is arguable 
whether or not more sorties increase the length of the battle as more sorties may weaken 
the enemy’s resistance, thereby shortening the war.  However, more sorties may also 
result in more civilian casualties, which may bring more parties into the conflict or cut 
allied forces involvement. 
     To calculate the number of personnel and the number of weapons remaining, it is 
necessary to make assumptions concerning how many are associated with each weapon 
system.  For the given weapon systems in the EADSIM scenario, personnel and weapon 
amounts were estimated using data from Operation Desert Storm (64).  Thus, when a 
ground target is destroyed, it is assumed that a given amount of ammunition and 







3.5  Warfighter Decision Analysis (DA) Model 
 
 
     3.5.1  Overview.   
     The warfighter DA model actually uses a subset of the MOPs utilized by the 
evaluators’ DA model, as seen in Figure 3.10.  Thus, no aspect of ATR system cost or 
risk, as quantified by the ATR evaluator, is included.  The result is that the warfighter 
model ultimately depends solely on the performance characteristics of the ATR CS.  
Another important difference between the evaluator and the warfighter DA models is that 
the latter implicitly combines the effects of both employment concepts—ISR and CID, 
while the former treated them as two different entities.  Figure 3.11 highlights the portion 















Figure 3.10  Description of MOP Differences Between Evaluator and Warfighter. 
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     3.5.2  Decision Situation.  
     For the construction of the warfighter DA framework, an SME from ACC/DRSA 
refined an original framework developed in preparation for research discussion.  The 
individual defined tasks that directly supported the overall goal of a generic scenario that 
incorporates ATR technology: achieve the mission objective.  The goal is reached with 
the completion of required tasks defined by the SME.  These tasks also incorporate the 
aspects of military worth previously mentioned.  The proficiency of task completion is 
measured via the associated MOEs.  Figure 3.12 illustrates the flow from Goal to Tasks 
to MOEs.   
     3.5.3  Encoding the Value Hierarchy.   
     To begin the warfighter value hierarchy encoding, the SME also provided initial 
estimates for the value functions (59).  Ultimately, three additional individuals from 
ACC/DR contributed weights used to establish the decision-maker preference structure of 
the framework.  Each individual filled out a sample DA model framework, and the results 
were averaged to create a collective model (59).  The resultant value hierarchy is 
presented in Figure 3.12. 
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Figure 3.12  Warfighter DA Framework. 
 
     In regards to military worth, this DA model includes all of the aforementioned items 
of interest.  The Length of Battle MOE refers to the time required to achieve the 
objective.  The MOEs that involve civilian deaths, destroyed civilian structures, and 
allied fratricide attempt to place a value on the level of collateral damage caused by 
fighting.  The Maximize Warfighting Systems Remaining objective highlights the 
importance of targets placed at risk and the value added by having friendly survivors.  
The Minimize Warfighting Systems Remaining objective captures the military worth of 
killing enemy targets.  Finally, the Maximize Expendables Remaining objective attempts 
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     Typically, inputs into a value hierarchy are of the same units, e.g. dollars, time, etc.  
However, in this case, the various MOEs do not share the same unit structure.  For 
instance, Length of Battle is measured in days while the majority of the MOEs are 
percentage measures.  This situation requires a value (utility) function to translate the raw 
MOEs into a space that makes the values compatible throughout the DA model.  The 
primary function of the value (utility) functions is to force the MOEs onto a 0 to 1 value 
(utility) scale for comparison sake.  For this process, the SME served as the decision-
maker for constructing value and utility functions for the MOE inputs (59).  Utility 
functions were based upon reaching an 80% solution relative to the value functions (59).  
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 illustrate the various value and utility curves employed within the 
warfighter’s DA model.  Due to the similarity in most of the value and utility functions, 















































































































































Figure 3.14  Utility Functions for Warfighter DA Model. 
 
     Table 3.5 provides the total possible value attributable to each MOP.  The total 
possible value attributable is calculated by multiplying the appropriate weights along the 

































































































































of value the MOE would contribute to the overall score were it at its maximum value.  
The MOEs are also ranked by their respective total possible weights in Table 3.5.  The 
results provide insight into the importance of each individual MOE.   
 
Table 3.5  Total Possible Value Attributable to Each MOE (Warfighter). 




% of Bombs Left 0.0102  14 
% of Mass Destruction Left 0.0596  5 




% of S/A & A/A Left 0.0513  6 
% of Systems Left 0.2149  2 
% of Personnel Left 0.0682 4 
Minimize Hostile 
Warfighting  
Systems % of C2 Left 0.2977  1 
Length of Battle 0.0124  13 
# of Civilians Killed 0.0241  11 




# of Fratricide Incidents 0.0877  3 
% of Systems Left 0.0279  9-10 
% of Personnel Left 0.0457 7 
Maximize Friendly  
Weapons 
Remaining % of C2 Left 0.0279  9-10 
% of Dumb Bombs Left 0.0032  18 
% of Precision Bombs Left 0.0073  15 












4.1  Overview   
 
 
     This chapter details how the proposed evaluation methodology could be applied to 
mature ATR technologies for influencing programmatic decisions or providing combat 
model analysis involving ATR technologies.  First, a combat scenario and performance 
characteristics for three different ATR systems are generated.  These MOPs are then 
applied to the ATR evaluator DA framework and produce a single value score for each 
ATR system.  Next, the performance characteristics are introduced to EADSIM, the 
combat model.  EADSIM results are then translated into MOEs.  The MOEs are then 
applied to the warfighter DA framework to produce a value score for each system.  
Finally, the two different value scores are analyzed within the decision analysis context. 
 
 
4.2  Scenario and Measures of Performance (MOPs) Generation   
 
 
     The following scenario considers three different, mature ATR systems for evaluation.  
The scenario involves an airborne ISR platform, multiple CID air-to-ground fighters, and 
various friendly, enemy, and neutral (FEN) ground targets.  The purpose of the airborne 
friendly units within the scenario is to detect all FEN targets while accurately 
distinguishing between those to be destroyed (enemy) and those to be avoided (friendly 
and neutral).  The objectives of the ISR platform are to detect as many potential targets as 
possible and relay the tracking information to the ground commander, who may vector 
air-to-ground fighters to the potential targets.  The objectives of the CID platforms 
 
4-2 
include responding to potential targets handed out by the ground commander, detecting 
the targets using its own sensor, and destroying the target if the original ISR classification 
is verified.   
     The definitions of the ISR and CID employment settings, summarized in Table 4.1, 
are based upon recommendations held by various ATR decision-making authorities.  The 
operating areas of the two different employment settings are marked along notional ROC 
curves in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.  To describe the process conceptually, ATR A will operate 
at an ISR and a CID level, each having an associated PD and PFA performance level that 
produces a ROC curve (Figure 4.1).  With a given PD setting, a PID and PFID level may be 
generated from a point on the PID ROC curve (Figure 4.2).  The definitions for PD, PFA, 
and PID presented in Section      2.2.3 are used.  The probability of false identification 
term, PFID, may be thought of as a false alarm measurement where the false alarms 





TypeFIDP Type)-Non|Type""P(D, ,       (4.1) 
such that 




TypeFIDP Type)-Non|Type)P(D-NonD,|P(“Type”       (4.2) 
where D is the event of a target detection, and “Type” is the declaration of an ROI as a 
“Type” target.  In other words, when focusing on PID-MRLS, PFID-MRLS accounts for all 
Red_Tanks, Intel Trucks, Blue_Tanks, and Neutral trucks rather than clutter objects.   
     For this study, the overall PD and PID MOPs are decomposed into an individual 
measure for each of the five target types, i.e. PD-Type and PID-Type.  For example,  
PID-MRLS = P(D,”MRLS”|MRLS),        (4.3) 
 
4-3 
where D is the event of a target detection, and “MRLS” is the declaration of an ROI as a 
MRLS.  Hence, 
     PID-MRLS = P(“MRLS”|D,MRLS)P(D|MRLS).                       (4.4) 
The first term to the right of the equality is taken from the approximate identification 
ROC curve.  The second term is taken from the appropriate detection ROC curve.  In this 
study, a constant probability of detection is assumed for all target types. This method 
allows a higher input resolution when introducing the MOPs into a combat model.   
 









ISR PD > 0.9 PID > 0.7 Large 
CID PD  > 0.6 PID  > 0.95 Small 
 











Figure 4.2 Identification Performance Points of ISR and CID Employment Settings. 
 
     The ATR systems, labeled A, B, and C, have differing performance advantages and 
disadvantages.  The performance measures for each ATR system are generated using a 
Microsoft Excel® worksheet.  First, Gaussian target and non-target population densities 
are chosen to represent the possible objects to be found within the scene.  As described in 
Section      2.2.7, a distance measure, ∆m, represents the difference between the means of 
the two populations.  A spread ratio, s, represents the ratio of the standard deviation of 
the target population to the non-target population.  For generating MOPs to be used in 
this study, the spread ratios are all assumed to be one as the force mixture of the scenario 
would be unknown to the ATR developers.  These two measures are then used to 
construct continuous, binormal ROC curves and the associated performance data.  For 
example, using the performance data for ATR A and given an ISR PD-RED_TANK of 0.9 (the 













Red Tank population, which corresponds to an enemy tank known to each ATR system, 
compared to other non-Red Tanks type targets has a distance measure of 1.43 and a 
spread ratio of 1.0, as seen in Table A.2.  The two measures correspond to PID-RED_TANK 
settings of 0.890 and 0.830 and PFID-RED_TANK of 0.123 and 0.318 when the PD-RED_TANK is 
set to 0.6 (CID) and 0.9 (ISR), respectively.  The data for each ATR and potential target 
can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2.  Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 depict the ISR and CID 
ROC curves for ATR systems A, B, and C.  Using the average AUC measure in Table 
A.2 to compare between the systems, it is unclear which is the best system as ATR A is 
the best CID system, while ATR B is the best ISR system.  It would seem that ATR C is 
the better performer at a CID setting while ATR B is the better performer when operating 
in an ISR mode when examining the overall averages of the PID, PCC, and PFA measures 
of the two different employment settings in Table A.1.  However, it is meaningless to 
examine the measures outside of their PD-PFA and PID-PFID relationships.  For example, 
an ATR CS could have a PID of 0.999, but it may occur when PFID also equals 0.999, 
which is a very undesirable performance level.  Also notice that the ISR and CID levels 
are set at the most liberal levels, i.e. PD is set to 0.6 and 0.9.  This provides a worst-case 




Figure 4.3  ATR System A Performance Expressed Through ROC Curves. 
 
Figure 4.4  ATR System B Performance Expressed Through ROC Curves. 
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Figure 4.5  ATR System C Performance Expressed Through ROC Curves. 
 
     Each of the three notional ATR CSs also has an associated probability of false alarm 
and false alarm rate, as seen in Tables A.1 and A.3.  The FAR is different from the PFA in 
that it refers to the amount of clutter items, i.e., natural objects, buildings, and untrained 
vehicles, which will be detected and perhaps classified as targets when a given area is 
scanned.  The PFA measure refers to the probability that a non-target will be incorrectly 
classified as a target.  To incorporate FAR and PFA measures for a particular sensor within 
EADSIM, intensive time requirements and advanced sensor modeling are necessary.   
Due to these difficulties, FAR and PFA effects were left out of EADSIM and the surrogate 
model as well.  Leaving the false alarm performance out of the combat models ignores 
the effects of CID platforms being tasked to seek and possibly destroy civilian structures, 
vehicles, and natural objects not included in the trained target set.  These effects 
predominantly impact the number of sorties generated and weapons used (as the number 
of detected objects increases), the number of neutral entities destroyed (as more clutter 
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objects are detected), and the length of the battle (as there should be more total objects to 
evaluate and the proportion of detected enemy targets to the total number of detected 
targets shrinks).  Thus, for this study, no clutter, i.e. untrained, objects are considered 
within the combat models.  Instead, the PFID, which refers to simply non-type objects 
declared a different type rather than unknown objects declared as a certain type, is used 
within the combat models rather than the traditional PFA.  For instance, the PFID-MRLS 
measure considers the other four objects of interest (Red_Tank, Intel, Blue_Tank, and 
Neutral) to be non-targets.  This concept is visualized in Figure 4.6 using the MRLS 
population as an example.   
 
Figure 4.6  PID and PFID Calculation Concept for EADSIM Input. 
 
     Though not used within the combat models, the FAR of each ATR CS is used as an 
input to the Evaluator DA model.  The false alarm rates, which are optimistic, were 
generated for this scenario to negate the false alarm effect that might be experienced via 




















First, the ATR systems are assumed to be mature.  The false alarm performance of future 
ATR CSs is uncertain, but should always improve as ATR technology improves.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a mature ATR system may have such a FAR in 
the future.  Next, the map used for the scenario is focused around a desert.  In fact, a 
Kuwaiti map is used as the backdrop for the scenario.  In such an environment, the 
number of false alarms should be drastically reduced due to a low incidence of foliage 
and a low number of vehicles in the area.  Finally, it could be assumed that the ISR 
platform excludes detections outside a certain area of interest, i.e. the battlespace, which 
could dramatically reduce the impact of the FAR.    
     As an MOP input to EADSIM, PID is considered to be a given performance measure 
in response to a given PD level.  Thus, the PID, associated with a given PD and PFA, has 
been estimated by an ATR evaluator through testing.  The PID measure is pivotal when 
introducing ATR CS MOPs into EADSIM.  ATR performance measures are introduced 
into EADSIM in the following way.  First, a PD is defined for every target object within 
the scenario.  Additionally, a PD may be defined for each of the target types within 
EADSIM, as it was in this study.  Next, for each target type, a Non-Cooperative Target 
Recognition (NCTR) matrix is defined.  This matrix, which sums to one, details the 
probability that EADSIM is to declare a particular object (in truth) should it detect it 
within the area scanned by the radar system.  Using the example given in Table 4.2, the 
matrix represents the identification options for a Red_Tank.  Thus, if a sensor detects an 
object (known to be a Red_Tank object by EADSIM), the sensor has an 83% chance of 
correctly identifying the object as a Red_Tank.  Similarly, the sensor has a 17.7% chance 
of declaring the object as a Blue_Tank.  The PB, PR, and PU columns correspond to the 
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probabilities associated with declaring a target type as Blue (Friendly), Red (Enemy), or 
Unknown.  In this study, the target types are automatically associated with their correct 
FEN association to ensure that all Red targets are attacked, which is reasonable under the 
assumption that Red_Tanks are of a certain type, e.g. T-72, and Blue_Tanks are from 
another, e.g. M-1A1.  For example, if a tank-like object is detected and classified as a T-
72, there is no reason to conclude that the tank is friendly.  Thus, the probability of 
classifying an object identified as a Red_Tank as a Blue (Friendly) object is zero, which 
is the first entry in the matrix.    
 
Table 4.2  Example EADSIM NCTR Matrix for a Red_Tank Object. 
  To Be Classified As 
 Target Type PB PR PU 
RED_TANK 0.00 0.830 0.00 
MRLS 0.00 0.048 0.00 
INTEL 0.00 0.024 0.00 




NEUTRAL 0.027 0.00 0.00 
 
 
     
     The robustness measures for the ATR CSs were randomly generated.  A random 
percentage value between five and twenty constitutes the degradation that the ATR CS 
encounters when moving from the ideal target profile to an altered one, i.e. from the 
nominal (trained) setting to a different (untrained) setting.  The assumption is also made 
that the Self-assessment capability is not used on these ATR systems.  Finally, the cost 
and employment concept data for each system was based loosely upon the data and 
assumptions used for evaluating the data from the MSTAR program and are listed in 
Table A.3.   
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4.3  Evaluator DA Framework Application 
     The data from Table A.1 is introduced into the evaluator DA framework.  The results 
in Table 4.3 indicate that the preference structure elicited from the evaluator regards ATR 
C as the best ATR of the three.  Table 4.3 provides the rankings for the evaluator.  
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 depict the value and utility scores for the ATR evaluator.  Notice that 
the evaluator’s value scores are given in both ISR and CID mode as well as a total value.  
The total value is merely the average of both the ISR and CID values and will allow 
subsequent comparison to a warfighter value score.   
 









CID 0.5913 (3) 0.5982 (2) 0.6282 (1) 
ISR 0.5798 (3) 0.5994 (2) 0.6238 (1) 
 
Value 
TOTAL 0.5856 (3) 0.5988 (2) 0.6260 (1) 
CID 0.5135 (2) 0.5071 (3) 0.5769 (1) 
ISR 0.4484 (3) 0.4589 (2) 0.5018 (1) 
 
Utility 




Figure 4.7  Evaluator Value Scores. 














































4.4  Warfighter DA Framework Application 
 
 
     To assess the value and utility of the warfighter perspective, the MOPs that strictly 
detail ATR performance, which includes the probabilities of detection, identification, 
classification, and false alarm but excludes costs, risks, and employment concept 
information, is then introduced to EADSIM.  Thus, the MOPs used in EADSIM focus 
solely on the measures that assess actual ATR operational performance.  The combat 
results for four different EADSIM runs are summarized in Table 4.4.  The MOEs are 
introduced into the warfighter DA model.  Thus, the raw MOEs are translated via a value 
function and incorporated into the warfighter DA value hierarchy.  The results listed in 
Table 4.5 indicate that the warfighter would prefer ATR B to the other two alternatives.  
Figure 4.9 illustrates the value and utility attributable to each of the warfighter’s goals.  
Figure 4.10 depicts the amount of value each objective composes of the total value score, 
while Figure 4.11 depicts the actual percentage of value each objective contributes 
compared to the total possible value contributable by each objective.  From Figure 4.10, 
it is evident that operations that impacted the effect on the enemy contributed the most 
value associated with each ATR CS (largest shaded region for each ATR), as would be 
expected with the highest valued objective (Figure 3.12).  To compute the objective 
percentage pictured in Figure 4.11, the value of each objective is divided by the 
appropriate top-level weight of the warfighter value hierarchy pictured in Figure 3.12.  
This graph provides insight into which objective is closest to being perfect in its 
contribution towards the overall value.  In this case, ATR C is the best performer in terms 
of the Minimize Bad Press and Minimize Effect on Allies objectives, while ATR B is the 
 
4-14 
best performer in the Maximizing Effect on Enemy objective.  Since the latter is the 
highest valued objective, it is evident why ATR B scores so highly in terms of value. 
 
Table 4.4  MOE Averages from EADSIM (4 Repetitions). 
MOE ATR A ATR B ATR C 
Pct of Dumb Bombs Remaining 1 1 1 
Pct of WMD Remaining 1 1 1 
Pct of S/S Missiles Remaining 0.3571 0.3929 0.4286 
Pct of A/A & S/A Remaining 1 1 1 
Pct Red Forces Damaged 0.4327 0.5577 0.4327 
Pct of Red Personnel Killed 0.3250 0.3173 0.3615 
Pct Red C2 Damaged 0.3750 0.6250 0.3125 
Length of Battle 18.7500 30.7500 17.2500 
Number of Dead Civilians 1.7500 2.7500 1.2500 
Number of Damaged Neutrals 0.7500 1.0000 0.5000 
# of Fratricide occurrences 3.7500 3.2500 0.0000 
Pct Blue Weapons Remaining 0.9375 0.9375 1 
Pct of Blue Personnel Remaining 0.9375 0.9458 1 
Pct of Blue C2 Remaining 1 1 1 
Pct Remaining Dumb Bombs 0.9846 0.9790 0.9841 
Pct Remaining Precision Bombs 0.9840 0.9775 0.9859 
Pct Remaining CMs 0 0 0 




Table 4.5  Warfighter Value and Utility Scores (Bold indicates highest score). 
 ATR A ATR B ATR C 
Value 0.3988 0.5061 0.4140 




Figure 4.9 Warfighter Value and Utility Scores. 
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Figure 4.11  Warfighter Objective Percentage. 
 
4.5  Analysis of Results 
 
 
     As mentioned in the previous chapter, the two DA frameworks were elicited at 
different times, and thus, constructed in different ways.  The evaluator treats the ISR and 
CID employment profiles as two different branches of the DA model while the warfighter 
makes the two inseparable as they are combined in the combat model execution.  
Therefore, to remedy this situation, the evaluator ISR and CID results are given equal 
weighting and averaged to produce an overall value score, i.e. the Total Value seen in 
Table 4.3 and the graphs that follow.  This assumption is reasonable and permits the 
direct comparison of the value scores between the evaluator and warfighter perspectives. 
     There are several different ways to analyze the results.  Graphically, the values and 
utilities from the two frameworks can be compared side by side, as in Figures 4.12 and 





























Maximize Effect on Enemy 24.74% 39.22% 22.88%
Minimize Bad Press 83.00% 83.16% 97.00%




4.13.  The most important find is that both view the ranking of the three ATR CSs in 
terms of value and utility in a different way.  The evaluator model indicates that ATR C 
is the best performer, while the warfighter model lists ATR B as the best.  The graphs 
also illustrate the notion that the warfighter DA framework views the value scores of the 
ATR CSs less favorably than the evaluator framework, but is closer in agreement to the 
evaluator model in terms of utility.  One argument for ATR A being the best overall ATR 
system is that it had the highest overall AUC measure average (Table A.2).  However, 
neither the warfighter nor the evaluator framework selected ATR A as the best ATR.  
This indicates that the AUC measure, which is highly regarded in selecting the better 
system among the evaluation community, may not be the major factor in determining the 
superior system.   
     An important way to gain insight into the frameworks is to examine the results for 
differences.  Table 4.6 indicates how the frameworks register similarities and differences 
between the ATRs and between the two frameworks.  Notice that the largest discrepancy 
between the two frameworks occurs over the value and utility scores for ATRs C.  When 
viewing the discrepancies between the two models, there are a few aspects to remember.  
First, the evaluator’s model accounts for the system’s employment concept, or ease of 
use.  EADSIM, in this study, ignores the impact of an ATR employment impact.  Also, 
ATR C performs better in terms of robustness when compared to the other systems.  The 
evaluator’s model places value on this trend, while the low resolution of EADSIM 
scenario used to evaluate the systems does not allow incorporation of this performance 
feature into the warfighter model.   
 
4-18 
     As for similarities between the ATR CSs, it is difficult to find any agreement between 
the two frameworks.  The warfighter model indicates that ATRs A and C are the closest 
in value, while the evaluator model indicates that ATRs A and B are the most similar.  
Between the two frameworks, ATR B is the nearest in terms of value and utility to both 
the warfighter and the evaluator.   
     Finally, cost-effectiveness is considered the “ultimate measure of goodness” when 
conducting an analysis of alternatives (24).  Thus, the ATRs are plotted against their 
respective redeployment costs in Figures 4.14 and 4.15.  Plotting an imaginary line 
between the two endpoints for a given framework (ATRs A and C, in this case) provides 
a benchmark for the ATR CSs in-between.  Any point lying below this line does not 
provide a better value to cost ratio, and is, therefore, not cost-effective.  It is clear that 
ATR B, in terms of both value and utility, is not cost effective to the evaluator, but is the 













Figure 4.12  Graphical Comparison of Evaluator and Warfighter Value Scores. 
 














































Table 4.6  Internal and External Differences of DA Frameworks. 
Absolute Differences in Value 
Between ATRs By Model 
A-B A-C B-C 
Evaluator 0.0079 0.0367 0.0287 
Warfighter 0.1023 0.0124 0.0899 
    
Absolute Differences in Value 
Between Models By ATR A B C 
Evaluator-Warfighter 0.2063 0.1119 0.2306 
    
Absolute Differences in Utility 
Between ATRs By Model 
A-B A-C B-C 
Evaluator 0.0021 0.0584 0.0564 
Warfighter 0.1013 0.0050 0.0963 
    
Absolute Differences in Utility 
Between Models By ATR A B C 
Evaluator-Warfighter 0.0900 0.0093 0.1434 
 
Figure 4.14  ATR Value Versus Redeployment Cost. 

























Figure 4.15  ATR Utility Versus Redeployment Cost. 
 
     Thus, given the results, a decision-maker could make a decision using the insights 
provided by the two different DA frameworks.  The results at the very least indicate that 
the two parties are in disagreement over the ranking of the value and utility of the ATR 
CSs.  The warfighter framework indicates that ATR C should be the first ATR CS to 
release from further consideration and that ATR A should be next, unless minimizing 
cost is the main objective of the ATR technology development process.  The evaluator, 
on the other hand, indicates that ATR B is the prime candidate for exclusion from further 
comparison as it is the least cost-effective solution and that ATR C is the best performer.  
As for ATR C, the results from the warfighter model indicate that it is the worst system 
for impacting the enemy in the given scenario, but is the best for protecting friendly and 
neutral targets (Figure 4.11).  Finally, the decision-maker may refuse to make a decision 
because the values of the system fail to meet a given threshold, or because he wishes to 
create a higher resolution scenario for more accurate comparison.  Regardless of the 


























decision, the decision-maker now has insight into what each party values in an ATR 
system and which MOEs and MOPs drive those preferences.  The decision-maker also 
has a tool, based upon evaluator and user preferences, costs, risks, and performance 
characteristics, with which to compare various ATR systems and to justify decisions 











5.1  Overview 
 
 
     The previous chapter details the steps for calculating a single value/utility score from 
both the evaluator and the warfighter perspective, which may then be compared.  
Essentially, we have created a two-pronged DA model.  As seen in Figure 2.27 and 
reproduced here in Figure 5.1, standard practice dictates a need for sensitivity analysis.  
Further, the analysis presented thus far is an expected value analysis in that expected 
values of the MOPs are propagated throughout the two prongs (Figure 5.2) while a 
value/utility score is realized (This value/utility score is not the expected value of the 
value/utility.  This difficulty will be addressed in Chapter VI).  With this in mind, 
sensitivity analysis could be performed using traditional DA tornado diagrams; 
alternatively, a partial differentiation approach is suggested below.  Partial differentiation 
allows the calculation of the individual impact that each MOP has upon the value score at 
a given MOP setting.  Thus, not only could an analyst use the MOP partial differentiation 
results to see how much an MOP is contributing to the value score via the magnitude of 
the partial differentiations, but also in which direction via the sign of the partial 







Figure 5.1  Decision Analysis Process Flowchart (19). 
 
Figure 5.2  Two-Pronged DA Model Approach. 
 
     The problem with direct partial differentiation lies in the fact that the combat model, 
EADSIM, is not differentiable.  There is no way to mathematically represent the internal 
working of this large combat model directly.  However, using linear regression, a 
response surface may be generated that maps the input space (in this case, a given 
collection of MOP inputs) to a response surface (the resultant value scores).  This 
response surface is differentiable.  To facilitate the creation of this response surface, a 
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was adopted for several reasons.  First, the scenario and data used within EADSIM is 
notional.  Thus, the given scenarios, being of an unclassified nature, are of little 
operational interest.  Therefore, there is no overwhelming need to use EADSIM for this 
analysis.  Secondly, EADSIM is a very detailed combat model that offers several 
different controls to many of the aspects of the wargame.  The surrogate, on the other 
hand, provides direct control over only the actions of interest within the combat scenario.  
Finally, the surrogate model requires much less computational time than EADSIM.    
     This chapter is organized as follows.  After sensitivity analysis in the traditional 
decision analysis sense is performed, i.e. expected value tornado diagrams, a surrogate 
combat model is described.  Next, a design of experiments is constructed which allows a 
mapping of MOPs to the MOEs, values, and utilities using the surrogate combat model 
results.  This process produces a meta-model, i.e. a model of the surrogate model.  With 
the meta-model, an ATR evaluator may easily generate expected value/utility rankings 
from a warfighters’ perspective without the use of a combat model and use the 
information when making a decision concerning ATR technology development.  Once 
the meta-model is inserted in place of the surrogate model, partial differentiation is 
performed.  This produces changes in value per unit change in a MOP at a particular 
instantiation of the MOP space, which enables sensitivity analysis.   
 
 
5.2  Tornado Diagrams 
 
 
     Expected value tornado diagrams are typically used to illustrate potential changes to 
the overall value and decision policies as inputs to the DA model, in this case individual 
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MOPs for the evaluator and MOEs for the warfighter, are varied (19).  For example, as an 
MOP is varied away from its original value, the changes in overall value are reflected 
graphically via the tornado diagram, which allows an analyst to evaluate how the decision 
policy changes, i.e. selecting another ATR CS as the best system, by determining the 
most important factors in a decision.  A tornado diagram, as in Figure 5.3, is composed of 
bars that indicate the variation in value, represented along the x-axis, as the variable in 
question is adjusted.  The feature that produces the most variation in expected value for 
the decision generates the longest bar and is always presented at the top of the diagram.  
A tornado-like graphic is produced as subsequent, ranked value variation bars are added 
below the first.  Changes in color along a bar indicate where a decision policy change is 
warranted, e.g. when a selection is no longer optimal.  The vertical line represents the 
original, or base case, value with no variation in the inputs. 
     Tornado diagrams for the evaluator model, shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, indicate that 
varying the value of the inputs along their range of possible values could affect the 
optimal decision policy, noted by the bars that extend to the left of the solid line.  The 
solid line represents the value of the second-best ATR CS in terms of value.  Thus, when 
a change in an input associated with the best ATR CS results in a value score that lies 
below the competing ATR CS’s value score, a decision policy change would be 
warranted.  The diagrams also provide insight into the important inputs to the DA model.  
These could suggest areas that an ATR evaluator should spend more time and money 
during ATR technology development.  Notice that the inputs which impact the value 
score as they are varied correspond to the higher ranked MOPs in terms of total possible 
value attributable (Figure 3.1).  Figure 5.5 offers the results for the warfighter’s 
 
5-5 
perspective.  In this case, the only possible policy decision change would occur if the 
percentage of Enemy C2 systems were to decrease to an unsatisfactory level.  In other 
words, ATR B remains the best alternative in regards to value unless the percentage of 
enemy C2 systems damaged falls too low.  Notice that this input is the highest ranked 
MOE in terms of total possible value (Table 3.5).  Further insight may be gained by 
realizing that the top two inputs involve the Maximizing Effect on Enemy objective, 
which is the most heavily valued objective (Figure 3.12).  Notice that the tornado 
diagrams for the evaluator and warfighter perspectives may not be compared directly as 
the evaluator analyzes the MOP set of inputs while the warfighter examines the set of 
MOE inputs.  A direct comparison of tornado diagrams could be accomplished, in 
concept, by varying the individual MOPs, one at a time, to the minimum and maximum 
of their domain values, introducing the settings to a combat model, recording the change 
in value at each setting, and depicting the ranges in value for each MOP via a tornado 












Figure 5.3  Evaluator Tornado Diagram (ISR). 
 
Figure 5.4  Evaluator Tornado Diagram (CID). 
 




























Base Case Value = 0.6439 (ISR)




























Base Case Value = 0.6525 (CID)
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Figure 5.5  Warfighter Tornado Diagram. 
 
     The major weakness of the tornado diagram approach is that inputs can only be varied 
one at a time.  Therefore, changes in input combinations and their effect on value cannot 
be realized via this method.  For instance, features that may be inherently linked with one 
another, such as the Percentage of Red Forces Damaged and Percentage of Dumb Bombs 
Remaining, may be varied one at a time to realize changes in value, but there exists a 
cause and effect relationship between the two.  The relationship is that inflicting 
casualties and damage requires weapons.  Also, when using this method, it is important to 
vary inputs through realistic values.  For instance, it is unrealistic to vary the Length of 
Battle feature to zero days because, under the assumption that a battle is going to take 
place, the battle will take time.  Thus, while useful, the tornado diagram is not without 
limitations. 
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
Value
Pct Remaining Dumb Bombs
Pct Remaining CMs
Pct Remaining S/A
Pct Remaining Precision Bombs
Pct of Dumb Bombs Remaining
Length of Battle
Pct Blue Weapons Remaining
Pct of Blue C2 Remaining
Number of Damaged Neutrals
Pct of SS Remaining
Pct of Blue Personnel Remaining
Pct of AA Remaining
Pct of W MD Remaining
Pct of Red Personnel Killed
# of Fratricide occurrences
Number of Dead Civilians
Pct Red Forces Damaged




Base Case Value = 0.5061
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5.3 Combat Model Surrogate 
 
 
     A combat model, which closely emulates the performance processes of EADSIM, 
referred to here as the surrogate model, is used for this area of research.  The surrogate 
combat model is in the form of nine Matlab® subroutines (produced in Appendix B): 
EADSIM2, Scenario, ISR, ATO, CID, BDA, Map, Map2, and Stats.  Figure 5.6 depicts 
the subroutine sequence in the execution of the surrogate model.  The EADSIM2 
subroutine takes six arguments and returns combat results.  The user inputs the number of 
air-to-ground forces as well as the number of ground objects found within the battle 
scene: Red_Tanks, MRLS, Intel, Blue_Tanks, and Neutral.  The user also specifies the 
MOPs associated with the ATR being modeled within the scenario.  The confusion 
matrices in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 illustrate the way in which ATR MOPs are 
instantiated within the surrogate model.  Table 5.1 indicates that each object within the 
battle scene has a 90% chance of being detected when the ATR operates under the ISR 
employment setting.  The matrices in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide a probability that an 
object within the image scene, i.e. an MRLS, will be classified as a particular type, i.e. as 
an MRLS or a Red_Tank, for the respective employment setting.  For example, if an 
MRLS system has been detected and the NCTR random number draw is 0.79534, the ISR 
system would declare the MRLS as an Intel Truck, while the CID system would declare 
that the target is indeed an MRLS.  Each row is equivalent to the probability of 
identification matrix used in EADSIM (Table 4.2) except that the probabilities are 
expressed cumulatively.  
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Figure 5.6  Surrogate Model Subroutine Sequence. 
 
Table 5.1  ATR CS PD Matrix in Surrogate Model. 
Employment 
Setting 
Red_Tank MRLS Intel Blue_Tank Neutral 
ISR 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
CID 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
 
Table 5.2  ATR CS PID Matrix in Surrogate Model (ISR, PID-Type = 0.70). 
  Classified As 
   Red_Tank MRLS Intel Blue_Tank Neutral 
Red_Tank 0.70 0.72 0.75 0.95 1.0 
MRLS 0.08 0.78 0.87 0.97 1.0 
Intel 0.03 0.13 0.83 0.88 1.0 




Neutral 0.03 0.12 0.22 0.30 1.0 
 
 
Table 5.3  ATR CS PID Matrix in Surrogate Model (CID, PID-Type = 0.95). 
  Classified As 
   Red_Tank MRLS Intel Blue_Tank Neutral 
Red_Tank 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.99 1.0 
MRLS 0.02 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.0 
Intel 0.01 0.03 0.98 0.98 1.0 














     The EADSIM2 subroutine begins the model execution by initializing the main 
variables and starting the main execution loop.  The Scenario module randomly places 
ground objects in the battle scene and calls of the Map subroutine to display them in the 
first figure.  Next, the ISR module emulates the processes of the ISR platform within the 
EADSIM model.  The ISR platform attempts to detect and classify the ground targets 
within its range according to the matrices that capture its performance level.  The ATO 
module then acts as the ground commander as it translates the targeting information 
generated by the ISR platform into an air tasking order, or strike list.  The strike list is 
then passed to the fighters, which implement a sensor operating under a CID mode.  The 
fighters must classify the potential target at the same identification level as the ISR 
platform in order to launch a weapon against that target.  A target may be destroyed or 
damaged by the air-to-ground fighter.  The Map2 module plots the effects of the air-to-
ground attacks.  The Stats module captures the numerical results of the combat model and 
translates them into MOEs.  The BDA module simply updates a target status matrix.  
 
5.4  Linear Regression  
 
 
     5.4.1  Design of Experiments.   
     Several issues must be answered before constructing the design of experiments for 
mapping the MOPs to both the warfighter’s value scores and MOEs.  First, the amount of 
runs must be manageable.  Next, the confidence intervals surrounding the resultant value 
score estimates should be small enough to realize significant differences between sample 
runs.  In other words, one surrogate model run at a given MOP setting will not offer the 
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required amount of confidence to make judgments against another run.  An acceptable 
confidence interval length must be generated. 
     The large number of MOPs forced the decision to choose a design of experiments that 
used a small fraction of design points.  Rather than evaluating the surrogate model at 
11,534,336 different samples (220), a fractional factorial design allowed the use of 32 
different runs to evaluate the various factors impacting the MOEs and values.  The design 
consisted of 20 separate factors with 15 different design generators (or confounding 
rules) where no main effect is aliased with any other main effect, but is aliased with at 
least a two-factor interaction; that is, a 220-15 fractional factorial design of resolution III 
(48).  The fractional factorial design is listed in Table A.6.    
     To address the sample size issue, random draws were taken from a set of MOP 
estimates, with a standard deviation of 0.05 for each MOP and the following means: PD-
ISR = 0.9, PD-CID = 0.6, PID-ISR= 0.7, and PID-CID = 0.95.  Using the same scenario 
introduced in Chapter IV (15 Red_Tanks, 7 MRLSs, 4 Intel Trucks, 12 Blue_Tanks, 15 
Neutral vehicles, and 5 Blue AG_Attackers), the MOP samples were introduced to the 
surrogate model in run increments of 20 from 20 samples to 400 samples to calculate the 
amount of variance evident between run increments.  This produced 40 different 
observations.  Thus, the value score of the first observation is the average of 20 value 
scores, the second observation is a value score based on the average of 40 value scores, 
and so forth.  Confidence intervals, based upon a confidence level of 95%, surrounding 
the mean value for each of the observations were calculated.  Table 5.4 lists a portion of 




Table 5.4  Surrogate Model Incremental Run Results. 






1 20 0.7151 0.0113 0.0466 
2 40 0.696 0.0105 0.0318 
3 60 0.6951 0.0151 0.0311 
4 80 0.6835 0.0107 0.0227 
5 100 0.6753 0.0147 0.0238 
6 120 0.6858 0.0120 0.0196 
7 140 0.6864 0.0120 0.0181 
8 160 0.6842 0.0120 0.0170 
9 180 0.6735 0.0136 0.0170 
… … … … … 




     Next, the value score differences between each of the 20 observations were calculated, 
resulting in 190 different value score differences.  The confidence interval half-lengths of 
the 20 run increments were then compared against the value score distance lengths.  To 
discern between 90% of the value score difference would require selecting a confidence 
interval half-length of 0.00125 (0.0025 divided by 2), which corresponds to the first bin 
and its associated frequency in Figure 5.7.  Figure 5.8 illustrates the confidence interval 
lengths surrounding each observation as the run number increase.  Thus, according to the 
results, to achieve an acceptable confidence interval half-length would require a large 
number of runs.   
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Figure 5.7  Value Score Difference Histogram. 
Figure 5.8  Confidence Interval Size by Run Number. 
 
























































































     To solve for the required sample size needed to achieve a given value score distance, 
the following heuristic could be implemented (10).  Given n pilot runs (samples) for j 
value score realizations (systems), the half width of the corresponding confidence interval 


























s pooled         (5.2) 
is the pooled standard error of the specified point estimator, n1 and n2 correspond to the 
sample sizes of the jth observations, and t n1+n2-1,(1-α/2) is the 100(1-α/2) percentage point 
of a t distribution with n1+n2-1 degrees of freedom.  Assuming that n = n1 = n2, then the 














sHW .      (5.3) 
Then, the upper and lower values of a confidence interval surrounding the value score 
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where the first term in the equation represents the difference between the respective value 
score means for two different systems.  If LL ≤ 0 ≤ LU is false, then there is a significant 
difference between the value score means of the two systems.  If LL ≤ 0 ≤ LU is true, then 
we define: 
   ),( 21 xxAbsD −=          (5.6) 
or the absolute difference between the value score differences.  Of the various 
differences, we may now define: 













* 2:min)( αα      (5.7) 
where i is the sample size needed to make the expression an equality.  Solving this 
equation provides the sample size necessary to distinguish between all value score 
differences between the j realizations.  These equations work if the sample variances are 
assumed to be equal and the sample sizes are the same, i.e. n1 = n2.  As an example using 
the surrogate model, with a pooled variance of 0.0108 and a t-statistic with α = 0.05 and 
99 degrees of freedom (where n1 = n2 = n = 50), 522 runs would be required to 
distinguish a significant difference between a value score mean difference of 0.0132.   
     However, it may be more beneficial to solve for practically significant confidence 
intervals surrounding the value score difference means rather than statistically significant 
intervals (10).  In other words, the computational time required to derive a difference 
between to value score differences may not be worth the end result.  Therefore, a 
predetermined D, from equation 5.6, should be selected in order to find the proper sample 
size.  Conversely, an acceptable sample size should be selected, and the value score 
difference detectable may be ascertained from Equation 5.7.  This method is implemented 
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for the remainder of this study as n = 300 surrogate model runs were used for all 
appropriate analyses, unless otherwise noted.  
     5.4.2  Model Building.   
     A linear regression model can now be used to capture the relationship between the 
MOPs and both the MOEs and the value/utility scores.  First, a model using only the first 
order terms without interactions is used to find important features (MOPs) that best 
account for the variation found within the outputs (MOEs or value).  The best features 
(effects) are retained and goodness-of-fit tests are performed.  If the model is 
unsatisfactory, linear regression is performed again using interaction terms.  Again, the 
best features are retained and goodness-of-fit tests are performed.  If the interaction 
model is unsatisfactory, then second-order terms are included within the model.  The best 
model of the three models is used to capture the MOP-MOE and MOP-value 
transformation for each output. 
     The following methodology was used to select the effects included in the regression 
models.  First, a backward stepwise model building approach is applied.  With each MOP 
included in the model, effects are systematically dropped out to minimize the value of the 
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) defined as: 
   pnSSEnAIC 2)/ln( +⋅= ,     (5.1) 
where n is the number of observations, p is the number of model parameters including the 
intercept, and SSE is the sum of squared errors. This is a general criterion for choosing 
the best number of parameters to include in a model. The model that has the smallest 
value of AIC is considered the best.  Next, beginning with the AIC-minimum model, 
effects that have a t-ratio in absolute value less than 2.0 are retained to create the t-ratio 
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model.  Thus, with the t-ratio model, we can be certain (with a confidence level of 95%) 
that the weight given to an effect in the model is significantly different from zero (61).   
     Two additional techniques were available should the previous methods provide 
unsatisfactory results.  The Cp model uses Mallow's Cp as a model selection criterion by 
selecting the model where Cp approaches the number of parameters in the model, p.  







=     (5.2) 
where s2 is the MSE for the full model, SSEp is the sum-of-squares error for a model with 
p variables and the intercept, and N is the number of observations (61).  Finally, the 
adjusted R2 value was minimized using the backward stepwise model building approach.  
R2 is the proportion of the variation in the response that can be attributed to terms in the 




SSRR −== 12 .     (5.3) 
The adjusted R2 term, written as Adj-R2 or R2adj, adjusts the R2 term to make it more 
comparable over models with different numbers of parameters by using the degrees of 











−=     (5.4) 
Unlike R2, which always increases as more terms are included in the model, R2adj is useful 
in stepwise model-building procedures as it decreases when unnecessary terms are added 
to the model (61).  Figure 5.9 uses an abstract illustration to describe the concept behind 
mapping the MOPs directly to the MOEs generated via a combat model.  The arrow 
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refers to the transformation process to be modeled via mathematical techniques.  Thus, T, 
which is a transformation matrix produced via the linear regression model building 
process, is a means to estimate the effects of the combat model.  The results of the model 
building methodology are given below in Table 5.5.  The model type column refers to the 
technique used to generate the data within the given row.  Rows in bold typeface indicate 
the model selected for use. 
 

























Adj R2 RMSE AIC 
AIC 9 62.12 0.9466 0.00996 -286 
RAdj 9 62.12 0.9466 0.00996 -286 
Pct of S/S Missiles 
Remaining 
t-Ratio 6 72.06 0.9322 0.01123 -281 
AIC 16 210.77 0.9908 0.00522 -327 
RAdj 16 210.77 0.9908 0.00522 -327 
Pct Red Forces 
Damaged 
t-Ratio 12 200.94 0.9872 0.00616 -316 
AIC 16 210.60 0.9908 0.00453 -336 
RAdj 16 210.60 0.9908 0.00453 -336 
Pct of Red 
Personnel Killed 
t-Ratio 12 200.38 0.9872 0.00535 -325 
AIC 17 62.81 0.9713 0.01087 -280 
RAdj 17 62.81 0.9713 0.01087 -280 
Pct Red C2 
Damaged  
t-Ratio 12 64.88 0.9611 0.01266 -270 
AIC 15 123.47 0.9834 0.19278 -96 
RAdj 15 123.47 0.9834 0.19278 -96 
Length  
of  
Battle t-Ratio 13 124.29 0.9810 0.20615 -91 
AIC 11 9.12 0.7423 0.28008 -72 
RAdj 11 9.12 0.7423 0.28008 -72 
Number of Dead 
Civilians  
t-Ratio 6 12.98 0.6987 0.30282 -70 
AIC 14 7.85 0.7558 0.07446 -156 
RAdj 14 7.85 0.7558 0.07446 -156 
Number of 
Damaged Neutrals 
t-Ratio 6 12.21 0.6844 0.08465 -152 
AIC 12 14.98 0.8440 0.05044 -182 
RAdj 13 14.01 0.8451 0.05026 -182 
# of Fratricide 
occurrences 
t-Ratio 9 17.27 0.8252 0.05339 -180 
AIC 8 14.07 0.7714 0.00426 -342 
RAdj 10 11.77 0.7765 0.00421 -342 
Pct Blue Weapons 
Remaining 
t-Ratio 5 22.86 0.7383 0.00456 -340 
AIC 7 30.96 0.8712 0.00193 -393 
RAdj 7 30.96 0.8712 0.00193 -393 
Pct of Blue 
Personnel Left 
t-Ratio 4 47.21 0.8564 0.00203 -392 
AIC 16 107.79 0.9822 0.00042 -488 
RAdj 16 107.79 0.9822 0.00042 -488 
Pct Remaining 
Dumb Bombs 
t-Ratio 14 117.76 0.9814 0.00043 -486 
AIC 14 89.24 0.9755 0.00049 -477 
RAdj 14 89.24 0.9755 0.00049 -477 
Pct Remaining 
Precision Bombs 
t-Ratio 12 92.54 0.9726 0.00052 -474 
   
 
 
     Using the linear regression results listed in Table 5.5, the MOPs associated with a 
given ATR CS may be used to produce estimates of the surrogate model MOEs.  This is 
accomplished via matrix multiplication: 
       MOE = MOP · T,      (5.5) 
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where MOE is the 1×18 vector of estimated MOE values, MOP is the 1×21 vector of 
ATR CS performance measures (including an intercept term), and T is the 21×18 
transformation matrix composed of columns which contain the linear regression 
parameters associated with the selected models.  These estimates may then be introduced 
to the value functions and weights of the warfighter’s DA model.  Thus, the above value 
score equation could be rewritten as: 



























23)(       (5.6) 
where ValueW is the value score estimate for the warfighter, MOP is a given set of n 
MOPs, the wij are the ith weights associated with the jth branch in the DA framework, gn 
is the nth value functions associated with each MOE and expressed as a polynomial up to 
the third order.  The evaluator’s DA framework may also be regressed, but it uses a 
simpler equation:  


























23)( ,      (5.7) 
as there is no transformation from MOPs to MOEs.  The value score estimate for the 
evaluator is ValueE.  The gm function for the evaluator uses a polynomial expression up to 
the second order. 
      Continuing in the same model building methodology, the MOPs may be used to 
directly estimate the value score for a particular ATR at a given setting and at a given 
scenario.  Figure 5.10 uses an abstract illustration to describe the concept behind mapping 
the MOPs directly to the value score.  This transformation could be represented by: 
       Value = MOP · V,     (5.8) 
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where V is the transformation vector produced by linear regression of the MOP inputs 
(the MOP matrix) versus the surrogate model value scores, and Value is the estimated 
value score.  A Utility estimate is produced similarly, using a different transformation 
vector, U.  Table 5.6 details the results of applying the aforementioned linear regression 
techniques toward creating a model that accurately estimates the value score given the set 
of MOPs.  Table 5.7 accomplishes the same for estimating the utility score with the same 
set of MOPs. 
 
Figure 5.10  Abstract Depiction of the MOP to Value Mapping Concept  











Adj R2 RMSE AIC 
AIC 15 80.27 0.9746 0.00599 -318 
RAdj 15 80.27 0.9746 0.00599 -318 



















Adj R2 RMSE AIC 
AIC 14 104.84 0.9791 0.00564 -322 
RAdj 14 104.84 0.9791 0.00564 -322 
t-Ratio 11 105.98 0.9739 0.00632 -315 
 
 
     For the evaluator, this transformation process does not include a transformation 
through a combat model.  This allowed a larger fractional factorial design to be used.  
The design made use of 128 different observations with 23 factors sampled at two 
different levels. Figure 5.11 abstractly illustrates the transformation vector as it 
transforms the evaluator’s MOP set directly into value.  Table 5.8 details the results of 
the linear regression model building process for the evaluator’s transformation vector.  
The AIC, R2-Adj, and t-Ratio models yielded a model consisting of all 23 factors.  Due to 
confounding effects within model, this is not a preferred solution.  To combat the 
confounding effects, a model, called the 7 Objectives model, that consists of the strongest 
factor from each of the seven objectives (except for the Classification Ability objective, 
from which both MOPs were used as factors as they represented the two most important 




Figure 5.11  Abstract Depiction of the MOP to Value Mapping Concept (Evaluator). 
 







Adj R2 RMSE AIC 
AIC 23 3.1601e+8 1.00 0.000017 -2786 
RAdj 23 3.1601e+8 1.00 0.000017 -2786 
t-Ratio 23 3.1601e+8 1.00 0.000017 -2786 




     5.4.3  Results.   
 
     The transformation matrix, T, provides a mapping of MOPs to MOEs, as depicted in 
Figure 5.9.  Not only does this matrix serve as a method for transforming MOPs 
efficiently into MOEs without the need for a combat model, but it is also serves as a 
method for determining which MOPs are the most important for affecting MOEs.  For 
instance, the transformation matrix, listed in its entirety in Table A.5, indicates that, for 
the Pct Red Forces Damaged MOE, the CID Red_Tank PD (0.542) is the most significant 
factor.  Thus, the most important factor in maximizing the effect on enemy forces is the 








second most important factor is the CID platform’s ability to correctly identify 
Red_Tanks.   
     The direct transformation of MOPs to value and utility using a linear regression 
approach for the warfighter’s perspective yields the transformation vectors found in 
Table A.4.  As expected, the close relationship between the warfighter’s expectation in 
value and utility is reflected in the transformation vector.  Also, the magnitude for each of 
the MOPs is roughly the same for each vector. 
     The linear regression results can be used in the following manner.  Table 5.9 lists the 
value score results for the evaluator’s DA model: via direct MOP insertion into the 
evaluator DA model and via linear regression using the All 23 Factors and 7 Objectives 
models.  While the value magnitudes are different, the rankings are not.  Thus, the 
evaluator could use the linear transformation from MOPs directly to value score as an 
estimate of the DA model.  Table 5.10 lists the value score results for the warfighter’s 
DA model: via introducing the MOP set into the warfighter’s DA model employing both 
EADSIM and the surrogate model, using the linear transformation from MOPs to MOEs, 
and using the linear transformation from MOPs to value.  The warfighter linear 
transformation from MOEs to value results in a different ranking scheme, but retains 
ATR B as the best performer.   
     The weakness in this approach seems to lie in the direct transformation from the 
MOPs to the value score.  There are several possible reasons for the differences between 
the expected and the predicted value scores.  First, the regression performed is linear, 
whereas the value and utility functions of the DA models are typically non-linear.  Next, 
the surrogate model does not perfectly emulate the execution of EADSIM.  Therefore, 
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there will be some differences in the MOEs, which impact the transformation matrix and 
the resultant value scores produced through linear regression.  Finally, the linear 
regression model building process does induce error into the predicted value score as it 
tries to fit the data.  In other words, the predicted value score will always be different 
from the actual value score.  
 





MOP to Evaluator 
Value 
(All 23 Factors Model)
MOP to Evaluator 
Value  
(7 Objectives Model) 
A 0.6116 (3) 0.5556 (3) 0.5632 (3) 
B 0.6195 (2) 0.5668 (2) 0.5825 (2) 













MOP to  
MOE via  
LR (T) 
MOP to 
Value via  
LR (V) 
A 0.3988 (3) 0.6372 (3) 0.6735 (2) 0.6889 (1) 
B 0.5061 (1) 0.6514 (1) 0.6741 (1) 0.6708 (3) 










Figure 5.12  MOP Input Structure for Evaluator and Warfighter Frameworks. 
 
5.5  Partial Differentiation. 
 
 
     One way to gauge the relative importance, or saliency, of an MOP to the resultant 
value or utility is partial differentiation.  The value score from the warfighter’s DA model 
may be computed from the formula: 














































23)( ,   (5.8) 
where MOPn is the nth of N MOPs, the wij are the ith weights associated with the jth 
branch in the DA framework, gn is the nth value functions associated with each MOE and 
expressed as a polynomial up to the third order (19,39).  Utility scores are produced 
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were produced in the linear regression process (Formula 5.5) and take the form of the 
transformation matrix (Table A.5).  The entire transformation is depicted graphically in 
Figure 5.13. 
 
 Figure 5.13  Graphical Depiction of Warfighter MOP to Value Transformation. 
 
     The value formula may be rewritten as: 




























123)( .      (5.9) 
This equation may then be differentiated with respect to each individual MOP.  Applying 
the chain rule here we have: 
































123 ,                (5.10) 





































































∂ .      (5.13) 
The process is simpler for the evaluator MOP to value transformation since there is no 
transformation through a combat model.  Thus, from the evaluator’s perspective, Figure 
5.13 would not include a transformation matrix to account for the combat model nor the 
MOEs. 
     The results for the warfighter, using the data from the application in Chapter IV, are 
given in Table 5.11.  The sample MOP points are given, followed by the evaluated partial 
differentiations for the individual MOPs.  The results indicate that the features that offer 
the most change in regards to increasing the value score are the PD and PID performance 
measures for the CID platform operating against Red_Tanks, MRLSs, and Intel trucks.  
Increasing the CID platform’s PD performance against the MRLS vehicles offers the 
largest decrease in value, while the major increase in value is available through 
increasing the ISR platform’s detection performance against friendly tanks.  The former 
seems to be contradictory in that increasing detection and identification against the 
enemy results in a decreased value.  However, this probably reflects the additional time 
required, the additional expended weapons, and the increased probability of destroying 
friendly and neutral targets as more sorties are performed.  The latter seems to reflect the 
importance placed upon reducing fratricide, also seen in the warfighter tornado diagram 
(Figure 5.5).  It is interesting that increasing the CID platform’s PID performance against 
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Blue_Tanks (though small) results in a negative impact on the value score.  This could be 
due to the fact that most Neutral vehicles are in a close proximity to Blue_Tanks, or that 
correctly detecting a Blue_Tank results in the slight increase in probability of an 
occurrence of fratricide due to the possible misclassification as an enemy vehicle.  
 
Table 5.11  Warfighter Partial Differentiation Vectors at Sample MOP                          
                               Observations. 
 Observed MOPs Partial Differentiations 
MOP A B C A B C 
ISR RED TANK PD 0.900 0.900 0.900 -0.0104 -0.0104 -0.0103 
ISR MRLS PD 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ISR INTEL PD 0.900 0.900 0.900 -0.0730 -0.0749 -0.0758 
ISR BLUE TANK PD 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.1073 0.1083 0.1098 
ISR NEUTRAL PD 0.900 0.900 0.900 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
CID RED TANK PD 0.600 0.600 0.600 -0.1623 -0.1623 -0.1647 
CID MRLS PD 0.600 0.600 0.600 -0.2793 -0.2787 -0.2832 
CID INTEL PD 0.600 0.600 0.600 -0.2155 -0.2189 -0.2216 
CID BLUE TANK PD 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 
CID NEUTRAL PD 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ISR RED TANK PID 0.683 0.743 0.640 -0.0350 -0.0343 -0.0350 
ISR MRLS PID 0.595 0.920 0.590 -0.0088 -0.0063 -0.0069 
ISR INTEL PID 0.423 0.203 0.402 -0.1460 -0.1488 -0.1505 
ISR BLUE TANK PID 0.858 0.900 0.725 -0.0978 -0.0986 -0.0999 
ISR NEUTRAL PID 0.410 0.322 0.482 -0.1257 -0.1267 -0.1284 
CID RED TANK PID 0.878 0.918 0.875 -0.1340 -0.1343 -0.1363 
CID MRLS PID 0.918 0.995 0.989 -0.1828 -0.1821 -0.1851 
CID INTEL PID 0.813 0.665 0.807 -0.1877 -0.1909 -0.1933 
CID BLUE TANK PID 0.995 0.995 0.974 -0.0173 -0.0173 -0.0172 




     The results of differentiation in the evaluator’s framework can be seen in Table 5.12.  
The MOPs used to produce the partial differentiation weights are the same set used in the 
Chapter IV application and can be found in Table A.3.  The results hint at the reason for 
the insensitivity of the evaluator’s framework with the MSTAR data (40).  The values 
indicate that the most significant change would result from a deviation in the self-
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assessment accuracy measures.  However, these values were evaluated at their maximum 
value (as the measures were not available in MSTAR) and could only be decreased.  
Increasing the probabilistic performance measures, such as PID and PCC, will result in an 
increase in the value score, as expected.  One interesting result is that each model 
indicates that increasing the redeployment monetary cost would increase the value score 
at the particular point in MOP space.  Also notice that the partial differentiation values 
are not merely reproductions of the total possible values attributable to each MOP found 
in Table 3.1.  Though the total possible value results do indicate the possible importance 
placed upon an MOP, the values, much like the tornado diagram results, evaluate one 
















Table 5.12  Evaluator Partial Differentiation Vectors at Sample MOP Observations. 
  Partial Differentiations 
  CID ISR CID ISR CID ISR 
Objectives MOPs A A B B C C 
 %∇ PD -0.0027 -0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0026 
Robustness %∇ PID -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0018 
 %∇ PCC -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0019 
Detection FAR|PD -0.0625 -0.0625 -0.0625 -0.0625 -0.0625 -0.0625 
Performance PFA|PD 0.0579 0.0579 0.0579 0.0579 0.0579 0.0579 
Employment 
Concept  -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0300 
Declaration 
Ability PDEC 0.0260 0.0260 0.0260 0.0260 0.0260 0.0260 
Classification PID 0.0008 0.0005 0.0008 0.0006 0.0008 0.0005 
Ability PCC 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 
 Money 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Development Time 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cost Expertise -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0030 
 Risk -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0152 
 Money 0.0244 0.0244 0.0244 0.0244 0.0244 0.0244 
Redeployment Time -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Cost Expertise -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 Risk -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0047 
 Money -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0113 
Use Cost Time -0.0168 -0.0168 -0.0168 -0.0168 -0.0168 -0.0168 
 Expertise -0.0280 -0.0280 -0.0280 -0.0280 -0.0280 -0.0280 
Self- ES-PD -0.0840 -0.0840 -0.0840 -0.0840 -0.0840 -0.0840 
Assessment ES-PID -0.1313 -0.1313 -0.1313 -0.1313 -0.1313 -0.1313 




     These results may be compared to the tornado diagram approach presented in Section 
5.2.  The tornado diagrams for the evaluator DA model (Figures 5.3 and 5.4) indicated 
that only a few of the features offered a significant impact on the overall value when 
varied: six features for the CID setting and three for the ISR setting.  Both settings 
indicated that value was sensitive to the ES-PCC measure, the PFA|PD measure, and the 
Employment Concept rating.  For the CID setting, the three robustness measures showed 
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significant change to the value score when varied.  The partial differentiation approach 
indicate that the features that offer the most change in value (with a partial derivative 
absolute value greater than or equal to 0.300) are the three self-assessment accuracy 
measures, the overall detection measures, and the employment concept rating.  The 
highest rated salient feature using this method was the ES-PCC measure, which is also the 
most salient measure according to the ISR tornado diagram.  Using partial differentiation, 
the second-most salient feature category was the Overall Detection Performance 
objective, which includes the PFA|PD and FAR|PD measures.  The PFA|PD measure was 
ranked first in the CID tornado diagram.  The two approaches do differ in some respects.  
The partial differentiation approach considers all of the features in the self-assessment 
accuracy category as salient while the tornado diagrams make no such indication.  While 
both approaches indicate the direction a feature changes the value, only the tornado 
diagram indicates whether or not the decision policy changes (color changes).  In 
summary, the calculation of the total possible value attributable to each input is an 
excellent way to screen for features that should have a large impact on the overall value 
score.  Tornado diagrams are also useful for determining important features, and they 
indicate when decision policy changes may occur as the input features are varied along 
their respective domains.  Both techniques allow an analyst to rank each input feature by 
its expected impact on the value score.  However, neither of these techniques account for 
any interactive effects between the features.  Determining salient features via partial 
differentiation does offer a means to account for the inherent interactions within the 
inputs.  This technique provides an analyst insight into the expected value score impact 
for a change in feature value while any other feature is also varied.  The fact that the three 
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techniques produce three different views of the features and their influence on the overall 
DA model outputs illustrates that analysts have several different tools for sensitivity 









6.1  Introduction 
 
 
     The direct comparison of value and utility scores, like those calculated in Chapter IV, 
may be misleading because the ATR performance measures that characterize the 
individual ATR CSs are estimates of the true MOPs.  In fact, the MOPs are random 
variables, and standard procedure is to represent them with their respective sample 
means.  Obviously, this approach ignores the inherent uncertainty surrounding the 
parameter estimate.  Chapter V illustrated how slight changes within the MOPs affect the 
overall value score results.  This chapter illustrates how a multinomial selection 
procedure (MSP) may be used not only to account for the variability within the 
estimation of the MOPs, but also to provide a certain level of confidence surrounding the 
comparison of multiple ATR CSs.  By simply using an ordered evaluation measure to 
distinguish between multiple ATR CSs, the MSP allows the selection of a best performer 
and introduces variation within the MOP estimates, which the Chapter IV comparisons 
lacked.  A variation of the MSP introduced in Chapter II is used in this section.   
     This chapter details the steps taken to perform the MSP on the ATR evaluation 
methodology presented.  First, assumptions must be made to allow for the use of the 
MSP.   To begin the process, the input MOPs are treated random variables rather than a 
point estimate.  A random draw from each MOP distribution is taken.  This draw is 
propagated through the surrogate combat model to produce a random sample of the value 
scores.  For example, rather than using a value of 0.6 as the probability of detection 
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against Intel vehicles, the PD is drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 0.6 and 
a given standard deviation.  The resultant value scores are then compared via the MSP.  
The performance data of three notional ATR CSs introduced in Chapter IV provides a 
simple example of the procedure.   
 
 
6.2  Assumptions   
 
 
     To implement the MSP, certain assumptions need to be made concerning the data.  
First, larger is assumed to be better.  Thus, a higher value or utility score is representative 
of a better system.  Secondly, it is assumed that there is a constant probability of success 
over all test trials.  This assumption holds as long as the test trials are at random, and the 
probabilities of success obtained are still estimates of the probabilities of winning in any 
randomly selected trial.  Finally, it is assumed that the trials are independent both across 
and within the systems.  This is a reasonable assumption considering the method by 
which an ATR selects and scores features from an individual region of interest (ROI) 
within a target scene.   
 
 
6.3  MOP Estimation   
 
 
     The MOPs of the ATR CSs are based upon estimates collected during ATR testing.  
For instance, an ATR CS undergoes testing prior to operational use and is proposed to 
operate at a given performance level, e.g. at a PD setting of 0.9, an ATR CS may be said 
to operate at a PID of 0.5.  However, this statistic is based upon randomized test data.  
Thus, both performance measures, in this case, are also random variables.  This 
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uncertainty detracts any confidence in comparisons made between ATR CSs via value 
scores.  To account for this uncertainty, the MOPs used in the MSP are drawn from a 
normal population with a mean of the estimated performance level and predetermined 
standard deviation, i.e. PD~Normal(0.9, 0.05).  The standard deviation value was chosen 
to be small enough to ensure that the performance measures remained reasonably well 
within the employment concept regions depicted in Figure 4.1.  Each of the random 
draws is also bounded at a value of one since the MOPs in question are probabilities.  
Drawing MOP value estimates randomly could reflect sampling error of the MOP 
estimation made during the performance measure assessment of an ATR CS.  
 
 
6.4  Application   
 
 
     A procedure similar to the one described in formulas 2.45 and 2.46 is implemented in 
the following application.  The procedure is described as: 
 
1.  Given n test data points, compare estimated value scores for each of the i  
     classifiers.  
 
2.  Select the best classifier for each data point as the classifier with the maximum  
     estimated value score. 
 
3.  Compute the number of wins/successes Yi for each classifier i. 
 
4.  Let Y[1] ≤ Y[2] ≤ Y[3] be the ranked number of successes from Step 3.  Select  






Thus, the equations used are: 
n
Y











α ,               (6.2) 
where pi is the probability of system i being the best, Z1-α/2 is the test statistic using the 
normal approximation (large sample size; n>30), and (1-α/2) is the desired level of 
confidence.  Equation 6.1 provides the formula for calculating the probability of being 
the best performer via a value score point estimate, and equation 6.2 describes the 
confidence interval generated around the probability of being the best performer, i.e. 
PBEST.   
     Using the assumptions listed above, the MSP may be applied to an ATR CS 
comparison example.  The data used for the application in Chapter IV was used and is 
found in Table A.1.  The PD, PID, PCC, and PFA values found in the table served as the 
means of the normal distribution from which the actual MOP estimates used were taken.  
A standard deviation of 0.05 was selected for each random draw.  The randomized MOPs 
were then input to both the evaluator DA model and the surrogate combat model.  The 
combat model results were then introduced to the warfighter DA model.  Both DA 
models produced the value scores used in the MSP.  An analysis on utility scores could 
be performed similarly, but were not accomplished here.  The results of the MSP using 
the resultant value scores were generated using formulas 2.45 and 2.46 are found in 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2.  
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Table 6.1  MSP Results for Evaluator Framework. 
Test Data Value Score Win/Successes = 1 
Number ATR A ATR B ATR C ATR A ATR B ATR C 
1 0.6043 0.6040 0.6404 0 0 1 
2 0.5995 0.6039 0.6401 0 0 1 
3 0.6007 0.6073 0.6357 0 0 1 
… … … … … … … 
300 0.5983 0.6066 0.6371 0 0 1 
0 0 300  Successes (Yi) = 




Table 6.2  MSP Results for Warfighter Framework. 
Test Data Value Score Win/Successes = 1 
Number ATR A ATR B ATR C ATR A ATR B ATR C 
1 0.7756 0.7575 0.4156 1 0 0 
2 0.6241 0.3852 0.7949 0 0 1 
3 0.7286 0.5950 0.4100 1 0 0 
… … … … … … … 
300 0.5509 0.8334 0.5376 0 1 0 
99 123 78  Successes (Yi) = 




Table 6.3  PBEST Confidence Intervals for Evaluator Framework. 
PBEST ATR A ATR B ATR C 
Upper 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Estimate 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 




Table 6.4  PBEST Confidence Intervals for Warfighter Framework. 
PBEST ATR A ATR B ATR C 
Upper 38.32% 46.57% 30.96% 
Estimate 33.00% 41.00% 26.00% 




6.5  Conclusions  
 
 
     From the MSP results in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, it is clear that the best overall ATR CS 
from each perspective is easy to distinguish for the evaluator.  The procedure provides 
insight into selecting the better system and a methodology for confidence associated with 
selecting a best performer.  In regards to the ATR evaluator’s decision, both ATRs A and 
B can be eliminated from the comparison, ATR C is the only ATR worth considering.  
The number of successes indicates that the overall value is not very sensitive to changes 
made only to the performance areas varied within the evaluator model (PID, PFA, and 
PCC).  This is reasonable in that previous sensitivity analysis performed upon the 
evaluator’s DA model indicated that no one variable, varied up to 10 percent of its 
estimated value, significantly altered the value score enough to change the ATR CS 
selection decision (40).  From the warfighter’s perspective, ATR B seems to be a better 
choice, but cannot be considered the best choice as the lower bound of ATR C’s PBEST 
(35.43%) is lower than the PBEST upper bound of ATR CS A (27.68%).  The conclusions 
from Chapter IV indicated that with the given preference structure, the evaluator would 
prefer ATR C, while the warfighter would prefer ATR B.  The MSP results further 
support these findings, and reflect sensitivity of the value scores to changes within the 
MOP estimates that were not necessarily noticeable with any associated confidence.  
Again, examining Table A.2, it is interesting that the ATR with the largest average AUC 
measure (ATR A) is the only one chosen for elimination by both of the interested parties.  
The results indicate that sensitivity can be very valuable for gaining insight into decision-
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maker preferences, eliminating competitors from comparison, and making decisions with 
an associated level of confidence.    
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7.1  Overview 
 
 
     This dissertation research provides a methodology for improving programmatic 
decision-making within the realm of ATR technology development.  This section 
summarizes the resultant contributions of the research and lists possibilities for future 
research. 
 
7.2  Summary 
 
 
     This dissertation research implemented expanded decision analysis practices to 
provide an evaluation methodology for ATR CS comparison.  The proposed methodology 
models the subjective preferences of both an ATR evaluator decision-maker and the 
eventual product user.  First, the methodology presents a way to synthesize the many 
ATR performance measures into two different scores for value and utility, which 
incorporate the preference structure and risk attitude of the evaluator decision-maker.  
Next, a methodology is presented that translates the performance characteristics of a 
particular ATR CS into measures of effectiveness via a combat model.  These MOEs are 
then introduced to the warfighter decision analysis model, which also produces both a 
value and utility score.   
     While these scores serve as valuable insight to both parties, there are limitations to 
direct comparison techniques.  The value scores provide little insight as to the sensitivity 
of the ATR systems to the MOPs.  Further, these scores ignore the variation inherent 
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within the MOPs of the ATR CSs.  An MSP is introduced to enable selection of the best 
ATR CS in terms of value.  The MSP not only accounts for the variation within the ATR 
performance measures, but also provides a level of confidence with decisions made 
concerning the value scores.  Following the selection of the best alternative, a sensitivity 
analysis approach is described.  The sensitivity analysis described examines the DA 
framework inputs by calculating the total possible value attributable to each input, 
producing tornado diagrams of each input, and calculating salient measures via partial 
differentiation.  Linear regression is used to create a value (utility) response surface to 
enable sensitivity analysis via differentiation.  With these results, evaluators and 
warfighters may determine the value they place on an individual ATR CS and their 
respective performance characteristics, which aids in the decision making process 
throughout the life-cycle of automatic target recognition technology development.  Figure 
7.1 illustrates the decision analysis approach to a problem and how this dissertation 












Figure 7.1  Decision Analysis Approach and Implementation. 
 
 
7.3  Contributions 
 
 
     This section summarizes the contributions resulting from this research. 
     7.3.1  Development of an Overall Methodology for ATR Technology Evaluation.   
     The chief contribution that this research offers is an overall approach to evaluating the 
various technologies being developed under the responsibility of the Sensors Directorate 
of the Air Force Research Laboratory. 
     7.3.2   Development of an Evaluator Decision Analysis Framework.   
     This dissertation presents a methodology for constructing a decision analysis 
framework for use in ATR CS evaluation, particularly for comparison between 
competing CSs.  This framework is the result of joint dissertation research conducted by 
the author and Col William K. Klimack, USA.  The research detailing the evaluator DA 
framework has already resulted in a technical report, and supporting results have been 
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     7.3.3  Development of a Warfighter Decision Analysis Framework.   
     This dissertation introduces a methodology for constructing a decision analysis 
framework from the warfighter’s perspective.  This methodology is important since it has 
been shown that optimizing ATR CS MOPs does not necessarily translate into desirable 
operational results.  The framework allows an ATR evaluator to discern what MOP 
mixture may produce an optimal mixture for operational results.     
     7.3.4  Development of a Methodology for MOP to MOE Translation.   
     This dissertation describes a method of translating MOPs associated with an ATR CS 
into MOEs that capture the operational results when an ATR technology is applied to an 
operational environment.  It is also noteworthy that the combat model used to 
demonstrate this methodology is an USAF-accepted model with an impressive VV&A 
pedigree. 
     7.3.5  Development of a Heuristic for Determining the Number of Simulation  
               Runs Necessary to Gain a Desired Confidence Interval Half-length about a   
               Value/Utility Score Estimate.   
     The process, detailed in Chapter V, offers an analyst a technique for determining an 
acceptable number of runs needed to calculate an acceptable confidence interval width 
for value or utility score estimate comparison. 
 
 
7.4  Recommendations 
 
 
     There are many potential avenues of research branching from this research.  This 




     7.4.1  Sensitivity Analysis on ATR CS Value Across Differing Scenarios.   
     Since the preference structure of the warfighter change as the operational scenario 
changes, i.e. a regional, conventional conflict may have different goals than a global, 
nuclear conflict; it would be advantageous to capture the robustness of given preference 
structures across several operational scenarios.  The results could be used to aid in 
designing an ATR that is best suited for accomplishing missions in multiple 
environments. 
     7.4.2  Creation of a Defined List of MOPs for Current and Future ATR  
               Technologies.   
     One of the difficulties of comparing current ATR technologies is the differing ‘lingo’ 
used by the various organizations producing ATR technologies.  For instance, the 
performance measure labeled PD may mean probability of detection to one researcher, 
but probability of declaration to another.  Creating a single vocabulary for all ATR 
technology developers, evaluators, and users would strengthen the argument for 
incorporating the decision analysis frameworks and simplify the MOP and MOE 
definition process. 
     7.4.3  Include the Effects of Sensor Fusion.   
     The idea of making decisions based upon multiple ATR sensors is not a new one, but 
incorporating the effects of fusing ATR systems (rather than having them compete) could 






Appendix A.  ATR Application Performance Data. 
Table A.1  ATR Performance Data. 
    CID     ISR   
  A B C A B C 
 RED_TANK 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 MRLS 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 
PD INTEL 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 BLUE_TANK 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 NEUTRAL 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 OVERALL 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 TANK 0.949 0.970 0.970 0.897 0.925 0.891 
 MML 0.960 0.970 0.950 0.760 0.780 0.810 
PCC TRUCK 0.984 0.960 0.977 0.911 0.895 0.888 
 OVERALL 0.965 0.966 0.969 0.875 0.884 0.873 
 RED_TANK 0.890 0.960 0.920 0.830 0.840 0.700 
 MRLS 0.960 0.970 0.950 0.760 0.780 0.810 
PID INTEL 0.980 0.910 0.940 0.820 0.700 0.690 
 BLUE_TANK 0.870 0.900 0.940 0.690 0.810 0.790 
 NEUTRAL 0.950 0.920 0.960 0.800 0.850 0.830 
 OVERALL 0.930 0.932 0.942 0.780 0.796 0.764 
 RED_TANK 0.123 0.083 0.125 0.318 0.258 0.360 
 MRLS 0.082 0.005 0.011 0.405 0.080 0.410 
PFID INTEL 0.188 0.336 0.193 0.577 0.797 0.598 
 BLUE_TANK 0.005 0.005 0.026 0.143 0.100 0.275 
 NEUTRAL 0.176 0.286 0.173 0.590 0.678 0.518 
PFA OVERALL 0.115 0.143 0.106 0.406 0.383 0.432 
FAR # per 10000 km2 3 4 2 9 12 6 
 RED_TANK 7.094 18.156 6.271 18.720 15.389 11.895 
% MRLS 16.011 5.931 12.537 19.078 7.500 15.006 
Change INTEL 15.269 5.864 10.113 12.040 8.797 9.593 
PD BLUE_TANK 13.734 7.934 19.195 14.839 7.827 16.787 
 NEUTRAL 12.678 16.757 18.684 11.520 10.684 14.142 
 OVERALL 12.957 10.928 13.360 15.240 10.039 13.484 
 RED_TANK 17.675 9.771 19.323 8.903 11.660 10.549 
% MRLS 7.372 17.239 12.513 19.898 9.742 14.920 
Change INTEL 7.909 17.602 8.574 15.271 11.410 8.831 
PID BLUE_TANK 19.538 10.324 15.709 15.766 17.152 11.035 
 NEUTRAL 7.821 8.759 11.111 11.264 15.374 8.904 
 OVERALL 12.063 12.739 13.446 14.220 13.068 10.848 
 RED_TANK 11.282 9.351 15.253 18.815 15.760 11.453 
% MRLS 13.714 16.499 17.443 10.638 14.775 11.114 
Change INTEL 15.556 8.768 15.876 15.150 18.105 16.372 
PCC BLUE_TANK 18.136 18.833 12.559 14.785 16.350 15.769 
 NEUTRAL 17.917 8.061 8.584 12.397 12.206 8.112 




Table A.2  ATR Binormal ROC Data. 
   CID     ISR  
 TGT Type A B C  TGT Type A B C 
Distance RED_TANK 2.40 3.15 2.56  RED_TANK 1.43 1.65 0.88 
Between MRS 3.15 4.46 3.97  MRS 0.95 2.18 1.11 
Means  INTEL 2.95 1.76 2.43  INTEL 0.73 -0.30 0.28 
(∆m) BLUE_TANK 3.71 3.86 3.51  BLUE_TANK 1.57 2.16 1.40 
 NEUTRAL 2.58 1.97 2.69  NEUTRAL 0.61 0.58 0.90 
          
AUC RED_TANK 0.9552 0.9870 0.9649  RED_TANK 0.8440 0.8783 0.7331 
Measure MRS 0.9870 0.9992 0.9975  MRS 0.7491 0.9384 0.7837 
 INTEL 0.9815 0.8933 0.9571  INTEL 0.6971 0.4160 0.5785 
 BLUE_TANK 0.9956 0.9956 0.9935  BLUE_TANK 0.8665 0.9367 0.8389 
 NEUTRAL 0.9659 0.9182 0.9714  NEUTRAL 0.6669 0.6591 0.7377 
Average  0.9770 0.9587 0.9769   0.7647 0.7657 0.7344 
(Rank)  (1) (3) (2)   (2) (1) (3) 
 


















ISR RED_TANK PD 0 0
ISR MRS PD 0 0
ISR INTEL PD 0 0
ISR BLUE_TANK PD 0.1095 0.1061
ISR NEUTRAL PD 0 0
CID RED_TANK PD -0.1537 -0.1723
CID MRS PD -0.2613 -0.2690
CID INTEL PD -0.1961 -0.1995
CID BLUE_TANK PD 0 0
CID NEUTRAL PD 0 0
ISR RED_TANK PID -0.0508 -0.0638
ISR MRS PID -0.1323 -0.1331
ISR INTEL PID 0 0
ISR BLUE_TANK PID -0.0914 -0.0933
ISR NEUTRAL PID -0.1144 -0.1185
CID RED_TANK PID -0.1218 -0.1367
CID MRS PID -0.1755 -0.1796
CID INTEL PID -0.1723 -0.1741
CID BLUE_TANK PID 0 0
CID NEUTRAL PID 0 0
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Table A.6  Fractional Factorial Design Matrix. 
 
B-1  
Appendix B.  Surrogate Model MATLAB® Subroutines. 
 
SUBROUTINE  ATO 
% author:  Capt Brian Bassham 
% date:    24 Apr 02 
% Revised: 30 Apr 02 
 
j = 1; 
for i = 1:Total_TGTs 
 if TGT_List(i,6) ~= 4 & TGT_List(i,6) ~= 5 & TGT_List(i,5) ~= 0 & 
TGT_List(i,9) < 1.0   %If the TGT is NOT CLASSIFIED as a 
Blue_Tank/Neutral, IS DETECTED and NOT DEAD 
      Strike_List(j,1) = TGT_List(i,6);   % What the ISR thinks it is 
      Strike_List(j,2) = TGT_List(i,1);   % What it actually is 
      Strike_List(j,3) = TGT_List(i,2);   % Its X position 
      Strike_List(j,4) = TGT_List(i,3);   % Its Y position 
      Strike_List(j,5) = TGT_List(i,8);   % Its target number 
      j = j + 1; 
   end 
end 
     
Strike_List = sortrows(Strike_List,1);  
%Sort the list based upon the ISR's classification   







if b == 1 
    for j = 1:N 
        if M(j,8) == a 
            M(j,9) = rand(1) + M(j,9); 
        end 




if b == 2 
    for j = 1:N 
        if M(j,8) == a 
            M(j,9) = 1; 
        end 
    end       
end 
 









% author:  Capt Brian Bassham 
% date:    24 Apr 02 
% Revised: 30 APR 02 
 
Fighter_Size = min(Num_CID,size(Strike_List,1)); 
 
for i = 1:Fighter_Size    
   Fighter(i,1:4)  = Strike_List(i,1:4); 
   Fighter(i,5:7)    = [0   0   0]; 
   Fighter(i,8:9)  = [0.5  0.05]; 
   Fighter(i,10)   = Strike_List(i,5); 
end 
 
%Calculate the Range of the CID platform to the TGT 
%for i = 1:Fighter_Size 




%Start the CID strike loop 
%[1] Determine if the CID radar can detect the TGT 
for i = 1:Fighter_Size 
    rn = rand(1); 
    if rn < PD_CID(Fighter(i,2))        %Determine if the CID platform 
detects the TGT (Use actual ID to determine result) 
        Fighter(i,6) = 1; 
    else 
        Fighter(i,6) = 0; 
    end 
%    if Fighter(i,4) <= 0.25 | TGT_List(i,4) >= 0.95 
%      Fighter(i,5) = 0;        %The detection setting is overwritten 
if out of range 
%   end 
 
%[2] Classify the detected TGT      
    if Fighter(i,6) == 1         
      rn = rand(1); 
      if rn <= PID_CID(Fighter(i,2),1)          %Base result upon 
actual ID 
         Fighter(i,7) = 1; 
      elseif rn <= PID_CID(Fighter(i,2),2) 
         Fighter(i,7) = 2; 
      elseif rn <= PID_CID(Fighter(i,2),3) 
         Fighter(i,7) = 3; 
      elseif rn <= PID_CID(Fighter(i,2),4) 
         Fighter(i,7) = 4; 
      else 
         Fighter(i,7) = 5; 
      end 
    end 
     
    %[3] Attempt to destroy TGT, if the CID and ISR classifications 
agree 
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    if Fighter(i,7) == Fighter(i,1)  
        %Determine if the bomb is a dumb bomb or precision-guided 
munition 
        rn3 = rand(1); 
        if rn3 < 0.5 
           Damage_Distance = Dumb_Damage_Distance; 
           Dumb_Bombs = Dumb_Bombs + 1; 
        else 
          Damage_Distance = Precision_Damage_Distance; 
           Precision_Bombs = Precision_Bombs + 1; 
        end 
        % The CID platform fires 
      rn = rand(1); 
        Weapons_Expended = Weapons_Expended + 1;                    
        %Incidental Damage Loop 
        for h=1:Total_TGTs 
            if (TGT_List(h,2) > (Fighter(i,3)- Damage_Distance)) & 
(TGT_List(h,2) < (Fighter(i,3)+ Damage_Distance))      %if TGT is in X-
range               
                if (TGT_List(h,3) > (Fighter(i,4)- Damage_Distance)) & 
(TGT_List(h,3) < (Fighter(i,4)+ Damage_Distance))      %if TGT is in Y-
range 
                    if TGT_List(h,9) < 1.0                                             
%if TGT is alive 
                        if  TGT_List(h,8) ~= Fighter(i,10)                             
%if TGT is not original TGT 
                            TGT_List(h,9) = rand(1); 
                        end 
                    end                                     
                end                         
            end                 
        end  
                
        if rn < Damage     
          if Fighter(i,2) < Friendly_Level 
              Hostiles_Damaged = Hostiles_Damaged + 1; 
              TGT_List = BDA(Fighter(i,10),1,Total_TGTs,TGT_List); 
          elseif Fighter(i,2) > Friendly_Level 
              Neutrals_Damaged = Neutrals_Damaged + 1; 
              TGT_List = BDA(Fighter(i,10),2,Total_TGTs,TGT_List); 
          else 
              Allies_Damaged = Allies_Damaged + 1; 
              TGT_List = BDA(Fighter(i,10),1,Total_TGTs,TGT_List); 
          end 
           
        elseif rn < Kill 
          if Fighter(i,2) < Friendly_Level 
              Hostiles_Killed = Hostiles_Killed + 1; 
              TGT_List = BDA(Fighter(i,10),2,Total_TGTs,TGT_List); 
          elseif Fighter(i,2) > Friendly_Level 
              Neutrals_Killed = Neutrals_Killed + 1; 
              TGT_List = BDA(Fighter(i,10),2,Total_TGTs,TGT_List); 
          else 
              Frat = Frat + 1; 
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              TGT_List = BDA(Fighter(i,10),2,Total_TGTs,TGT_List);  
          end 
        
        else 
          Weapon_Miss = Weapon_Miss + 1;           
        end 
    end 
end 
                 
 
SUBROUTINE EADSIM2 
function [Value,MOEsM,MOPs]=  EADSIM2(A,B,C,D,E,F) 
% EADSIM2 is a set of Matlab subroutines designed to mimic the effects 
of ATR technology in an  
% operational environment as executed in the EADSIM combat model.  This 
model is created for 
% support of Capt Bassham's dissertation research on a new ATR CS 
evaluation methodology. 
% author:  Capt Brian Bassham 
% date:    24 Apr 02 
% Revised: 16 May 02  
 
clear TGT_List;clear Strike_List;clear Fighter;clear Damaged_TGTs 
 
%MOPs of the ATR in Question 
%Probabilities of Detection 
PD_ISR   = [0.92  0.92 0.92  0.92     0.92]; 
PD_CID      = [0.65     0.65  0.65  0.65     0.65]; 
 
%Probabilities of Identification/Misidentification 
%Based upon: [1] Red_Tank [2] MSR [3] Intel [4] Blue_Tank [5] Neutral 
Object 
%PID for ISR must be > 0.7 
%PID for CID must be > 0.95 
PID_ISR   = [  0.80 0.82 0.87 0.97     1.0;    
        0.03 0.83 0.87 0.92     1.0;                  
        0.04 0.09 0.89 0.92     1.0;     
        0.12 0.13 0.15 0.95     1.0;     
              0.03 0.05 0.15 0.20     1.0];                
PID_CID     = [  0.92 0.93 0.95 0.99     1.0;    
              0.02 0.94 0.97 0.99     1.0;     
              0.01 0.02 0.94 0.96     1.0;     
        0.05 0.06 0.07 0.99     1.0;     
                    0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08     1.0];  
 
PD_ISRM = [mean(PD_ISR(1:3)) PD_ISR(4) PD_ISR(5)]; 
PD_CIDM = [mean(PD_CID(1:3)) PD_CID(4) PD_CID(5)]; 
PID_ISRM = [mean([PID_ISR(1,1) PID_ISR(2,2)-PID_ISR(2,1) PID_ISR(3,3)-
PID_ISR(3,2)])  PID_ISR(4,4)-PID_ISR(4,3)  PID_ISR(5,5)-PID_ISR(5,4)]; 
PID_CIDM = [mean([PID_CID(1,1) PID_CID(2,2)-PID_CID(2,1) PID_CID(3,3)-
PID_CID(3,2)])  PID_CID(4,4)-PID_CID(4,3)  PID_CID(5,5)-PID_CID(5,4)];                  
MOPs = [PD_ISRM PID_ISRM PD_CIDM PID_CIDM]';    
 
%False Alarm Rate 




%Combat Model Outcome Percentages 
Kill      = 0.75;         %Friend's ability to strike a TGT 
Damage         = 0.23;         %Friend's ability to damage a TGT 
Dumb_Damage_Distance = 0.035;     %TGTs within a certain radius of dumb 
bombs are damaged 
Precision_Damage_Distance = 0.015;     %TGTs within a certain radius of 
precision bombs are damaged 
Dumb_Bombs = 0; 
Precision_Bombs = 0; 
 
%Force Initialization (Based upon User inputs): 
http://www.army.mil/CMH-PG/books/www/Wwindx.htm 
Num_Red_Tank = A;   %Assume crew of 5   50 mph    >3000 m    
 [T-72] 
Num_MRS   = B;            %Assume crew of 5   46 mph   >20,380 m  
 (40) [BM-21] 
Num_Intel  = C;   %Assume crew of 5   65 mph        
 [Hummer or M1974] 
Num_Blue_Tank = D;   %Assume crew of 4   41 mph    >3000 m    
 [M1A1] 
Num_Neutral    = E;       %Assume crew of 2   50 mph 
Total_TGTs    = Num_Red_Tank + Num_MRS + Num_Intel + Num_Blue_Tank + 
Num_Neutral; 
Red_Forces     = A + B; 
Red_C2   = C; 
Red_Total  = Red_Forces + Red_C2; 
Num_CID    = F;       %The number of Allied fighters available for 
vectoring 
Friendly_Level = 4;  %The number at which TGTs not to be attacked begin 
(Blue_Tanks & Neutrals are not to be hit) 
 
%MOE Initialization 
Frat              = 0; 
Allies_Damaged    = 0; 
Hostiles_Killed   = 0; 
Hostiles_Damaged  = 0; 
Neutrals_Damaged  = 0; 
Neutrals_Killed   = 0; 
Weapons_Expended = 0; 
Weapon_Miss   = 0; 
Red_Tank_Damaged    = 0; 
Red_Tank_Dead       = 0; 
MRS_Damaged = 0; 
MRS_Dead = 0; 
Intel_Damaged = 0; 
Intel_Dead = 0; 
Blue_Tank_Damaged = 0; 
Blue_Tank_Dead = 0; 
Neutral_Damaged = 0; 
Neutral_Dead = 0; 
 
 
%Create the target list  
%The nine columns are: 
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%[TGT_Type      X Position Y Position Range_to_ISR Detected?
 ID_Type?  Last_ID_Type       TGT #       Dead/Damaged ]  
TGT_List = zeros(Total_TGTs,9); 
 
%Create the Air Tasking Order (ATO)   
%The five columns are: 
%[ID_Type  Actual_Type  X Position  Y Position TGT #]  
Strike_List = zeros(1,5); 
 
%Create the Fighter's target list  
%The 10 columns are: 
%[Classified_Type  Actual_Type  TGT_X_Position  TGT_Y_Position   
Range_to_CID Detected?   Classified As X_Pos_Fighter Y_Pos_Fighter   
TGT #]   
Fighter = zeros(Num_CID,10); 
 
% Begin Combat Model Execution 
Scenario  %Places objects in the scene and generates a starting map 
 
Loops = 10; 
 
%while ((Red_Tank_Damaged + Red_Tank_Dead + MRS_Damaged + MRS_Dead + 
Intel_Damaged + Intel_Dead)/Red_Total) < 1.0 
for l=1:Loops 
%   ((Red_Tank_Damaged + Red_Tank_Dead + MRS_Damaged + MRS_Dead + 
Intel_Damaged + Intel_Dead)/Red_Total)  
   ISR   %Simulates the ISR platform detecting/classifying 
targets & calls ATO (Strike List generation) & CID (Vectors fighters) 
modules 
   Stats 








% author:  Capt Brian Bassham 
% date:    24 Apr 02 
% Revised: 01 May 02 
 
% This initializes the band width of the ISR platform's (SAR) 
visibility 
% The band will stretch across the entire map but will be limited to 
the  
% Y-boundaries between 0.25 and 0.8.  Thus, targets above and below 
this band will 
% not be detected unless they move into it or the ISR platform moves 
closer to/further away. 
 
%Run through each TGT to see if it can be detected and Classified 
%Update the TGT List 
for i = 1:size(TGT_List,1)    
   %Calculate Range to ISR Platform 
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   TGT_List(i,4) = sqrt((TGT_List(i,2)-XPos_Blue_ISR)^2+(TGT_List(i,3)-
YPos_Blue_ISR)^2); 
   %The Last ID Type is set as the previously detected ID 
   TGT_List(i,7) = TGT_List(i,6); 
   % Can the TGT be detected?  Based upon the PD value of the ISR 
sensor 
   rn = rand(1); 
   if rn <= PD_ISR(TGT_List(i,1))  
      TGT_List(i,5) = 1;    
   else 
      TGT_List(i,5) = 0; 
      TGT_List(i,6) = 0;  %If not detected this turn then the 
Classified ID is set back to nothing 
   end    
   % The TGT cannot be detected if outside of the range of the ISR 
Platform (overwrites previous result) 
   if TGT_List(i,4) <= 0.0 | TGT_List(i,4) >= 1.95 
      TGT_List(i,5) = 0;        %The detection setting is overwritten 
if out of range 
   end 
   % Identify TGT as...based upon PID value of the ISR sensor 
   if TGT_List(i,5)==1      %If the TGT was detected 
      rn = rand(1); 
      if rn <= PID_ISR(TGT_List(i,1),1) 
         TGT_List(i,6) = 1; 
      elseif rn <= PID_ISR(TGT_List(i,1),2) 
         TGT_List(i,6) = 2; 
      elseif rn <= PID_ISR(TGT_List(i,1),3) 
         TGT_List(i,6) = 3; 
      elseif rn <= PID_ISR(TGT_List(i,1),4) 
         TGT_List(i,6) = 4; 
      else 
         TGT_List(i,6) = 5; 
      end 
   end 
   %Assign a TGT Number 
   TGT_List(i,8) = i; 
end 
 
TGT_List = sortrows(TGT_List,4);   %Randomize the entries so that 
the Red_Tanks are not always chosen first. 
 
ATO  %Calls the subroutine that generates the ATO 
CID  %Calls the subroutine that allows the Fighters to strike their 
TGTs 
 
%Change the ISR Platform's position 




% The map is assumed to be a unit square with (0,0) being the lower 
left corner 
% author:  Capt Brian Bassham 
% date:    25 Apr 02 
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% Revised:  
 




















% The map is assumed to be a unit square with (0,0) being the lower 
left corner 
% author:  Capt Brian Bassham 
% date:    25 Apr 02 































% This subroutine positions the objects within the scenario 
% The map is assumed to be a unit square with (0,0) being the lower 
left corner 
% author:  Capt Brian Bassham 
% date:    24 Apr 02 
% Revised: 25 Apr 02 
 
%Variables for ease of programming 
Level_1 = Num_Red_Tank; 
Level_2 = Num_Red_Tank + Num_MRS; 
Level_3 = Num_Red_Tank + Num_MRS + Num_Intel; 
Level_4 = Num_Red_Tank + Num_MRS + Num_Intel + Num_Blue_Tank; 
Level_5 = Num_Red_Tank + Num_MRS + Num_Intel + Num_Blue_Tank + 
Num_Neutral; 
 
%This places Red_Tanks in a box with X boundaries at 0.2-0.8 & Y 
boundaries between 0.5 & 0.7  
for i = 1: Level_1 
   TGT_List(i,1) = 1; 
   TGT_List(i,2) = (0.2+0.8*rand(1)); 
   TGT_List(i,3) = (0.5+0.2*rand(1)); 
end 
%This places MRSs in a box with X boundaries at 0.4-0.9 & Y boundaries 
between 0.5 & 0.75 
for i = Level_1 + 1:Level_2 
   TGT_List(i,1) = 2; 
   TGT_List(i,2) = (0.4+0.5*rand(1)); 
   TGT_List(i,3) = (0.5+0.25*rand(1)); 
end 
%This places Intel Trucks in a box with X boundaries at 0.5-0.95 & Y 
boundaries between 0.65 & 0.9 
for i = Level_2 + 1:Level_3 
   TGT_List(i,1) = 3;    
   TGT_List(i,2) = (0.5+0.45*rand(1)); 
   TGT_List(i,3) = (0.65+0.25*rand(1)); 
end 
%This places Blue_Tanks in a box with X boundaries at 0.2-0.8 & Y 
boundaries between 0.2 & 0.6 
for i = Level_3 + 1:Level_4 
   TGT_List(i,1) = 4;    
   TGT_List(i,2) = (0.2+0.6*rand(1)); 
   TGT_List(i,3) = (0.2+0.4*rand(1)); 
end 
%This places Neutral Objects in a box with X boundaries at 0.3-0.9 & Y 
boundaries between 0.3 & 0.8 
for i = Level_4+ 1:Level_5 
   TGT_List(i,1) = 5;    
   TGT_List(i,2) = (0.3+0.6*rand(1)); 
   TGT_List(i,3) = (0.3+0.5*rand(1)); 
end 
 
%This places the Blue_Airfield at the following X-Y Coordinates 
XPos_Blue_Airfield = 0.5; 




%This places the Blue_ISR at the following X-Y Coordinates 
XPos_Blue_ISR = (0.2+0.6*rand(1)); 






% author:  Capt Brian Bassham 
% date:    25 Apr 02 
% Revised: 14 May 02 
 
Weapon_Info = [Weapons_Expended  Weapon_Miss]; 
 
FEN_Damaged_Killed = [Allies_Damaged  Frat  Hostiles_Damaged   





for k = 1:Total_TGTs 
   if TGT_List(k,9) > 0.0 
      Damaged_TGTs(j,:) = TGT_List(k,:); 
      j = j+1; 




Incidental_Allied_Damage  = 0; 
Incidental_Allied_Kill   = 0; 
Incidental_Hostile_Damage  = 0; 
Incidental_Hostile_Kill  = 0; 
Incidental_Neutral_Damage  = 0; 
Incidental_Neutral_Kill  = 0; 
Red_Tank_Damaged    = 0; 
Red_Tank_Dead       = 0; 
MRS_Damaged = 0; 
MRS_Dead = 0; 
Intel_Damaged = 0; 
Intel_Dead = 0; 
Blue_Tank_Damaged = 0; 
Blue_Tank_Dead = 0; 
Neutral_Damaged = 0; 
Neutral_Dead = 0; 
 
%The loop which calculates proximity kills/hits 
for k=1:j-1 
   if Damaged_TGTs(k,1) < Friendly_Level & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) < 1.0 
      Incidental_Hostile_Damage = Incidental_Hostile_Damage + 1; 
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) < Friendly_Level & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) >= 1.0 
      Incidental_Hostile_Kill = Incidental_Hostile_Kill + 1; 
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == Friendly_Level & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) < 1.0 
      Incidental_Allied_Damage = Incidental_Allied_Damage + 1; 
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   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == Friendly_Level & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) >= 
1.0 
      Incidental_Allied_Kill = Incidental_Allied_Kill + 1; 
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) > Friendly_Level & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) < 1.0 
      Incidental_Neutral_Damage = Incidental_Neutral_Damage + 1; 
   else 
      Incidental_Neutral_Damage = Incidental_Neutral_Damage + 1; 
   end 
end 
 
%The loop which calculates the  
for k=1:j-1 
   if Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == 1 & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) < 1.0 
      Red_Tank_Damaged = Red_Tank_Damaged + 1; 
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == 1 & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) >= 1.0 
      Red_Tank_Dead = Red_Tank_Dead + 1;       
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == 2 & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) < 1.0 
      MRS_Damaged = MRS_Damaged + 1; 
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == 2 & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) >= 1.0 
      MRS_Dead = MRS_Dead + 1;       
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == 3 & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) < 1.0 
      Intel_Damaged = Intel_Damaged + 1; 
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == 3 & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) >= 1.0 
      Intel_Dead = Intel_Dead + 1; 
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == 4 & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) < 1.0 
      Blue_Tank_Damaged = Blue_Tank_Damaged + 1; 
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == 4 & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) >= 1.0 
      Blue_Tank_Dead = Blue_Tank_Dead + 1;    
   elseif Damaged_TGTs(k,1) == 5 & Damaged_TGTs(k,9) < 1.0 
      Neutral_Damaged = Neutral_Damaged + 1; 
   else 
      Neutral_Dead = Neutral_Dead + 1; 
   end 
end 
Incidental = [Incidental_Allied_Damage  Incidental_Allied_Kill  
Incidental_Hostile_Damage Incidental_Hostile_Kill 
Incidental_Neutral_Damage Incidental_Neutral_Kill]; 
Total_Damage = [Red_Tank_Damaged  Red_Tank_Dead  MRS_Damaged  MRS_Dead  
Intel_Damaged  Intel_Dead  Blue_Tank_Damaged  Blue_Tank_Dead  
Neutral_Damaged  Neutral_Dead]; 
 
% [1]  Pct Remaining Dumb Bombs       [2]  Pct Remaining WMD          
[3]  Pct Remaining CMs & S/S         [4]  Pct Remaining A/A & S/A 
% [5]  Pct Red Systems Damaged       [6]  Pct Red Personnel Destroyed   
[7]  Pct Red C2 Destoyed            [8]  Empty  
% [9]  Length of Battle               [10] # of Dead Civilians           
[11] # of Neutral Objects Destroyed  [12] # of Fratricide occurrences 
% [13] Pct Blue Systems Remaining     [14] Pct Blue Personnel Remaining  
[15] Pct Blue C2 Remaining           [16] Empty 
% [17]  Pct Remaining Dumb Bombs      [18] Pct Remaining Precision 
Bombs [19] Pct Remaining CMs & S/S         [20] Pct Remaining A/A & S/A 
 
MOEs = [ 0 0 1-(MRS_Dead/B) 0; 
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   (Red_Tank_Damaged+Red_Tank_Dead+MRS_Damaged+MRS_Dead)/Red_Forces 
(5*(Red_Tank_Dead+MRS_Dead+Intel_Dead))/(5*Red_Total)  (Intel_Damaged + 
Intel_Dead)/Red_C2   0; 
   Loops     Neutral_Damaged+Neutral_Dead*(round(rand(1)+1))   
Neutral_Damaged+Neutral_Dead  Frat; 
   1-((Blue_Tank_Damaged+Blue_Tank_Dead)/D)  ((Num_Blue_Tank*5)-
(Blue_Tank_Dead*5))/(Num_Blue_Tank*5)   0 0;   
   1-(Dumb_Bombs/(Loops*Num_CID*0.5))   1-
(Precision_Bombs/(Loops*Num_CID*0.5)) 0 0]; 
 
MOEsM = [0 0 1-(MRS_Dead/B) 0 
(Red_Tank_Damaged+Red_Tank_Dead+MRS_Damaged+MRS_Dead)/Red_Forces 
(5*(Red_Tank_Dead+MRS_Dead+Intel_Dead))/(5*Red_Total)  (Intel_Damaged + 
Intel_Dead)/Red_C2 Loops     Neutral_Damaged+Neutral_Dead*2   
Neutral_Damaged+Neutral_Dead  Frat 1-
((Blue_Tank_Damaged+Blue_Tank_Dead)/D)  ((Num_Blue_Tank*5)-
(Blue_Tank_Dead*5))/(Num_Blue_Tank*5)   0 1-
(Dumb_Bombs/(Loops*Num_CID*0.5))   1-
(Precision_Bombs/(Loops*Num_CID*0.5)) 0 0]'; 
 
% [1]  Pct Remaining Dumb Bombs   [2]  Pct Remaining Precision Bombs     
[3]  Pct of Weapons Expended           [4]  Pct of Expended Weapons 
that Miss 
% [5]  Number of Damaged Neutrals [6]  Number of Dead Neutrals           
[7]  Estimate of Dead Civilians        [8]  Length of Battle  
% [9]  Pct Blue Weapons Remaining [10] Number of Damaged/Dead Blue Wpns  
[11] Pct of Blue Personnel Remaining   [12] # of Fratricide occurrences 
% [13] Pct Red Forces Damaged     [14] Pct Red C2 Damaged                
[15] Pct of S/S Missiles Remaining     [16] Pct of Red Personnel Killed 
 
%MOEs = [1-(Dumb_Bombs/(Loops*Num_CID*0.5)) 1-
(Precision_Bombs/(Loops*Num_CID*0.5))    
Weapons_Expended/(Loops*Num_CID)    Weapon_Miss/Weapons_Expended; 
%        Neutral_Damaged    Neutral_Dead     
Neutral_Damaged+Neutral_Dead*2    Loops; 
%        1-((Blue_Tank_Damaged+Blue_Tank_Dead)/D) 
 Blue_Tank_Dead+Blue_Tank_Damaged   ((Num_Blue_Tank*5)-
(Blue_Tank_Dead*5))/(Num_Blue_Tank*5)   Frat; 
%        
(Red_Tank_Damaged+Red_Tank_Dead+MRS_Damaged+MRS_Dead)/Red_Forces     





Appendix C.  Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations. 
2AFC  two-alternative, forced-choice 
ACC Air Combat Command 
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 
AGRI Air-to-Ground Radar Imaging 
ATO Air Tasking Order 
ATR Automatic Target Recognition 
AUC area under the curve 
AVC All Vector Comparison 
BDA Battle Damage Assessment 
BEM Bechhofer, Elmaghraby, and Morse 
CA classification accuracy 
CI confidence interval 
CID Combat Identification 
COMPASE Comprehensive ATR Scientific Evaluation 
CS Classification System 
DA Decision Analysis 
DOE design of experiments 
EADSIM  Extended Air Defense Simulation 
EUROC Expected Utility Receiver Operating Characteristic 
FEN friend/enemy/neutral 
FN false negative 
FP false positive 
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FROC Frequency Receiver Operating Characteristic 
GUI graphical user interface 
IFF  Identification Friend or Foe 
ISR Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance 
K-S Komolgorov-Smirnov 
LGP Linear Goal Program/Programming 
LROC Localization Receiver Operating Characteristic 
MBT Main Battle Tank 
MOE Measure of Effectiveness 
MOP Measure of Performance 
MRLS Mobile Rocket Launcher System  
MSP Multinominal Selection Procedure, Multinomial Selection Problem 
MSTAR Moving and Stationary Target Acquisition and Recognition 
NCTI Non-cooperative Target Identification 
NCTR Non-cooperative Target Recognition 
N-N binormal 
PDF probability distribution function 
RAC Response Analysis Characteristic 
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic 
ROI region of interest 
SAR synthetic aperture radar 




TN true negative 
TP true positive 
USAF United States Air Force 
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